Filed 3/18/13 Alghabra v. CVS Pharmacy CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

MAHER ALGHABRA, D059334 Plaintiff and Appellant, v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2009-00104678- CU-OE-CTL) CVS PHARMACY, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, John S.

Meyer, Judge. Affirmed.

Plaintiff Maher Alghabra appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (CVS); Garfield Beach CVS, LLC; CVS RX Services, Inc.; and Sylvester Arcaro (collectively "defendants") on Alghabra's first amended complaint alleging wrongful termination in violation of public policy and related claims. Alghabra contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on defendants' purported statutory immunity from liability for the reporting of evidence of prohibited conduct by a pharmacist to the California State Board of Pharmacy (BOP). (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4104.) He also contends he presented admissible evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether his employment was terminated in retaliation for his engaging in the protected activity of reporting to federal authorities suspicious activity involving the cash purchase of OxyContin by patients on welfare, and complaining to his pharmacy supervisor that the store manager was sending him and other pharmacy employees sexually explicit text messages. We conclude the court correctly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment because, in opposing the motion, Alghabra did not present sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to the causal connection between his termination and his alleged protected activity.

I FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Alghabra, a licensed pharmacist, began his employment with CVS as a pharmacy manager or "pharmacist-in-charge" (PIC) at CVS "Store No. 8842" in December 2006.

During his employment with CVS, defendant Sylvester Arcaro was Alghabra's pharmacy supervisor, Robert Wiltfang was CVS's regional loss prevention manager, and Marshall Hayde was the district manager who supervised Arcaro and the nonpharmacy employees of Store No. 8842. During his year of employment with CVS, Alghabra brought about a substantial increase in pharmacy sales at Store No. 8842.

In September 2007, Alghabra contacted the San Diego RxNet task force to report suspicious activity he had observed in the purchase of the drug OxyContin for cash by several pharmacy customers of Store No. 8842 who were welfare (Medi-Cal) recipients.

Alghabra provided an agent of the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) copies of the suspicious prescriptions and the identities of certain customers whose prescriptions he believed had been forged. On September 21, 2007, Arcaro sent Wiltfang an e-mail message reporting that Alghabra had informed him about the suspected forged prescriptions and cash payments for OxyContin by patients who "appear homeless." Arcaro's message concluded: "[Alghabra] has reported to RxNet, but if you could follow up, I would appreciate it. This is bad." On November 13, 2007, Alghabra sent Arcaro an e-mail in which he identified three Medi-Cal patients who were willing to pay cash for OxyContin prescriptions and stated, "This is a continuation for an Oxycontin diversion scheme." He asked Arcaro to forward the information to the DEA agent in charge of the case. Arcaro replied to Alghabra's e-mail the same day, stating, "I know you won[']t read this for a couple of days — but nice job!" Arcaro instructed Alghabra and other pharmacists to continue to fill the prescriptions in question, but to exercise caution by calling the providers to verify that the prescriptions were legitimate.

In late October 2007, Alghabra and pharmacy employees under his supervision began receiving sexually explicit text messages on their cell phones from Carlos Salorio, the manager of Store No. 8842. Around November 1, 2007, Alghabra sent Arcaro an e-mail message complaining about the inappropriate text messages that Salorio and a photo clerk named Abbey were sending to Alghabra and other pharmacy employees.

Arcaro turned the e-mail over to Hayde because Salorio and Abbey were under Hayde's, rather than Arcaro's, supervision. Arcaro told Alghabra that he and Hayde were looking into the matter. On November 21, 2007, Alghabra complained to Arcaro in an e-mail that Salorio was "text messaging 24/7 to the employees in the Pharmacy on inappropriate materials and [that] Abby [sic] (photo staff is also involved)." Arcaro replied, "Thanks for the focus on this." In late October or early November of 2007, during a routine inspection of pharmacy documents at Store No. 8842, Arcaro discovered discrepancies that suggested a customer was picking up multiple refills of hydrocodone, a narcotic drug and controlled substance, on refill prescriptions bearing the same number. Multiple pick-ups of the same refills at the same price suggested that the pharmacy was dispensing more medication to the customer than his prescriptions allowed. Arcaro discussed his discovery with Hayde and Wiltfang.

