Filed 1/15/21 City of San Diego v. Nelson CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, D073207 Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2016- 00039245-CU-PT-CTL) ALICE HOWARD NELSON et al., Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Lisa C. Schall and Richard S. Whitney, Judges. Affirmed.

Alice Howard Nelson, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

Andrew Nelson, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Timothy K. Branson, and David A.

Chasin for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Alice Howard Nelson (also known as Alice Howard) and Andrew Nelson appeal from a judgment of abandonment of their mobilehome, which was situated on property owned by the City of San Diego (City) at the former De Anza Cove Mobilehome Park (Park). The judgment of abandonment authorized the City to dispose of the mobilehome and awarded damages in the City’s favor. (Civ. Code, § 798.61.)1 Appellants contend the trial court erred when it determined the mobilehome was abandoned, failed to comply with a bankruptcy stay, and improperly refused to continue a hearing at which Alice failed to appear. Appellants also challenge the manner of service of the City’s notices and petition. Appellants have not demonstrated they are entitled to relief. We affirm the judgment.

FACTS The City of San Diego owned the property on which the former De Anza Cove Mobilehome Park was located. Appellants resided in a mobilehome stationed at the Park. Appellants owned the mobilehome and paid rent to the City for a spot at the Park. The mobilehome sat atop a concrete slab; it was not attached to the land.

In 2010, the City obtained a judgment against Alice in an unlawful detainer action. In addition to a judgment of possession, the judgment included an award of damages totaling $95,981.55. In August 2012, while an appeal of the unlawful detainer judgment was pending, Alice informed the Park property manager she had vacated her unit. The unlawful detainer judgment became final in November 2014. After resolution of various lawsuits involving the property, the City closed the Park to the majority of its former residents in January 2016, and to all remaining residents in October 2016. After closing the Park, the City fenced it off to prevent anyone from entering without permission. The City did this “to protect the property and the City.”

In addition to posting a copy of the Notice at the mobilehome, counsel also sent copies of the Notice via certified mail to multiple off-premises addresses he had located through research and e-mailed copies to her attorney in the unlawful detainer action and prior class counsel.

In a letter to the designated attorney, Alice wrote, “It has just come to my attention that your law firm . . . is possibly pursuing a lawsuit against me

The City sent a letter to the address provided by Alice offering to waive its monetary claims against her in exchange for her either removing the mobilehome or permitting the City to remove the mobilehome. Alice responded via e-mail, stating, “We just received your letter and are seeking legal counsel and advice. [¶] Please clarify all of the statements that you made in your letter addressed to us.”

By now, the City’s attorney was also in contact with the attorney who had represented Alice in the unlawful detainer action. The City sent a proposed agreement memorializing the City’s offer to waive its monetary claims against Alice in exchange for removal of the mobilehome; however, Alice failed to respond.

In November 2016, the City petitioned for a judicial declaration of abandonment pursuant to section 798.61. The petition stated that Park management would dispose of the abandoned mobilehome and not seek a tax clearance certificate, management did not intend to sell the mobilehome’s contents before its disposal, and management intended to file a notice of disposal with the Department of Housing and Community Development and complete the disposal process consistent with the statutory requirements. In addition to serving the parties, the City sent a copy of the petition to the county tax collector, stating, “Please be advised that the City of San Diego

intends to dispose of the abandoned unit.” The petition also sought damages for past due rent.3 Originally, the petition named only Alice as a respondent. In December 2016, Alice’s son Andrew was added to the title of the mobilehome as a registered owner. Although it is unclear from the incomplete record, the City reports that Andrew was added as a respondent after he voluntarily appeared in the action, based on his assertion of an ownership interest in the mobilehome.

Andrew filed a general denial in response to the petition stating he was a co-owner of the mobilehome, he denied all asserted claims, and he had not been served. Alice also generally denied all claims asserted by the City. She claimed the mobilehome was not abandoned, but rather the City prevented her from going to it, and further claimed she had not been properly served.

She filed an additional declaration stating she had attempted to obtain copies of documents from counsel’s downtown office; however, the employees there “refused to serve [her] with the papers that [she] never received” and refused to accept her “legal papers.” She again claimed the City prevented her from entering the Park and “blocked [her]” from her home.

