The portion of Welfare and Institutions Code section 3108 pertinent to this case reads: “If the person so committed ... is dissatisfied with the order of commitment, he may within 10 days after the making of such order, file a written demand that the question of his addiction or imminent danger of addiction be tried by a jury in the superior court of the county in which he was committed. Thereupon, the court shall cause a jury to- be summoned and to be in attendance at a date stated, not less than 4 days nor more than 30 days from the date of the demand for a jury trial.” This- is a statutory right which comes into play only when the person ordered committed chooses to request it. (People v. Murphy (1969) 70 Cal.2d 109, 117, 119 [74 Cal.Rptr. 65, 448 P.2d 945].) It is, therefore, something in the nature of a lateral appeal to a new trier of fact. It is not an, initial judicial determination of facts. The second sentence from section, 3108 quoted above has been held to mean, that the jury trial must be held within 30 days (People v. Murphy, supra, 70 Cal.2d 109, 118, fn. 7), subject (I would add) to exception where good legal cause is shown. I would construe this time limitation ,to be applicable to- the person requesting the jury trial as well as to the People. Where the trial is not held within the 30-day period because the person ordered committed runs away *822and becomes “a fugitive,” I would rule that he forfeits his right to further pursue this statutory remedy.

However, I think that the person who demands the jury should be warned of this possible forfeiture; the warning in the instant case having failed to cover this construction of section 3108, I join in the judgment reversing the trial court’s order which reinstated and ordered into execution the original order of commitment.

Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied May 31, 1972. Burke, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Opinion

A petition to commit the appellant as a drug addict was filed by the district attorney under the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 3100.6.1 The public defender was appointed to defend appellant, and an order setting time and place for hearing for commitment, as well as an order for appearance, were served on him. At the time of the hearing (in Dept. 95-A, superior court), appellant was represented by privately retained counsel. Appellant’s motion to dismiss the petition was denied following the court’s finding that there was probable cause for taking appellant into custody. Appellant was found to be a narcotic drug addict and was committed to1 the California Rehabilitation Center at Corona for placement as provided by law.2 (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 3106.5.) A written request for a jury trial was filed by appellant, and the execution of the commitment order was stayed pending the outcome of the jury trial. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 3108.) At the time of setting of the jury trial, the judge stated: “This matter is set for trial on September 3rd, a Thursday, *815at 9 a.m. in Department 1. Mr. Malins, you are ordered to return to the courthouse, First and Hill, Department 1, at 9 o’clock on September 3rd [1970], Thursday, without any further notice, order or subpoena, bail to stand. The court would advise you that in the event you fail to appear as ordered for your jury trial, you run the risk of loss of jury trial, since there is an outstanding commitment order that the court has made in this matter already, which order has been stayed.” (Italics added.) On September 3, 1970, appellant appeared, in compliance with the court order. On motion of counsel for appellant, the court relieved him as counsel and appointed the public defender to represent appellant, the case was continued to September 16 on motion of the public defender, with appropriate waiver of time, and defendant was instructed to return on the continued date. On September 16, appellant failed to make his appearance in compliance with the court’s order; bail was forfeited, and a bench warrant ordered returnable in Department 95. On or about December 24, 1970, appellant was apprehended, and on December 29, the “Matter [was] called for Hearing” (clerk’s minutes), with appellant present and being represented by the public defender. An extended colloquy3 between the court, appellant, the deputy *816district attorney, and counsel for appellant ensued, culminating in a determination by the court that, by having failed to appear at the time set for the jury trial, the appellant had waived his right to trial by jury; the *817commitment order of August 12, 1970 which had been stayed pending trial by jury was activated; and appellant was remanded to the custody of the sheriff for delivery to Corona. Appellant appeals “from the judgment rendered against him on August 12, 1970.”