Arcaro, Hayde, Wiltfang, and another pharmacy employee went into the pharmacy on two different nights after the store was closed to further investigate the questionable hydrocodone refills. Salorio viewed store surveillance videos of the after-hours investigations and testified at deposition that he viewed Arcaro, Hayde, Wiltfang and the other employee who accompanied them remove several trash bags from the pharmacy that appeared to be three-quarters full, but he did not know what was in the bags.1

Wiltfang testified that they made copies of documents related to the refill transactions in question, including prescription logs and prescriptions.

Based on their investigation, Arcaro and Wiltfang concluded that prescriptions were missing from the Store No. 8842 pharmacy and that Alghabra and employees under his supervision had illegitimately dispensed multiple refill prescriptions. On November 28, 2007, Wiltfang contacted a DEA agent he had worked with in the past and told her that Alghabra was fraudulently creating prescriptions and dispensing hydrocodone to a particular customer. He and Arcaro later met with DEA agents to discuss their investigation and the documents they had copied. Because the DEA was conducting its own investigation, Arcaro and Wiltfang discontinued their investigation.

DEA agents told them not to speak with Alghabra about their findings while the DEA's investigation was pending.

On December 15, 2007, Alghabra came in to work on a scheduled day off at Arcaro's request. After he arrived, DEA agents arrested him and took him into custody.

The DEA did not consult anyone at CVS before deciding to arrest Alghabra. The following day, Alghabra sent an e-mail to Arcaro stating: "This is my resignation as of today please put in- and [FedEx] my final paycheck and vacation check . . . ."2

Shortly after Alghabra's arrest, Arcaro submitted written reports to the DEA and BOP confirming the loss of controlled substances at Store No. 8842. In June 2009, the BOP fined CVS for a loss of hydrocodone at Store No. 8842. In January 2010, the BOP issued an accusation against Alghabra charging him with dispensing hydrocodone without a prescription and excessive furnishing of controlled substances. The DEA did not file any charges against Alghabra.

Alghabra filed the instant action in December 2009. His operative first amended complaint included causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) violation of Labor Code sections 201 through 203, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress, (6) wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and (7) intentional interference with prospective business and economic advantage.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. They sought summary judgment on the entire first amended complaint on the ground Alghabra's lawsuit was barred by Business and Professions Code section 4104, which requires pharmacies to report evidence of certain prohibited conduct by pharmacists to the BOP and provides that "[a]nyone making a report authorized or required by this section shall have immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise arise from the making of the report. Any participant shall have the same immunity with respect to participation in any

administrative or judicial proceeding resulting from the report." (Id., subd. (e).)3 Defendants additionally argued that the exclusive remedy provisions of the California Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) barred Alghabra's claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress because those claims arose out of conduct that is a normal part of the employment relationship. Regarding Alghabra's sixth cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, defendants argued that Alghabra could not show a prima facie case of retaliation for whistle blowing because there was no evidence of a causal connection between his claimed protected activity (reporting fraudulent OxyContin prescriptions and reporting sexual harassment) and the termination of his employment.

The court granted summary judgment on the entire first amended complaint. On appeal, Alghabra challenges the summary judgment only as to his fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action. In its summary judgment ruling as to Alghabra's fourth and fifth causes of action for emotional distress, the trial court suggested, but did not clearly rule, that Alghabra's entire action was barred by the immunity provision of Business and Professions Code section 4104. The court granted summary judgment on those causes of action "based on the general premise that, as a matter of law, management of personnel does not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct for purposes of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress causes of action." The court added: "Moreover,

Defendants were legally obligated to report such issues to the DEA and enjoy an absolute statutory immunity when they do so." Regarding the sixth cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, the summary judgment ruling began by noting that Alghabra "alleges wrongful termination in violation of public policy. He asserts two separate grounds for wrongful termination — wrongful termination based on his reporting to CVS that employees at his location were sending sexual text messages and wrongful termination in retaliation for reporting fraudulent prescriptions to the DEA. . . . As set forth, infra, the conduct of [d]efendants relative to the DEA and [BOP] was subject to the absolute immunity provided by [Business and Professions] Code [section] 410[4]."4 Although it is somewhat unclear, we construe this statement in the court's ruling to mean that to the extent Alghabra's termination was in retaliation for his reporting fraudulent prescriptions to the DEA, the court found defendants statutorily immune from liability under Business and Professions Code section 4104.

