People v. Heck
People v. Heck
Opinion of the Court
On January 7, 1952, the district attorney of Eldorado County filed an information against appellant, and against George Theodore Poulter and Roland Wayne
As grounds for a reversal of the judgment, appellant contends (1) that the trial court committed prejudicial error in (a) commenting on a defense request that defendants’ witnesses be excluded from the courtroom, (b) its refusal to permit defendants’ counsel to.question Poulter with regard to his intent as to count II, (c) its comments that the case must be speedily concluded, and (d) the questions directed by it to the materiality of questions propounded by defendants’ counsel to the witness Sam Alexander; and (2) that the evidence is not sufficient to support the verdict on the second count (attempted robbery). Before discussing these contentions we shall give a brief summary of the evidence as shown by the record.
On September 30, 1952, appellant, Poulter and Wright, who were inmates in the state prison at Folsom, escaped from the prison by concealing themselves in a truck. When the truck was outside the prison walls, but still on the prison grounds, the three prisoners jumped from the truck and made their way to the highway where they obtained a ride into Placerville. Poulter testified that the driver of the car gave appellant a $10 bill which Poulter used to buy hamburgers, whiskey and cigarettes when they arrived in Placer-ville. After eating and drinking, they started to walk out of town, toward the highway. As the three prisoners were walking out of Placerville, they approached the parking lot of a Safeway store on the eastern edge of town. This was between 8:30 and 9 o ’clock in the evening of September 30th, and the lights in the parking lot had just been turned out, preparatory to closing the store. At that time Robert
Poulter was called as a defense witness and testified at length regarding the escape and the assault. There are some glaring contradictions in his testimony, but in substance it is that he planned the escape by himself and for himself, alone. Appellant and Wright came over to the truck when he was preparing it for his escape. They appeared to be sick or intoxicated and he took them with him because he was afraid that they would talk and prevent his escape if he let them go. He also testified that he asked them to leave, but they would not go, so he asked them whether they wanted to take a ride around the institution. He stated that he helped them get onto the truck, under the platform, and that when they got off the truck he helped them off. On their way to the highway they passed a reservoir in some hills. This was 4 to 6 miles from the place where they left the truck and it was not on the prison grounds. At Poulter’s insistence, appellant and Wright went into the water and it sort of sobered them. They then continued on to the highway and got a ride into Plaeerville.
Both appellant and Wright testified that they had drunk alcohol derived from shellac, and eaten benzedrine taken from nose inhalators, during the afternoon of September 29th, the day before the escape. They did this to get “high,” and each testified in effect that the combination of alcohol and benzedrine had put him in a dazed condition and that he did not remember anything that happened on the day of the escape until he found himself in the water in the reservoir. There is a conflict in the evidence regarding appellant’s and Wright’s condition during the evening of September 29th and the morning of the 30th. Inmate witnesses testified that appellant and Wright appeared to be sick or “high”; prison officials testified to the contrary. Appellant admitted that when he regained his senses, in the water in the reservoir, he knew that he was off the prison grounds. He testified that he did not return to the prison then because it would have been suicide. Warden Heinz talked with appellant on the day the latter was recaptured and appellant-told the warden
Regarding the attempted robbery, appellant testified that he was not with Poulter and Wright when the latter two approached Hord at the car, but that he was sick and that he sat down to rest, about a block and a half from the store. Poulter and Wright both testified that appellant was not with them when they were at the car.
Appellant does not attack the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction under count I, but does attack the sufficiency of the evidence to support count II, the attempted robbery count. He argues that the evidence is insufficient to show that he was at the scene of the crime and that none of the complaining witnesses was able to identify him as one of the persons there.
However, as pointed out by respondent, there is strong circumstantial evidence which points to appellant’s participation in the attempted robbery. The three men were making an escape and they admitted that they were together, on their way out of town, just before they reached the Safeway store. Appellant admitted that they had not split up yet, and that their plans did not call for splitting up until after they got out of town or got a ride. Poulter admitted that he was looking for transportation, and Wright said that he started to get into the car because he thought the man was going to give them a ride. Wright had also asked Hord how much gas he had in the car. During the attempted robbery, Hord heard Poulter say to someone, “You guys get in the back,” or words to that effect, and Hord then heard the car door open and the car seat was moved forward and someone scrambled around in the back seat. This happened twice, as though two persons got into the car. Poulter was standing outside the ear at the time. Finally, Mrs. Hord saw three men running away from the car. We are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction on count II. The reasonable inference is that these men were attempting to take, by force, an automobile in which to make a getaway. Otherwise why would Poulter have threatened Hord with the knife? We are required to review the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent. (People v. Hammel, 101 Cal.App.2d 168, 170 [225 P.2d 8].) Stated another way, if the circumstances reasonably
Appellant next contends that he was prejudiced by the court’s comment on his request that defendants’ witnesses be excluded from the courtroom. The request was made after some of defendants’ witnesses had testified and the court chided defendants’ counsel for not having made the request sooner, and then the court granted the request and excluded the witnesses. There is no merit in appellant’s contention that the remarks of the court constituted prejudicial error.
Likewise, there is no merit in appellant’s contention that the court erred in refusing to permit appellant’s counsel to examine Poulter as to the latter’s intent to commit robbery. The record shows that Poulter had pleaded guilty to the second count, and in view of this, evidence of his intent would hardly be material or relevant and it is difficult to understand how appellant could have been prejudiced by its exclusion. (People v. Monson, 102 Cal.App.2d 308, 313 [227 P.2d 521].)
Appellant also complains that the trial judge expressed impatience with the manner in which appellant’s counsel was conducting the defense, and complains particularly of the statement of the court during appellant’s counsel’s examination of Poulter when the court told counsel to proceed, that “we are wasting too much time,” and later said, “I want this case finished Friday, no question about it. It must be,” and then, turning to the sheriff, said, “Mr. Morris, this case must finish on Friday.”
Appellant complains also that during direct examination of Sam Alexander, a general carpenter employed at Folsom prison and one of appellant’s witnesses, the trial court expressed impatience at the number of preliminary questions asked the witness, saying, “Why is that material? Get at the meat of it and don’t waste so much time with the preliminary questions.” Counsel continued with the examination and asked the witness whether he had ever known of appellant drinking on the job. The prosecuting attorney objected to the question as being incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, whereupon the court said, “I don’t see how it is material. Why don’t you get at the meat of the subject?”
We do not believe that there was any prejudicial error in
In view of the foregoing we conclude that the evidence fully supports the judgment of conviction and that no prejudicial error was committed.
The judgment is affirmed.
Peek, J., and Paulsen, J. pro tern.,
Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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