In this juvenile dependency proceeding (Welf. Inst. Code, §300),¹ the four children of appellant, Christine W., were placed in foster care. On appeal from the jurisdictional finding that the children were dependent children, appellant claims procedural error and insufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the juvenile court's order.

The case was set for January 31, 1995, for a "J-1" hearing. On January 31 both parents, through counsel, denied the allegations of the petition, and the matter was continued to March 8 for a settlement conference on jurisdictional and dispositional issues. The juvenile court referee ordered the parents to appear. On March 8 the matter was again continued to March 28 for a settlement conference.

On March 28 the settlement conference was held. Neither parent personally appeared, but both were represented by counsel. The father's attorney asked that the "appropriate orders" be entered but stayed, as counsel believed the father intended to appear. The request was denied. The mother's attorney stated he did not know where his client was. The juvenile court *Page 432 referee found that both parents had wilfully failed to appear and entered both parents' default. The referee then proceeded to adjudicate the petition.

Based upon the social worker's report and the information presented at the detention hearing, the referee made jurisdictional findings that the allegations of the petition were true and that the minors are persons described by section 300 The referee then proceeded immediately to disposition and ordered the minors placed in foster care. The court ordered various conditions for reunification and set the matter for six-month and twelve-month reviews.

The father subsequently moved to set aside the default judgment, asserting that he had run out of gas on his way to the courtroom. The motion was denied.

Only the mother, Christine W., has appealed. During the pendency of the appeal we were informed by appellant's counsel that on January 11, 1996, at a hearing on the mother's petition for modification of custody, physical custody of the children was granted to appellant, their mother, who now resides in Massachusetts. Jurisdiction was continued, and the conditions for reunification previously imposed were deemed conditions for dismissal. In light of this change, appellant has withdrawn her challenges to the dispositional order. She challenges only the jurisdictional order.

A. Lack of Notice and Hearing

It is apparent from the record that the juvenile court proceeded as it did because both parents were deemed to be "in default."² Although we have serious reservations about the entry of "default" in these circumstances,³ appellant has failed to demonstrate what prejudice she suffered. Appellant was represented by counsel, who was present at the hearing. Counsel asked for clarification of certain findings and certain reunification services, but he voiced no objection to the summary adjudication and made no assertion that he was taken by surprise or needed more time to proceed to a full hearing. Nor did appellant seek relief from her "default" in the court below. On appeal appellant has given no indication of what evidence she might have presented had she known the jurisdictional hearing would be held. At the detention hearing, held two months earlier, counsel for appellant informed the court that appellant was "not . . . in a position to seek custody. . . ." The social worker's report submitted for the settlement conference similarly indicated that appellant was homeless and unable to provide adequate housing. The juvenile court may properly rely upon a social worker's report to support a jurisdictional finding under section 300 as long as the opportunity *Page 434 to cross-examine the social worker is provided. (In re MalindaS. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 368, 382 [272 Cal.Rptr. 787,795 P.2d 1244]; In re Dirk S. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1043 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 643].) Appellant complains that no cross-examination of the social worker was conducted. Yet, her attorney made no request to cross-examine, nor has appellant revealed how cross-examination would have resulted in a different outcome. We conclude that under the circumstances presented here any error in the procedure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

B. Sufficiency of the Findings^*

The order is affirmed.

Strankman, P.J., and Stein, J., concurred.