Regarding Alghabra's claim that he was terminated in retaliation for reporting to management that employees at his location were sending sexual text messages, the court

cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence . . . ." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 855.)

"If the defendant's prima facie case is met, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact with respect to that cause of action or defense. [Citation.] ' "When opposition to a motion for summary judgment is based on inferences, those inferences must be reasonably deducible from the evidence, and not such as are derived from speculation, conjecture, imagination, or guesswork." ' [Citation.] [¶] Ultimately, the moving party 'bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' [Citation.] [¶] We review a summary judgment or summary adjudication ruling de novo to determine whether there is a triable issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Citation.] 'In practical effect, we assume the role of a trial court and apply the same rules and standards which govern a trial court's determination of a motion for summary judgment.' [Citation.] '[W]e are not bound by the trial court's stated reasons for its ruling on the motion; we review only the trial court's ruling and not its rationale.' " (Mills, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 894-895.)

As noted, on appeal Alghabra challenges the summary judgment ruling only as to his fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, fifth cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress and sixth cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. As to all of these causes of action, Alghabra asserts that granting summary judgment based on Business and Professions Code section 4104 immunity was erroneous because defendants did not plead immunity as an affirmative defense and, in any event, did not meet the statutory requirements for immunity. We need not and do not address these contentions because on de novo review, we conclude that defendants are entitled to judgment on other grounds, as discussed below.

Alghabra's primary focus in this appeal is his claim that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to his sixth cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, in which he alleges that CVS violated public policy by terminating him in retaliation for his reporting fraudulent prescriptions to the DEA's RxNet task force and reporting acts of sexual harassment by the store manager.

Accordingly, we begin our discussion with the sixth cause of action.

A. Cause of Action for Wrongful Termination Based on Retaliation Because California law prohibiting employment discrimination and retaliation is similar to federal law, "California courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying our own statutes. [Citation.] In particular, California has adopted the three- stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of [both] discrimination [and retaliation] . . . ." (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (Guz); Coffey v. Dobbs Int'l Servs., Inc. (2d Cir. 1999) 170 F.3d 323, 326; Sada v. Robert F. Kennedy Medical Center (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 138, 155; see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 (McDonnell

Douglas).)5 This test is commonly known as the McDonnell Douglas test. (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 334.)

"Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b), provides that an 'employer may not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information to a government or law enforcement agency, where the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation or noncompliance with a state or federal rule or regulation.' A retaliation claim may be proved in two different ways.

"First, a plaintiff may prove retaliation by circumstantial evidence. In these cases, [the McDonnell Douglas test requires] the plaintiff . . . to first establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Once established, the defendant must counter with evidence of a legitimate, nonretaliatory explanation for its acts. If the defendant meets this requirement, the plaintiff must then show the explanation is merely a pretext for retaliation." (Mokler v. County of Orange (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 121, 138 (Mokler).)

"Second, retaliation may be proved by direct evidence." (Mokler, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 138.) When a plaintiff offers direct evidence of retaliation that the trier of fact believes, the defendant may limit liability by proving the plaintiff would have been subjected to the same employment decision without reference to the unlawful factor. (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203 (Harris); see generally Mokler, at

Nor does the statute require the employer to have good cause for its decisions. The employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory [or unlawfully retaliatory] reason. . . . "While an employer's judgment or course of action may seem poor or erroneous to outsiders, the relevant question is . . . whether the given reason was a pretext for illegal discrimination [or retaliation]. The employer's stated legitimate reason . . . does not have to be a reason that the judge or jurors would act on or approve." ' " (Artega v. Brink's, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 344 (Artega).)

