People v. Jones
Cases that cite this one
201 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.
- People v. Montes (Cal. Ct. App. 2021)
- People v. Delp CA4/2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021)
- People v. Gamboa CA4/2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020)
- People v. Taylor (Cal. Ct. App. 2019)
- People v. Petri (Cal. Ct. App. 2020)
- People v. Dodd CA4/2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020)
- People v. Williams CA4/2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021)
- People v. Smith CA6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021)
- People v. Smith CA6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021)
- People v. Pulidocolmenero CA4/2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021)
- People v. Silva CA4/2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021)
- People v. Radabaugh CA4/2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021)
- People v. Duenas (Cal. Ct. App. 2020)
- People v. Camacho CA4/2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020)
- People v. Espinosa-Alvarez CA4/2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020)
- People v. Oliver (Cal. Ct. App. 2020)
- People v. Campos CA4/1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022)
- People v. Stokes CA4/2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022)
- People v. Rockhold CA4/1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021)
- People v. Zyszkiewicz CA5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021)
- People v. Yanez CA6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021)
- People v. Johnson (Cal. Ct. App. 2020)
- People v. Farrow CA4/2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020)
- People v. Gales CA1/5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020)
- People v. Ward CA4/1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
RAPHAEL J.
*1029Defendant and appellant Carl Jones was convicted of sodomy of an unconscious victim pursuant to Penal Code section 286, subdivision (f), a felony. The trial exhibits included a video recording where Jones's roommate recounted what she had observed to an investigator. What the roommate said was hard to discern at times, and the parties disputed whether she said she heard the victim tell Jones immediately before the incident that " 'I'm a little horny.' " Whether the victim made such a remark would bear on whether she was conscious and gave consent. On appeal, Jones contends that the trial court erred by not providing the jury a version of the video's transcript that contains the line " 'I'm a little horny.' " The trial court correctly informed the jury, however, that the video itself was the *1030evidence, not any transcript purporting to indicate the contents of the video. Therefore, in the unpublished portion of this opinion, we reject Jones's contention and affirm the conviction.
In a supplemental brief relying on People v. Dueñas (2019)
I. FACTS
II. DISCUSSION
*192A. The Conviction
B. Dueñas Error
While this case was pending, another district of this Court of Appeal decided Dueñas , which held that a trial court must "conduct an ability to pay hearing and ascertain a defendant's present ability to pay" before requiring a defendant to pay assessments under Government Code section 70373 and Penal Code section 1465.8 or a restitution fine under Penal Code section 1202.4. ( Dueñas ,
As we explain, although Jones did not object to the fine and fees below, he may raise it for the first time on appeal because an objection prior to Dueñas " 'would have been futile or wholly unsupported by substantive law then in existence.' " ( People v. Brooks (2017)
1. Forfeiture
"Reviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an issue at trial where an objection would have been futile or wholly unsupported by substantive law then in existence." ( People v. Welch (1993)
At the time of Jones's trial and sentencing, controlling case law on point effectively foreclosed any objection that imposing the $300 restitution fine without conducting an ability to pay hearing violated his due process rights. In *193People v. Long (1985)
At bottom, Dueñas simply disagreed with Long 's due process analysis. ( Dueñas , supra , 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1172, fn. 10,
Aside from Long , the Penal Code itself all but precluded Jones from meaningfully contesting the restitution fine. Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(1) states that "[i]f the person is convicted of a felony, the fine shall not be less than three hundred dollars ($300)," which was the amount imposed here. Subdivision (c) of that section, moreover, states that "[i]nability to pay may be considered only in increasing the amount of the restitution fine in excess of the minimum fine pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (b)." (Italics added.) Because only the minimum amount was imposed, the statute strongly supported the conclusion that the trial court had no discretion to take ability to pay into account.
Similarly, the relevant statutes all but foreclosed any due process objections to the court facilities or court operations assessments. As Dueñas noted, neither Government Code section 70373 nor Penal Code section 1465.8 expressly requires that the pertinent assessment be premised on an ability to pay. (See Dueñas , supra , 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1166,
In People v. Frandsen (2019)
With regard to the court facilities and court operations assessments, however, Frandsen stated that nothing prevented the defendant from "making the same request that the defendant in Dueñas made ...." ( Frandsen , supra , 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1154,
*1034As discussed above, due to controlling authority in Long , it was reasonable for Jones to conclude at the time of his sentencing that he could not meaningfully raise the objection that ultimately prevailed in Dueñas. As our Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he circumstance that some attorneys may have had the foresight to raise this issue does not mean that *195competent and knowledgeable counsel reasonably could have been expected to anticipate[ ]" the change in law. ( Black , supra , 41 Cal.4th at p. 812,
Moreover, the fact that a new case relies on long-held principles or other established law does not necessarily mean it was foreseeable. Black demonstrates this. There, our Supreme Court considered whether a defendant forfeited a claim that he was entitled to a jury trial on sentencing issues based on an argument that the United States Supreme Court would eventually accept in Blakely v. Washington (2004)
At the time Jones was sentenced, Long and the relevant statutes would have meaningfully foreclosed the argument he now seeks to advance. Jones could not have been expected to anticipate Dueñas , even though Dueñas applied principles first articulated in other contexts long ago. Accordingly, he has not forfeited his claim.
2. Harmless Error
The People do not dispute that the trial court imposed the fees and restitution fine without conducting an ability to pay hearing. The People thus concede that Dueñas error occurred. Nevertheless, the People contend that any such error was harmless.
*1035A " 'very limited class' " of federal constitutional errors are "subject to per se reversal"; all others are "amenable to harmless error analysis." ( People v. Aranda (2012)
Because no ability to pay hearing was held, it is not defendant's burden on appeal to establish his eligibility for relief. Nevertheless, *196we will find Dueñas error harmless if the record demonstrated he cannot make such a showing. Here, he cannot do so. Jones was sentenced to a term of six years with a credit of 332 days for presentence custody and conduct. Wages in California prisons currently range from $12 to $56 a month. ( Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3041.2, subd. (a)(1) ; Cal. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Operations Manual, ch. 5, art. 12, § 51120.6, pp. 354-355 (Jan. 1, 2019) < https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ccjbh/wp-content/uploads/sites/172/2019/06/Ch_5_2019_DOM.pdf> [as of June 26, 2019].) And half of any wages earned (along with half of any deposits made into his trust account) are deducted to pay any outstanding restitution fine. ( Pen. Code, § 2085.5, subd. (a) ; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3097, subd. (f).) Given that the restitution fine is $300 and the assessments are $70, Jones will have sufficient time to earn these amounts during his sentence, even assuming Jones earns nothing more than the minimum. (At $12 a month, Jones will have earned $720 after five years, $300 of which will be deducted to pay for the restitution fine, leaving $420 to pay the remaining $70.) In our view, this forecloses a meritorious inability to pay argument. (See People v. Hennessey (1995)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed. The trial court is directed to modify the abstract of judgment to indicate the imposition of the assessments *1036and restitution fine and forward a copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
We concur:
MCKINSTER Acting P. J.
MILLER J.
See footnote *, ante .
See footnote *, ante .
The record does not specify the statute or statutes invoked in assessing the $70, but it is apparently a combination of a $30 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1) ) and a $40 court operations assessment (Pen. Code, § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1) ), both of which "shall be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense" subject to exceptions not applicable here. Because these amounts are not reflected in the abstract of judgment, we order that the abstract of judgment be corrected to reflect these amounts. (People v. Mitchell (2001)
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.