Mechling v. Asbestos
Cases that cite this one
35 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Gowdey v. Heseltine CA1/5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021)
- 510pacificave v. Lucido CA2/5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020)
- Deleon v. EH & BG Investments CA1/5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020)
- City of Perris v. Henry CA4/1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2024)
- Brains Work Group v. OME Ventures CA4/1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2023)
- Old Republic Gen. Ins. v. Alamillo Rebar CA2/7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022)
- Buckley v. Katina CA2/7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020)
- Buckley v. Katina CA2/7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020)
- Burrow v. Nguyen CA6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2025)
- Planful v. Global Growth Holdings CA1/4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2025)
- First American Commercial Bancorp v. BB Co. CA2/7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2023)
- Chichyan v. Roger CA2/7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022)
- Burunsuzyan v. Roger CA2/7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022)
- Lasalle v. Vogel (Cal. Ct. App. 2019)
- Jenni Rivera Enters., LLC v. Latin World Entm't Holdings, Inc. (Cal. Ct. App. 2019)
- Politsch v. Metroplaza Partners, LLC (Cal. Ct. App. 2025)
- Sheriff v. St. Anton Multifamily CA3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2025)
- Triton Pacific Capital Partners v. Cenegenics CA2/5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2024)
- Tanguay v. Lavallee CA4/3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2024)
- Marriage of N.T. and J.G. CA4/1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2024)
- Salcido v. Lopez CA4/1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2023)
- Barajas v. Satvia L.A. County Water Dist. (Cal. Ct. App. 2023)
- Browne v. Hudson Insurance Co. CA4/2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2023)
- City and County of San Francisco v. Bato CA1/3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2023)
- Antich v. Capital Accounts CA2/1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2023)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
*1244In these four consolidated cases, William Mechling, James Greely, Omar Barstad, and Alexander Corns (collectively, plaintiffs) appeal from trial court orders setting aside default judgments on the equitable ground of extrinsic mistake. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Beginning in 2009, plaintiffs filed personal injury complaints against numerous defendants-including Associated Insulation of California (Associated)-for injuries arising out of plaintiffs' alleged asbestos exposure.
After entry of the default judgments, Fireman's Fund located insurance policies appearing to provide coverage for Associated.
Fireman's Fund claimed it had a meritorious case because it "never had its day in court. It appears plaintiff[s] simply picked a default amount and had that amount reduced to judgment in the absence of any party protecting the interests of Fireman's Fund or its insured [Associated]." Next, Fireman's Fund contended it had a satisfactory excuse for not defending the action *903because of "mistakes regarding the insured notifying the insurer of the filing of suit, service of the complaint, and the intention to take a default." Third, *1245Fireman's Fund argued it acted diligently in moving to set aside the default judgments after learning of the lawsuits and hiring counsel. Fireman's Fund noted setting aside the defaults and default judgments promoted the policy that "cases should be decided on the merits whenever possible." In a supporting declaration, counsel averred Fireman's Fund "retained counsel to defend any asbestos claims made against [Associated]" in February 2016. Counsel also stated Associated's corporate status had been suspended.
Plaintiffs' opposition argued Fireman's Fund failed to present sufficient evidence to support entitlement to equitable relief. Plaintiffs noted that in two of the four cases, they sent a "demand seeking coverage" to Fireman's Fund, which Fireman's Fund "acknowledged and denied" in a March 2012 letter. In the letter to plaintiffs' counsel, Fireman's Fund stated it received notice of the Mechling and Greely lawsuits and had "searched all available records and have not located any reference or policies of insurance issued to Associated ... under any Fireman's Fund ... company.... [¶] If you believe that Fireman's Fund ... issued policies of insurance to Associated ... please forward them and/or any secondary information you would like us to review, as soon as possible." Plaintiffs argued Fireman's Fund could not "claim ignorance and seek ... equitable relief without any showing of extrinsic ... mistake or its diligence, considering that [Fireman's Fund] has been on actual notice, via acknowledgment through its March 20, 2012 letter."
