Opinion

Appellant pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357) after the trial court denied his motion to *847suppress evidence, and he appeals pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (m).

At 4:45 a.m. on February 9, 1974, Deputy Sheriffs Rust and Schilling stopped a 1966 Chevrolet on Santa Monica Boulevard because it had no registration tabs on the license plate for either 1973 or 1974. The car was driven by one Walker, and appellant was the right front passenger. A radio check of the license number did not indicate any outstanding wants. After Walker got out of the car and approached the officers, Deputy Rust directed him to the sidewalk and requested his driver’s license and the registration on the car. Walker produced a driver’s license and a registration, but the registration was for a different vehicle, a motorcycle. Deputy Schilling had been standing near the passenger door of thé vehicle. Deputy Rust advised him that the registration was for a motorcycle, and not for the vehicle in question, and asked Deputy Schilling to check the vehicle identification number plate (VIN). Deputy Schilling knew that on this model automobile the VIN was located on the doorjamb of the driver’s door. The officers wanted the YIN because the license plate could have been for another vehicle and by running a radio check of the VIN they could determine if there were any wants on the vehicle. Deputy Schilling opened the driver’s door to check for the VIN and upon doing so he detected the odor of marijuana. Appellant was then asked to step out of the vehicle and was found to be under the influence of marijuana. He was arrested and then two baggies of marijuana were found under the right front passenger seat.

Appellant presents one contention. Relying on certain language in People v. Superior Court (Simon), 7 Cal.3d 186, 192-196 [101 Cal.Rptr. 837, 496 P.2d 1205], appellant argues that the fact the car lacked registration tabs and that Walker produced a wrong registration card was insufficient to give the officers probable cause to believe that the car was stolen, and that therefore “the deputies had no right to open the car door, and that the act of opening the door to enter was a search made without probable cause” in violation of his constitutional rights. This contention is without merit. The evidence shows that the officers acted reasonably and properly in opening the car door to check for the VIN on the door jamb.

Even aside from the fact that the evidence here shows more suspicious circumstances than in Simon,1 appellant’s reliance on that case is misplaced. In Simon the court was discussing whether there was probable *848cause to arrest for grand theft of the automobile so as to justify a search of the driver’s person. That is not the situation here. Nor is this a case where the officer entered the car to search for the registration in the glove compartment2 or to search the interior of the car to see what was inside.3

Here the only conduct of which appellant complains is that the officer opened the car door for the purpose of seeing the VIN which he knew to be on the doorjamb of this model automobile. A cursory examination of the door jamb for the VIN cannot be likened to a search of the automobile. It is a minimal intrusion on the privacy of the driver and occupants of the automobile. (See People v. Dumas, 9 Cal.3d 871, 882 fn. 9 [109 Cal.Rptr. 304, 512 P.2d 1208].) It is no more intrusive than a request by an officer that the driver and occupants alight from the vehicle, which, as we recognized in People v. Figueroa, 268 Cal.App.2d 721, 726-727 [74 Cal.Rptr. 74], and People v. Beal, 44 Cal.App.3d 216, 221 [118 Cal.Rptr. 272], is far less intrusive than a search of the person or the auto, and which is justified on grounds falling short of probable cause.4

*849Virtually directly in point is People v. Cole, supra, 20 Cal.App.3d 548. There a Plymouth was stopped because it lacked registration tabs for the current or previous year, as in this case. The driver produced a registration for a different vehicle, as in this case. The officer requested him to get out of the car, and when the door was opened he noticed the VIN was not secured where it should be. The officer then also observed a marijuana cigarette and properly seized it. Similarly, in People v. Williams, 17 Cal.App.3d 275, 277-278 [94 Cal.Rptr. 735], when the driver got out of the car the officer observed that the VIN on the doorjamb had been altered, and he lawfully arrested the occupants for auto theft.

Simon recognizes that, while the absence of registration might itself be insufficient to provide probable cause to arrest for auto theft, it is ample ground for further investigation. (7 Cal.3d at p. 197.) In this case the fact that the license plate lacked two years’ registration tabs and Walker had provided a wrong registration card for a different vehicle virtually demanded further investigation. It was reasonable that the further investigation took the form of checking the VIN on the door jamb because this provided an alternative means of determining if the vehicle had been reported stolen. Balancing the need for further investigation against the minimal intrusion involved (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 905-906, 88 S.Ct. 1868]), we conclude Deputy Schilling did not engage in an unreasonable search by merely opening the car door to check the door jamb. The marijuana was inadvertently discovered in the course of the investigation and properly seized. (People v. Cole, supra; People v. Monreal, 264 Cal.App.2d 263, 265 [70 Cal.Rptr. 256].)

The judgment is affirmed.

Stephens, Acting P. J., and Hastings, J., concurred.