The People argue that appellant’s notice of appeal (filed on December 29, 1970) “from the judgment rendered against him. on August 12, 1970" is untimely as the time for appeal had lapsed, citing People v. Winfrey, 13 Cal.App.3d 818, 825, footnote 7 [92 Cal.Rptr. 33]. In the cited Winfrey footnote, we stated that at the time of the rendition of a commitment order, the person committed has the choice to appeal or to demand a jury trial, and unless he carries the jury trial through to its conclusion, his right of appeal dissipates upon expiration of the appeal period. We recognize that the cited Winfrey footnote was not a necessary holding to that case; it is not improper, therefore, to extend the thought that we had intended to express therein, in the instant case, where our holding is adjudicative of the question. In Winfrey (p. 825, fn. 7), we said: “Unless [the person, committed] carried the jury trial through to its conclusion his right of appeal was gone as soon as the time for appeal elapsed.” This is true as it relates to the issue of addiction (which includes issues of sufficiency of the evidence and admissibility of evidence,4 as well as all other aspects of the commitment process.)5 The Winfrey statement, however, was intended to encompass the requirement for a “knowingly and intelligently” made waiver of *818the jury trial after trial by jury had once been demanded.6 In People v. Davis, 273 Cal.App.2d 257, 258 [77 Cal.Rptr. 903], the court was careful to note that “[a]t the opening of that hearing [jury trial], defendant, personally, his counsel, and the deputy district attorney, waived jury trial by a procedure that followed explicity the procedure for waiver of a jury trial in a criminal case.” Certainly there can be no question that an appeal from the original commitment order may be taken if noticed within the period of time provided therefor, and this would be true whether or not a demand for jury trial was made, providing such an appeal was filed with the acquiescence of the committed person if made after demand for jury trial. (For the effect of an appeal filed prior to a demand for jury trial, see People v. Murphy, supra, and fn. 6 herein, supra.) Such appeal would effectuate the abandonment of the jury demand, as well as divest the trial court of further jurisdiction to- adjudicate the issue of addiction. Any such abandonment of the right to- jury trial of that issue, however, must be knowingly and intelligently made. The guaranty of review of the commitment adjudication of addiction is preserved by appeal from that order or a jury determination thereof and the right of appeal from that determination. The “protective” route available to- a committed person may be chosen by the filing of the appeal from the original commitment order, so long as such appeal is not in direct violation of the expressed direction of the committed person.

In the instant case, although appellant requested a jury trial and there was no express waiver by appellant or his counsel of appellant’s right to-a trial by jury, the court precluded appellant from “carr[ying] the jury trial through to its conclusion” by its December 29, 1970 determination to activate the commitment order after it “specifically [found] that Mr. Peter Malins, by his actions [non-appearance] on September 16, 1970, waived his right to a jury trial.” (Italics added.) While it may be advantageous to expedite commitment proceedings by a court declaration that failure to appear at the time set for the jury trial constitutes a waiver thereof, there is no statutory authority for such imposition of waiver. It may be argued that proceedings under (Welf. & Inst. Code) section 3100 et seq., being civil in nature though closely identified with certain aspects of criminal law (protecting the person accused), are governed by procedures applicable to- civil matters. (People v. Bourdon, 10 Cal.App.3d 878, 882 [89 Cal.Rptr. 415].) If we were to apply this- principle to the fullest *819extent, Code of Civil Procedure section 631, subdivision 17 would effectuate a waiver of the right to jury trial in the instant case. However, specific procedural provisions governing involuntary civil commitment proceedings patently manifest the requirement of protection of the individual beyond the protection afforded by normal Civil Procedure provisions. (See People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 681 [72 Cal.Rptr. 800, 446 P.2d 800].)8 Section 3108 provides that “the person so committed [after hearing before a judge without a jury (§ 3106)] . . . may ... file a written demand that the question of his addiction or imminent danger of addiction be tried by a jury . . . The trial shall be had as provided by law for the trial of civil cases ... [11] The person committed shall be awarded all his constitutional rights including, but not limited to, his right to counsel, his right to notice of the nature of the proceedings brought against him, his right to the process of the court to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, and his right to' be confronted with witnesses.” It has been held that this last paragraph does not include the right to exclude statements made to an examining physician though the statements are made without the prior warning prescribed by the Miranda rule (People v. Garcia, 268 Cal.App.2d 712, 716 [74 Cal.Rptr. 103]),9 and that the person is not entitled to the presence of a lawyer at the time of such examination (People v. Candalaria, 18 Cal.App.3d 754 [96 Cal.Rptr. 90]). It does, however, require the personal waiver of the procedural framework of the commitment process. (In re Jones, 61 Cal.2d 325, 330 [38 Cal.Rptr. 509, 392 P.2d 269].) And, in In re Cruz, 62 Cal.2d 307 [42 Cal.Rptr. 220, 398 P.2d 412], the court listed the necessary elements of a valid waiver under now section 3107.10