The City filed a prehearing brief attaching declarations and evidence in support of its petition. A declaration from the Park’s property manager explained the mobilehome was located on property formerly known as the De Anza Cove Mobilehome Park, the unit was not permanently attached to the land, Alice had informed management she had vacated her unit in August

2012, and Appellants failed to pay rent after March 2010.4 The City claimed it was entitled to damages for unpaid rent accruing from the posting of the abandonment notice in August 2016 through the date of hearing on the petition at a rate of $548.52 per month, Alice’s prior monthly rent.

The property manager’s declaration further stated: “The unit is vacant and has been so for several years.

Further, with the exception of [Alice] attempting to come onto the property a few times in late 2016, there has been no activity in the unit that I or any of my staff have observed. . . . Based on the fact that the City obtained a judgment for possession against [Alice] in 2011, that she informed us that she was vacating the unit in August 2012, that her appeals have been dismissed, that the unit has remained vacant and unused for several years, and that [Alice] has not taken steps to remove the unit, I believe, as most reasonable people would, that [Alice] has abandoned the unit. Although I understand [Alice] contests the City in this abandonment proceeding and asserts she has not abandoned the unit, it does not make sense that she claims to maintain an interest in the unit but will not take steps to remove the mobilehome from the Park despite the Park closure.”

There is no record of any prehearing brief submitted by Appellants.

The matter was originally set to be heard in April 2017. However, on the day of the hearing, Appellants filed a request to stay proceedings based on pending bankruptcy proceedings, and proceedings were stayed. After the bankruptcy stay was lifted as to Andrew, an order finding abandonment was entered against Andrew only, after a hearing in November 2017. An order was entered against Alice after her bankruptcy stay was lifted in May 2018.

The hearing proceeded in Alice’s absence after the court denied a request for

Shortly thereafter, the trial court entered a judgment of abandonment, authorizing the City to dispose of the mobilehome pursuant to the statute. (§ 798.61, subd. (f).) We exercised our discretion to treat prematurely filed notices of appeal as being taken from the appealable judgment.

DISCUSSION I.

Applicable Law “The state Mobilehome Residency Law (Civ. Code, § 798 et seq.) regulates relations between the owners and residents of mobilehome parks.” (Cacho v. Boudreau (2007) 40 Cal.4th 341, 345, fn. omitted.) Among other things, the Mobilehome Residency Law sets forth the procedure mobilehome

At the hearing on the petition, the petitioner must “show[] by a preponderance of the evidence that the criteria for an abandoned mobilehome has been satisfied . . . .” (§ 798.61, subd. (d)(2).) If the petitioner does so, “and no party establishes an interest [in the mobilehome] . . . and tenders all past due rent and other charges, the court shall enter a judgment of abandonment, determine the amount of charges to which the petitioner is entitled, and award attorney’s fees and costs to the petitioner.” (Ibid.)

The statute prescribes the procedures management must undertake, having obtained a judgment of abandonment, to sell or dispose of the abandoned mobilehome. (§ 798.61, subds. (e), (f).) At any time prior to the sale or disposal of the abandoned mobilehome, “any person having a right to possession of the abandoned mobilehome may recover and remove it from the premises upon payment to the management of all rent or other charges due, including reasonable costs of storage and other costs awarded by the court.” (Id., subds. (e)(1)(C), (f)(1)(D).)

II.

Standard of Review There are no published cases specifying the standard of review applicable to a judgment of abandonment under Civil Code section 798.61.

Appellants do not address the applicable standard of review in their briefing.

The City contends the judgment should be reviewed under the same abuse of discretion standard applicable to a trial court’s decision in an action for declaratory relief. (See Osseous Technologies of America, Inc. v. DiscoveryOrtho Partners LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 357, 364 [court’s decision to grant or deny declaratory relief will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion].) However, the trial court’s authority to grant declaratory relief is inherently discretionary. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1060, 1061; see Osseous Technologies, at p. 364.) The abandonment statute is not inherently discretionary; it sets forth the criteria for an abandoned mobilehome and the procedure a petitioner must undertake to obtain a judgment, which is required prior to disposal or sale of the abandoned property. (See Civ. Code, § 798.61, subds. (b)-(d).) If the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence the criteria have been satisfied, and no party establishes an interest in the mobilehome and tenders all past due rent and other charges, “the court shall enter a judgment of abandonment . . . .” (Id., subd. (d)(2), italics added.)