Plaintiffs also faulted Fireman's Fund for not attaching a proposed pleading in intervention to the motion, and for failing to support the motion with "declarations showing facts to support" a "valid defense." Finally, plaintiffs argued Fireman's Fund could not establish diligence in seeking to set aside the default judgments because it did not state when it became aware of the complaints, and because it failed to present an "excuse as to why it did not step into the shoes of its insured and present a defense to the original action once it learned about it." In reply, Fireman's Fund reiterated its grounds for relief.
The court held a hearing on the motions. At the conclusion of that hearing, the court granted the motions and issued a written order setting aside the defaults and default judgments "pursuant to the Court's inherent, equitable power to set aside defaults on the ground of extrinsic ... mistake."
DISCUSSION
A trial court has inherent power to vacate a default judgment on equitable grounds. ( Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994)
*1246"One ground for equitable relief is extrinsic mistake-a term broadly applied when circumstances extrinsic to the litigation have unfairly cost a party a hearing on the merits." ( Rappleyea, at p. 981,
*904In re Marriage of Park (1980)
To qualify for equitable relief based on extrinsic mistake, the defendant must demonstrate: (1) "a meritorious case"; (2) "a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the original action"; and (3) "diligence in seeking to set aside the default once the fraud [or mistake] had been discovered." ( In re Marriage of Stevenot (1984)
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by granting the motions to set aside the default judgments. Fireman's Fund established it had "a meritorious case." ( Aldrich, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 738,
Plaintiffs argue Fireman's Fund did not establish a meritorious defense because the motion did not attach a proposed pleading in intervention or a declaration with "evidence" showing a meritorious defense. To support this argument, plaintiffs rely on Shields v. Siegel (1966)
Plaintiffs also cite Smith v. Busniewski (1952)
*1248In California, a responsive pleading functions to set " 'at issue' " all material allegations of the complaint. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 590 ; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2018) ¶ 6:385, p. 6-120.) A defendant may controvert the material allegations by way of affirmative defenses and/or denials. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 431.30, subds. (b), (d).) Thus, the responsive pleading would have revealed nothing more than the intent of Fireman's Fund, as an intervener, to contest plaintiffs' claims against Associated. (See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000)
Next, Fireman's Fund articulated a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the lawsuits. ( Aldrich, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 738,
Finally, Fireman's Fund established diligence in "seeking to set aside the default" judgments once they "had been discovered." ( Aldrich, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 738,
In our view, this case presents exceptional circumstances warranting equitable relief. Fireman's Fund was denied an opportunity to present its case in court because it was not served with any of the relevant pleadings, did not have notice of two of the lawsuits, and did not believe it had a duty to defend Associated. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting Fireman's Fund's motion for equitable relief. We emphasize our review of the trial court's ruling is governed by the deferential abuse of discretion standard. As a result, we may reverse only if we conclude the trial court's decision is " 'so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.' " ( Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012)
DISPOSITION
The orders setting aside the defaults and default judgments are affirmed. Fireman's Fund is entitled to costs on appeal. ( Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)
We concur:
Simons, J.
Bruiniers, J.
We deny Fireman's Fund Insurance Company's (Fireman's Fund) request for judicial notice. "Reviewing courts generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial court.... No exceptional circumstances exist that would justify deviating from that rule[.]" (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996)
The record is silent on the dates Fireman's Fund discovered the default judgments and when Fireman's Fund located the insurance policies.
The parties analyze the factors articulated in Rappleyea . We too analyze those factors, but note that the case before us does not fit neatly within the factual scenario contemplated by Rappleyea . In that case, two named defendants were properly served with the complaint but filed their answer late because they were misadvised about the filing fee, and they moved to vacate the default after the deadline in Code of Civil Procedure section 473. Applying a "stringent three-pronged test," the California Supreme Court determined defendants were entitled to equitable relief. (Rappleyea, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 982,
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.