However, evidence that the employer's profferred reasons for an adverse employment action were pretextual does not automatically establish that the plaintiff employee was the victim of unlawful discrimination or retaliation. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. (2000) 530 U.S. 133 (Reeves) regarding employment discrimination claims, "the factfinder's rejection of the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action does not compel judgment for the plaintiff. [Citation.] The ultimate question is whether the employer intentionally discriminated, and proof that 'the employer's proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish that the plaintiff's proffered reason . . . is correct.' [Citation.] In other words, '[i]t is not enough . . . to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination.' " (Id. at pp. 146-147, quoting St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks (1993) 509 U.S. 502, 511, 524, 519.) "Reeves' reasoning applies with equal force to . . . retaliation claims." (Wells v. Colorado Dept. of Transp. (2003) 325 F.3d 1205, 1218; see Doebele v. Sprint/United Management Co. (2003) 342 F.3d 1117, 1135-1136; Mato v. Baldauf (2001) 267 F.3d 444, 452; Brown v. Farmland Foods, Inc. (N.D. Iowa 2001) 178 F.Supp.2d 961, 983-984 [Reeves court's reasoning applies to a retaliation claim because a retaliation claim is subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis].)

In Fisher v. Vassar College (2d Cir. 1997) 114 F.3d 1332, 1337 (Fisher), the Court of Appeals observed: "A showing that the defendant's proffered reason for the adverse employment action is not the real reason may serve as evidence that the defendant intentionally discriminated. We attach the label 'pretext' to a proffered reason that is not credited by the finder of fact. But the label 'pretext' does not answer the question: pretext for what? In some cases, an employer's proffered reason is a mask for unlawful discrimination. But discrimination does not lurk behind every inaccurate statement. Individual decision-makers may intentionally dissemble in order to hide a reason that is [not discriminatory or retaliatory] but unbecoming or small-minded, such as back-scratching, log-rolling, horse-trading, institutional politics, envy, nepotism, spite, or personal hostility." The Fisher court observed that "[t]he sufficiency of the finding of pretext to support a finding of discrimination depends on the circumstances of the case. This is an unremarkable principle: the sufficiency of any evidentiary finding depends on the other findings and evidence that accompany it. What is at issue is the drawing of inferences from human behavior. Once the trial has moved to the stage at which the plaintiff must prove discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, a defendant's false statements are nothing more than pieces of circumstantial evidence, which may be employed, as in many other types of cases, to reveal the speaker's state of mind. To the extent that an actor in defendant's position is unlikely to have proffered a false explanation except to conceal a discriminatory motive, then the false explanation will be powerful evidence of discrimination. On the other hand, if the circumstances show that the defendant gave the false explanation to conceal something other than discrimination, the inference of discrimination will be weak or nonexistent. And if, on examination of the circumstances, there are many possible reasons for the false explanation, stated or unstated, and illegal discrimination is no more likely a reason than others, then the pretext gives minimal support to plaintiff's claim of discrimination." (Fisher, supra, 114 F.3d at p. 1338.) The Fisher court reasoned that "while a prima facie case and a finding of pretext may in some cases powerfully show discrimination, neither one necessarily gives plaintiff much support in discharging his obligation to prove that he was the victim of discrimination.

Indeed, the combined effect of both may have little capacity to prove what the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving. Thus, a finding of pretext, together with the evidence comprising a prima facie case, is not always sufficient to sustain an ultimate finding of intentional discrimination." (Id. at p. 1339.)

Under the reasoning of Reeves and Fisher, a plaintiff claiming unlawful employment retaliation "may prevail only if an employer's proffered reasons are shown to be a pretext for [retaliation], either because the pretext finding itself points to [retaliation] or because other evidence in the record points in that direction — or both. . . . '[A] reason cannot be proved to be a "pretext for [retaliation]" unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that [retaliation] was the real reason.' " (Fisher, supra, 114 F.3d at p. 1339, italics added.)10

employer's proffer of a reason, coupled with the error or falsity of the employer's proffered reason may — or may not — be sufficient to show illegal discrimination.' [Citation.] In nearly identical terms the Supreme Court explained in Reeves that in some circumstances, a prima facie case plus falsity of the employer's explanation can, without more, be enough to support a reasonable finding that prohibited discrimination has occurred, and thus that a plaintiff may, under those circumstances, reach the jury on this evidence and without additional evidence, but that in other circumstances, a prima facie case, combined with falsity of the employer's explanation, will not be sufficient . . . ." (James, at pp. 155-156.)