*820In In re Walker, 11 Cal.2d 54, 57 [77 Cal.Rptr. 16, 453 P.2d 456], the court said: “The first requirement of any waiver of statutory or constitutional rights, of course, is that it be knowingly and intelligently made. Such a showing is difficult enough in an ordinary criminal case, . . .; it is even more difficult when the person purporting to make the waiver is in an altered physiological or psychological state, the characteristic of all narcotics addicts [Citation].” In In re Gary W., 5 Cal.3d 296, 307 [96 Cal.Rptr. 1, 486 P.2d 1201], the court stated: “In extending the right to trial by jury to other classes of persons subject to civil commitment proceedings, the California Legislature has recognized that the interests involved in civil commitment proceedings are no less fundamental than those in criminal proceedings and that liberty is, no less precious because forfeited in a civil proceeding -than when taken as a consequence of a criminal conviction. We conclude that in the absence of a compelling state purpose for the distinction between the class of persons subject to- commitment pursuant to [Welf. & Inst. Code] section 1800 and to other classes of persons subject to involuntary confinement, the right to jury trial is a requirement of both due process of law and equal protection of the law.”

We therefore conclude that the provision for waiver of right to jury trial contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 631 is inapplicable in the instant proceedings for involuntary civil commitment.

We feel that the injury to defendant resulting from the erroneous determination by -the court on December 29, 1970, was compounded by the error of defendant’s court-appointed counsel, who: inadvertently or otherwise appealed from the August 12, rather than the December 29, order, thereby impliedly at least acquiescing in the misconception of the court and the deputy district attorney -that appellant had effectively waived his right to trial by jury by the fact of his nonappearance.

In these unique circumstances, in the interests of justice we feel constrained to -treat appellant’s appeal as a timely appeal from the court’s ruling of December 29. We therefore requested argument of counsel on the issue of the effectiveness of the purported waiver of trial by jury, and for the reasons hereinafter set forth, we conclude that the commitment order must be restored to its posture as of the time of appellant’s request for trial by jury.

As stated in In, re Walker, supra, 71 Cal.2d 54, 57: “It is, settled that jurisdiction to enter an order of commitment depends on strict compliance with each of the specific statutory prerequisites for maintenance of the proceeding. [Citations.] There being no such compliance in the case at bar, the commitment was invalid unless it was saved by petitioner’s pur*821ported waiver.” Walker continues with an analysis of the prerequisites for a “knowingly and intelligently” made waiver. (See also In re Cruz, 62 Cal.2d 307, 312-313 [42 Cal.Rptr. 220, 398 P.2d 412].) Even a cursory reading of the colloquy set out in footnote 3, supra, establishes beyond question that defendant made no waiver of his statutory right to a jury determination of the issue of whether he is an addict, or of the issue of probable cause. (People v. Bourdon, 10 Cal.App.3d 878, 881 [89 Cal.Rptr. 415].) We note also that not only did appellant contest below the determination that he had waived his statutory right to jury trial, but the original court admonition to him (“you run the risk of loss of jury trial”) falls far short of the certainty of a declaration that appellant would lose his right to jury trial if he failed to appear. Were we to hold other than that there was no waiver here, the concomitant result would be that appellant would be denied his protective guaranty, i.e., the right to rehearing de novo by a jury, or a right of appeal from the court-ordered commitment, and judicial conscience does not permit of such a result.

The order activating the original order of commitment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the superior court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

Kaus, P. J., concurred.