In light of the statutory language, we find the appropriate standard of review is a mixed one. (See, e.g., Robinson v. City of Yucaipa (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1514, 1516-1517 [noting that interpretation of a statute is a question of law, while fact questions are reviewed for substantial evidence, and concluding Mobilehome Residency Law does not preempt local rent control ordinance].) We defer to the facts, as found by the trial court, if they are supported by substantial evidence. (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632 [trial court’s resolution of disputed factual issues must be affirmed so long as supported by substantial evidence].) We review the entire record to determine whether the evidence was sufficient, resolving all evidentiary conflicts and indulging all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 577; Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hospital (2012) 55 Cal.4th 291, 308.) If there is substantial evidence in support of the trial court’s factual determinations, “it is of no consequence that the trial court believing other evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.” (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 874, italics omitted.)

Whether the historical facts (i.e., those found by the trial court, if supported by substantial evidence) justify issuance of the judgment of abandonment under the applicable statutes is a question of law we review de novo. (See People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 893-896, 900-903 [discussing standards of appellate review and concluding that appellate courts should independently review a trial court’s determination that the prosecution’s failed efforts to locate an absent witness are sufficient to justify an exception to the defendant’s constitutionally guaranteed right of confrontation at trial]; Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 800-801 [observing traditional notion that questions of fact are reviewed by giving deference to the trial court’s decision, while questions of law are reviewed under a nondeferential standard, affording plenary review, and concluding the court should independently determine whether the trial court was correct in finding a settlement note to be usurious]; cf., People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1272 [concluding appellate courts should apply abuse of discretion standard of review to trial court’s grant of new trial on ground of prejudicial juror misconduct].) Regardless of whether we apply a de novo, substantial evidence, or abuse of discretion standard of review, we conclude Appellants have not demonstrated they are entitled to relief.

III.

Appellants Have Not Demonstrated Error The record establishes the City’s petition met the statutory requirements for a judicial declaration of abandonment. A notice of belief of abandonment was properly posted on the mobilehome and served via mail. (§ 798.61, subd. (b).) The petition was filed in the appropriate venue (San Diego County, where the mobilehome was located) (id., subd. (c)(1)), and contained the required declarations that management would dispose of the abandoned mobilehome and not seek a tax clearance certificate, management did not intend to sell the mobilehome’s contents before its disposal, and management intended to file a notice of disposal with the Department of Housing and Community Development and complete the disposal process consistent with the statutory requirements. (Id., subd. (c)(2)(A), (B), & (D).)

The City notified the county tax collector of its intentions by providing a copy of the petition. (Id., subd. (c)(2)(C).)

The record further establishes the trial court’s determination that the mobilehome was “abandoned” is supported by substantial evidence, much of which was uncontested. The Park property manager’s declaration established that the mobilehome was located on property formerly known as the De Anza Cove Mobilehome Park, the mobilehome was not permanently affixed to the land, Appellants ceased paying rent in March 2010—far longer than 60 days before the petition was filed, Appellants vacated the mobilehome in 2012, and the mobilehome was therefore “unoccupied.”6 (§ 798.61, subd. (a)(1)(A), (B), (D).) Moreover, the conclusion that a reasonable person would believe the mobilehome to be abandoned (id.,

The City thus demonstrated the criteria necessary to establish the mobilehome was abandoned under the law. As noted (see fn. 6, ante), there is no evidence that Alice or Andrew even attempted to tender past due rent and other charges for the relevant time period to preclude entry of judgment. (§ 798.61, subd. (d)(2).) The trial court properly entered judgment of abandonment. (Ibid.)

Appellants’ arguments on appeal do not compel a different conclusion.

Appellants contest the manner of service, stating “they served us at our home at De Anza for this case but we don’t live there so how could they serve us?”

