Amaral v. United Benefit Life Insurance
Amaral v. United Benefit Life Insurance
Opinion of the Court
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff in an action brought by her to recover the value of a life insurance policy issued by appellant upon the life of plaintiff’s deceased husband, August P. Amaral. The policy was issued in May, 1942, without medical examination, upon the solicitation of a salesman employed by an agency. It is conceded that all premiums due thereon were paid up to the time of the death of Amaral in October, 1942. Defendant refused payment to plaintiff, the beneficiary, alleging in its answer to plaintiff’s complaint that the policy had been issued in reliance upon answers to questions set forth in the written application which Amaral made, and that in said application Amaral concealed from defendant and misrepresented material facts, particularly in that he represented that he was sound mentally and physically; that he had never had “Kidney Disease”; that he had not had any local or constitutional disease within five years, and that he was then in good health. It was further alleged on information and belief that Amaral’s answers were false, fraudulent and un
The cause was tried by the court sitting without a jury, and at the conclusion of the hearing findings of fact were filed in which the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint were found to be true and it was specifically found that the foregoing allegations of the answer were untrue.
Appellant here contends that the findings are without support in the evidence, particularly the finding that it was not true that at the time of the making of the application Amaral was in poor health and suffering from disease, or that such fact was known to Amaral, and the finding that it was not true that at said time he had suffered from chronic nephritis or that said fact, was known to him. Appellant asserts that proof offered by it of the existence of kidney disease in Amaral “was clear and uncontradicted and that there was no evidence adduced from which the trial court was justified in finding to the contrary.”
This contention calls for a reiteration of the well established rule that where, on appeal, it is contended that findings of a trial court are not sustained by the evidence, the duty of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is in the record any substantial evidence—whether contradicted or uncontradicted—which, taken in its most favorable aspect together with reasonable inferences therefrom, is sufficient to support the judgment; and that when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court. (Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co., 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [45 P.2d 183]; Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221, 223-224 [143 P.2d 689].)
Appellant relies upon the testimony of one Dr. Bulman, whose testimony, briefly stated, was that Amaral had consulted him in August, 1935, for “nerves”; that the patient was then about 25 years of age; that he examined him and concluded that he had “a grade two albumin area, he was a medio type of hypertension,” and that his blood pressure was “one hundred fifty systolic and ninety diastolic”; that from his past history he made a diagnosis of “chronic nephritis with parenchymatous.” That the substance of the history given him by Amaral was that as a boy of eight years ‘ ‘he was
In his final report made after the patient’s death this doctor stated that he had treated the patient for “Uraemia and chronic interstitial nephritis.” Another time he said that Amaral had “glomerulitis nephritis.”
As opposed to the testimony of Dr. Bulman, plaintiff called Dr. Makaroff who testified that about 5 per cent of healthy young people show the presence of albumin in the urine, without having any disease of the kidneys. Regarding
Plaintiff, in addition to the testimony of Dr. Makaroff, called two witnesses who testified that they had known Amaral for twenty years or more, and had worked with him; that Amaral worked at hard manual labor, never missed work on account of his health, never complained, and was “the picture of health.”
Mrs. Amaral testified that she married Amaral in April, 1935, and had known him then for two years; that during her marriage Amaral never stayed at home from work because of illness, never complained and never mentioned that he had kidney trouble; that he looked “nice and strong”;
From the foregoing we are satisfied that the trial court’s findings, of which appellant complains, cannot be said to be without substantial support in the evidence. The credibility of Dr. Bulman, and the reliability of his various diagnoses were matters for the determination of the trial court, as was the question whether Amaral, even if he had kidney disease, knew of the fact.
In the recent case of Lavender v. Kurn, - U.S. - [-S.Ct.-, 90 L.Ed.-,-,-], the court said:
“Whenever facts are in dispute or the evidence is such that fair-minded men may draw different inferences, a measure of speculation and conjecture is required on the part of those whose duty it is to settle the dispute by choosing what seems to them to be the most reasonable inference. Only when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached does a reversible error appear. But where, as here, there is an evidentiary basis for the jury’s verdict, the jury is free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion. And the appellate court’s function is exhausted when that evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being immaterial that the court might draw a contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more reasonable.”
The functions of the trial court in the case before us were the same as those of the jury in the case last cited. That court was not compelled to accept the testimony of Dr. Bulman in toio, but may well have concluded that his prescience regarding Amaral’s earlier condition was due to a large extent to subsequent events. And the testimony of the other witnesses was ample to support the conclusions set forth in the findings which appellant contends do not find support in the evidence.
The judgment is affirmed.
Peek, J., and Thompson, J., concurred.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.