The James court understood Reeves to hold that "once a minimal prima facie case is proved and the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation has been given, the McDonnell Douglas presumptions disappear from the case and the governing standard is simply whether the evidence, taken as a whole, is sufficient to support a reasonable inference that prohibited discrimination occurred." (James, supra, 233 F.3d at p. 156.)

The James court concluded that both Fisher and Reeves "essentially stand for the same propositions — (i) evidence satisfying the minimal McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, coupled with evidence of falsity of the employer's explanation, may or may not be sufficient to sustain a finding of discrimination; (ii) once the employer has given an explanation, there is no arbitrary rule or presumption as to [its] sufficiency; (iii) the way to tell whether a plaintiff's case is sufficient to sustain a verdict is to analyze the particular evidence to determine whether it reasonably supports an inference of the facts plaintiff must prove — particularly discrimination [or retaliation]." (James, at pp. 156- 157.) the action was discriminatory [or retaliatory]. For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory [or nonretaliatory] reason for the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination [or retaliation] had occurred. [Citations.] . . . [¶] Whether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in any particular case will depend on a number of factors. These include the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case . . . .' " (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 361-362, quoting Reeves, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 148-149.)

Thus, under Reeves and Guz, it is clear that even if an employee presents a sufficient prima facie case of unlawful retaliatory termination and substantial evidence that the employer's proffered reason for the termination is false, the employer will nevertheless be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if there is no substantial evidence that the termination was in fact retaliatory — i.e., that the termination was causally connected to the protected activity giving rise to the employee's retaliation claim.

In the present case, defendants presented evidence that they terminated Alghabra's employment for the legitimate, nonretaliatory reason that he and employees under his

supervision had illegitimately dispensed hydrocodone prescriptions.11 Specifically, the evidence showed that Arcaro discovered discrepancies in point of sale documents indicating a customer had been picking up multiple refills of a hydrocodone prescription with the same refill number. Arcaro, Hayde, Wiltfang and another pharmacy employee investigated the questionable prescriptions, and the investigation led Arcaro and Wiltfang to conclude that Alghabra and employees under his supervision had illegitimately dispensed multiple refill prescriptions.

Given this evidence of a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for his termination, the burden shifted to Alghabra to present evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the true reason for his termination was retaliation for engaging in the protected activities of reporting fraudulent prescriptions to the RxNet task force and reporting acts of sexual harassment by the store manager. To meet that burden, Alghabra had to present substantial evidence from which a trier of fact could reasonably find that his protected activity and his termination were causally connected.

The only evidence Alghabra cites of a causal connection between his termination and protected activity is the temporal proximity of the termination to his protected activity. However, temporal proximity alone does not satisfy the plaintiff's burden of

Defendants' showing of a credible nonretaliatory reason for Alghabra's termination shifted the burden to Alghabra to rebut defendants' showing by pointing to evidence that raises a rational inference that intentional retaliation occurred. (Ibid.) ` producing evidence that a proffered legitimate reason for employment termination was a pretext and that the plaintiff was actually discharged for a retaliatory reason. (Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952, 990.)