The applicable statute requires posting both the notice and the petition at the mobilehome, as well as service by mail to the parties’ last known addresses. (Civ. Code, § 798.61, subds. (b), (c)(1).) Although the record is incomplete, it establishes that the City complied with these requirements.7 The record further establishes that Appellants appeared and answered. “ ‘A general appearance by a party is equivalent to personal service of summons on such party.’ [Citations.] Thus, the Courts of Appeal have explained: ‘ “A general appearance operates as a consent to jurisdiction of the person, dispensing

Appellants also claim the case against Alice “was supposed to be put on hold due to a [bankruptcy] filing,” but was not. They claim the City was aware of an active bankruptcy case when the court entered its ruling. The record, however, does not support these claims. Rather, the record establishes that an order was entered only against Andrew—not Alice—when Alice’s case was stayed due to a pending bankruptcy, and the case against Alice proceeded only when the bankruptcy stay applicable to her had been lifted. Appellants have not established that the case proceeded in violation of a bankruptcy stay.

Appellants contend the court improperly “refused” Alice’s doctor’s note which purportedly “[told] [her] not to appear due to [her] health,” and proceeded to enter an order finding abandonment in Alice’s absence. “[T]he trial court has a wide discretion in granting or denying continuances,” and its “decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown.” (Muller v. Tanner (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 445, 457 [no abuse of discretion in denying request to continue motion hearing].) Appellants bear the burden of showing that the court abused its discretion in denying the request for a continuance. (Mahoney v. Southland Mental Health Associates Medical Group (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 167, 170.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion here. The proceedings had already been unduly protracted due to bankruptcy stays and prior requests for continuances allegedly attributable to health conditions, and the trial court reasonably concluded an additional continuance was not warranted under the circumstances. Alice did not file a noticed motion, supporting declaration, or ex parte application to continue the May 2018 hearing, despite having been previously admonished to do so by the trial court. Instead, she merely sent her daughter with a purported doctor’s note on the same date as the scheduled hearing.

Although the trial court has the discretion to grant a continuance based on the illness of a party, the court “may take into consideration the legal sufficiency of the showing in support of the [request for continuance] and the good faith of the moving party.” (Kalmus v. Kalmus (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 405, 414, disapproved on other grounds in Hudson v. Hudson (1959) 52 Cal.2d 735, 739.) “Illness of a party does not ipso facto require the granting” of a continuance request, and we do not disturb the trial court’s ruling absent a plain abuse of discretion which is not present here. (Ibid.; see In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 823 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying party’s request for continuance of contempt hearing where court impliedly found the request was a delaying tactic].)

Finally, Appellants raise a host of other arguments which are unsupported by the record, irrelevant to the judgment of abandonment, and in many cases indecipherable. For example, Appellants contend the reporter’s transcript from one hearing inaccurately failed to include an exchange between Andrew and the court in which Andrew informed the court that Alice could not afford an attorney, but that exchange is reflected in the reporter’s transcript. Appellants claim a different judge “acted drunk in court” and the City’s attorney “repeatedly lie[d] in court to get what he want[ed],” but they point to no specific incidents or evidence to support these allegations. Appellants contest the prior unlawful detainer action against them and class actions involving the Park and reference various criminal cases purportedly involving their former Park neighbors—none of which is relevant. And Appellants make conclusory and unclear claims such as “The Ellis Act” (followed by no argument or explanation); “Conflicts of interest from many, many sources” (again with no reasoned argument or explanation); and statements such as the following, “There have been multiple attempts on our lives and multiple threats on our lives. We have been threatened, hurt, followed and filmed by Neo-Nazis, Gordon and Rees Attorneys, white racists, etc. There is more to tell.” (Some capitalization omitted.) In their reply brief, Appellants rhetorically ask if they were evicted “[b]ecause [they] know too much[,] [s]aw too much[,] [t]old too much[.]” (Capitalization and bolding omitted.) They request that one of the City’s attorneys submit to a “lie detector test” and questioning by this court, and they conclude their argument section with the statement “More to come.” In all instances, Appellants fail to explain how these allegations demonstrate the trial court erred in issuing the judgment that is the subject of this appeal.

Appellants have not demonstrated they are entitled to relief.

DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to its costs on appeal.

GUERRERO, J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, Acting, P. J.

IRION, J.