Filed 5/19/25 P. v. Morales CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B335175 Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. A361773 v. JOSE RAMON MORALES, Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Shelly Torrealba, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with directions.

Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H.

Chung, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION1 The trial court denied Defendant-Appellant Jose Ramon Morales’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.2 The trial court denied relief as a matter of law, noting the record demonstrated Morales was the sole defendant, and was convicted of murder as the actual killer, not under an imputed-malice theory of liability. The court thus concluded that Morales’s record of conviction made him prima facie ineligible for relief under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), obviating the need for an evidentiary hearing under subdivision (d). On appeal, Morales’s sole contention is that the trial court could not, as a matter of law, rely upon the transcript of a preliminary hearing in making that prima facie determination.

Our Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 (Patton) resolved this issue. Patton holds that a trial court may properly rely on uncontroverted evidence in a preliminary hearing transcript to refute conclusory allegations in determining whether a petitioner has stated a prima facie entitlement to relief under section 1172.6. (Patton, supra, at p. 564.) Following Patton, we reject Morales’s claim of error.

However, also following Patton, we remand the matter to the trial court to allow Morales to file an amended petition if he wishes to do so. (Id. at pp. 569-570.)

Jud. Admin., § 8.1.)

BACKGROUND3 In 1982, Jose Ramon Morales pleaded no contest to second degree murder. (§ 187, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced him to 15 years to life in state prison.

In 2018, the Legislature, through Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), amended section to eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it applies to murder and to require, with certain exceptions under the felony-murder rule, that a defendant act with malice to be convicted of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)

Under section 1172.6, a defendant convicted by plea of second degree murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine must attest to the following: “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under [an imputed-malice theory of murder liability] . . . . [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of murder . . . following . . . a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder . . . . [¶] (3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder . . . [under current law].” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)

After a facially sufficient petition is filed, the trial court determines whether the petitioner is prima facie eligible for relief. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) We review de novo a trial court’s determination of whether a petitioner has

made a prima facie showing. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)

DISCUSSSION Morales’s only argument on appeal is that the trial court engaged in impermissible fact-finding as a matter of law at the prima facie stage by relying on a preliminary hearing transcript to deny his section 1172.6 petition. At the time Morales submitted his briefing, this issue was the subject of a split of opinion among the Courts of Appeal. However, after briefing concluded, our Supreme Court resolved the issue and foreclosed Morales’s contention.

In Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 569, our Supreme Court held that a trial court may “reference the record of conviction [which includes the preliminary hearing transcript] to ‘“‘refut[e]’”’ [citation] conclusory allegations in furtherance of its statutorily required screening function at that juncture of a section 1172.6 proceeding” without engaging in impermissible fact-finding, and may conclude, based upon its review, that the petitioner has failed to make a prima facie showing of eligibility.

Patton compels affirmance. Under Patton, the preliminary hearing transcript at issue here formed part of the record of conviction. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 568.) Confronted with that record of conviction, Morales failed to make a prima facie showing. As in Patton, he “offered only conclusory allegations of entitlement to resentencing relief under section 1172.6 in response to a record of conviction” that in no way suggested Morales was convicted under a now-invalid murder theory. (Patton, supra, at p. 569.) Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it found Morales ineligible for relief.

However, in Patton, the petitioner asked for leave at oral argument to be able to plead additional facts on remand in support of the petition. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 569.) “[O]ut of an abundance of caution” our Supreme Court ordered a remand to the superior court with directions for the superior court to consider an amended petition if the petitioner asked for leave to file one. (Id. at pp. 569-570.)

Here, after briefing was complete in this case, Morales filed a new authority letter citing Patton. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.254.) We deem that citation to the disposition in Patton as a request to remand for the opportunity to plead additional facts.

Accordingly, consistent with Patton, and in an abundance of caution, we remand the matter to the trial court with directions for that court to consider an amended petition should Morales, within 30 days of that remand, seek to file one. We express no opinion on the viability of any additional facts Morales might allege in his amended petition. We otherwise affirm the trial court’s order.

DISPOSITION We remand the matter to the trial court with directions to consider an amended petition should Morales seek to file one within 30 days of the issuance of the remittitur. We otherwise affirm the trial court’s order denying Morales’s petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

DAUM, J.* We concur:

COLLINS, Acting P.J.

MORI, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article IV, section 6 of the California Constitution.