Because the employee's burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation for protected activity is fairly minimal, temporal proximity between protected activity and the employee's subsequent termination may satisfy the causation requirement at the first step of the burden-shifting process, "[b]ut temporal proximity alone is not sufficient to raise a triable issue as to pretext once the employer has offered evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination." (Artega, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 353, italics added.) "Where the employee relies solely on temporal proximity in response to the employer's evidence of a nonretaliatory reason for termination, he or she does not create a triable issue as to pretext, and summary judgment for the employer is proper." (Id. at p. 357.) Accordingly, the court properly granted summary judgment on Alghabra's sixth cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy based on retaliation because Alghabra produced no substantial evidence that his termination was causally connected to his alleged protected activity.12

The only evidence of defendants' response to Alghabra's complaint about sexual Alghabra contends the evidence shows that defendants bore animus against him and that their purported legitimate reason for terminating him was untrue. As "direct evidence" that defendants' purported reason for terminating him was untrue,13 Alghabra cites his deposition testimony that a former assistant manager of Store No. 8842 told him that she knew he had been "set up," and the deposition testimony of former CVS employee Lamya Alsabagh that another employee told her that "whatever happened with [Alghabra], it was like, planned or something."14 Assuming, without deciding, that Alghabra has presented substantial evidence that defendants bore animus against him and that their purported legitimate reason for terminating him was untrue, such evidence is insufficient to defeat defendant's summary judgment motion because it is not evidence that Alghabra's termination was causally connected to his alleged protected activity — i.e., that he was terminated because he reported fraudulent prescriptions to the DEA and complained about sexual texting in the harassment in the form of sexual text messaging was that Arcaro told Alghabra that he (Arcaro) and Hayde were looking into the matter, and Arcaro's e-mail to Alghabra stating, "Thanks for the focus on this." Alghabra testified that he did not recall seeing any inappropriate comments, pictures, or text messages after he reported the matter to Arcaro, and did not know of any comments or documents that suggested Arcaro wanted to get rid of him because of his reporting of inappropriate text messages.

Accordingly, notwithstanding the evidence that CVS's management employees felt animus toward Alghabra and wanted his employment terminated and the evidence that their purported reason for terminating him was pretextual, the trial court properly granted summary judgment on Alghabra's sixth cause of action because there is no substantial evidence in the record that his termination was causally connected to his alleged protected activity.15 Alghabra's contention that his termination was in retaliation for his alleged protected activity amounts to conjecture and speculation, and "it is well established that a plaintiff's 'suspicions of improper motives . . . primarily based on

B. Causes of Action for Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Alghabra argues that if we reverse the judgment as to his cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, we must also reverse as to his fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and fifth cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress because emotional distress damages may be recovered under a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. (See Phillips v. Gemini Moving Specialists (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 563, 577.) Alghabra is mistaken. The fact that emotional distress damages may be recovered under a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy does not make them automatically recoverable under a separately pleaded cause of action for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress based on the same facts.

The trial court granted summary judgment as to the fourth and fifth causes of action based on its conclusion, as a matter of law, that "management of personnel does not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct for purposes of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress causes of action." Quoting Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 80, the trial court observed that "[m]anaging personnel is not outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency, but rather

conduct essential to the welfare and prosperity of society."16 Alghabra does not challenge the court's specific ruling on his fourth and fifth causes of action; his sole argument on appeal regarding his entitlement to emotional distress damages is that he is entitled to claim them under his sixth cause of action if we reverse the judgment as to that cause of action. Consequently, he has waived any claim on appeal that the court erred in granting summary judgment as to his fourth and fifth causes of action. (Tan v. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 800, 811 [issues not raised in an appellant's brief are deemed waived or abandoned]; Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6 [although review of a summary judgment is de novo, it is limited to issues that have been adequately raised and supported in appellant's brief].)

C. Remaining Contentions and Requests for Judicial Notice Alghabra contends the trial court erred in sustaining defendants' evidentiary objections to certain evidence he presented in opposition to defendants' summary judgment motion, namely, the declaration of his expert witness, Dr. Edward Bubar, regarding the standard of care that governs the dispensing of prescription refills and related subjects concerning pharmacy practice, and Alsabagh's deposition testimony

Alghabra and defendants filed separate requests that we take judicial notice of legislative history materials pertaining to Business and Professions Code section 4104.

We deny the parties' requests for judicial notice on the ground the materials in question are unnecessary to our resolution of the appeal. (County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 613, fn. 29.)

DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P.J.

O'ROURKE, J.