Filed 5/21/25 P. v. Fields CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, E083232 v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1602427) STEFFEN LUTHER FIELDS, JR., OPINION Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.

Affirmed with directions.

Laura Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Jon S. Tangonan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendant and appellant Steffen Luther Fields, Jr., appeals from the trial court’s order finding him ineligible for recall of his sentence and resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75.1 The trial court entered its order after determining one-year sentencing enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision (b), for defendant’s two prior prison commitments were stayed at his original sentencing and never executed. We affirm the court’s ruling. We remand with directions for the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect defendant’s presentence custody credits, as respondent concedes is necessary.

BACKGROUND In February 2017 a jury convicted defendant of two counts of second degree robbery. In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court found defendant had two prison prior convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), three prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)), and multiple prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).

In March 2017 the court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in state prison, consecutive to a determinate 15-year term. Relevant here, the court imposed but stayed execution of one-year penalty enhancements for each of defendant’s two prison priors.

In December 2023 the trial court considered defendant’s eligibility for recall of his sentence and resentencing under section 1172.75. The court found he was ineligible.

In reaching that conclusion, the court noted expressly that it considered several recently decided cases: People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270 (Saldana), review granted March 12, 2024, S283547; People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, review granted February 21, 2024, S283189 (Christianson); People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38 (Rhodius), review granted February 21, 2024, S283169; and People v. Renteria (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276.

DISCUSSION Defendant contends he is entitled to recall of his sentence and resentencing under section 1172.75 despite the fact his prison prior enhancements were stayed. We conclude the trial court did not err in finding defendant ineligible under the statute.

At the time of defendant’s conviction and sentencing, “section 667.5, subdivision (b) required trial courts to impose a one-year sentence enhancement for each true finding on an allegation the defendant had served a separate prior prison term and had not remained free of custody for at least five years.” (People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 664, 681.) Subsequently, section 1172.75 now provides, with an exception that is not applicable here: “Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5 . . . is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a), italics added.2) Disagreement over what constitutes “imposed” within the meaning of the statute has divided reviewing courts, as we note briefly post.

Section 1172.75 further provides, as pertinent here, for recall and resentencing on conditional terms, namely, only “[i]f” the superior court in which the defendant was sentenced “determines that the [defendant’s] current judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a).” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c), italics added; see id., subd. (b) [specifying sentencing court as recall and resentencing venue].) Additionally, the statute specifies that for defendants eligible for recall and resentencing, their resentencing “shall result in,” “as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement,” “a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed . . . , unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1), italics added.3) We conclude defendant is ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.75 because his prison prior enhancement terms have remained stayed since his original sentencing. Simply put, we agree with Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 38 that the critical term “imposed” in subdivision (a) of section 1172.75 must be interpreted as “shorthand for ‘impose[d] and execute[d].’ ” (Rhodius, at p. 43; see People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1125 [recognizing “the word ‘impose[d]’ ” refers “often” to “enhancements that are ‘imposed and then executed’ ”].) Rhodius reached this conclusion to make sense

In particular, Rhodius examined the requirement in section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), that resentencing must result in “a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement.” (Rhodius, at p. 43, some italics omitted.) Reasoning that “[t]he only way for the repealed enhancement to have increased the length of a sentence is for the enhancement to have been imposed and executed,” Rhodius concluded that applying section 1172.75 to a stayed prior prison term would require a resentencing court to “arbitrarily lower” the defendant’s sentence in a way unrelated to the enhancement in order to comply with the statute’s “lesser sentence” requirement. (Rhodius, at p. 44.) Because the Legislature presumably must not have intended arbitrary sentence reductions to meet this requirement, Rhodius held section 1172.75 must be interpreted to apply only to prior prison enhancement terms that were imposed and executed. (Rhodius, at p. 44.)

Similarly, in the uncodified preamble to the statute, the Legislature stated its intent expressly in a way incompatible with relief for stayed prison priors: “[I]t is the intent of the Legislature to retroactively apply [new limitations on prior prison term enhancements] to all persons currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for these repealed sentence enhancements.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1, italics added.) A defendant who had his or her punishment on a prior prison enhancement stayed at sentencing is not serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for that enhancement, so the Legislature manifestly did not intend to provide retroactive relief to those defendants.

Other appellate panels—one before Rhodius and the others relying on Christianson after Rhodius was decided—have held that section 1172.75 applies to prior prison term enhancements that were imposed but stayed. (See People v. Renteria, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th 1276; see also Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 300; Saldana, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 1270; People v. Mayberry (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 665 (Mayberry), review granted Aug. 14, 2024, S285853.) All of these decisions since and including Rhodius remain under review, as the high court considers the issue.

In brief, Christianson, Saldana, and Mayberry diverged from Rhodius because they viewed striking a stayed enhancement upon resentencing as resulting in a “lesser” sentence in compliance with section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1). According to Christianson, this view is grounded in a stayed enhancement’s “potential for an increased sentence” because “the trial court retains the ability to lift the stay and impose the term under certain circumstance[s], such as if an alternately imposed term is invalidated.” (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312.) Under this interpretation, striking a stayed enhancement reduces the defendant’s sentence because it eliminates the risk that the enhancement will be executed in the future. (Ibid.; see also Mayberry, at pp. 674-675 [“Imposed-but-stayed prior prison term enhancements carry the possibility of execution,” and striking them “eliminates their impact”].)

We do not agree with this rationale. It does not account for the uncodified preamble to section 1172.75 stating the Legislature’s contrary intent. Likewise, Rhodius held the statute’s codified language requiring a lesser sentence is better reconciled with an actual reduction in “time served” as the enactment’s goal, as reflected throughout

section 1172.75’s legislative history. (See Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 46-48 [identifying numerous such instances].) Rhodius summarized that history as follows: “The findings, costs, and ramifications of Senate Bill 136 and Senate Bill 483 cited during the legislative sessions presuppose inmates who are serving additional time as a result of the sentencing enhancement under section 667.5(b). The references to financial and familial burdens do not logically follow if a defendant is not actually serving additional time as the result of an imposed and executed sentence associated with a section 667.5(b) prior. As such, to interpret the statute to include enhancements that were imposed and stayed would be contrary to the legislative intent and the plain language of the statute.” (Rhodius, at pp. 48-49; see also id. at p. 47 [the foregoing history reflects “a clear presupposition by the Legislature of an imposed and executed sentence”].)

Consequently, the trial court did not err in finding defendant ineligible for recall of his sentence and resentencing under section 1172.75.

As defendant argues, the People concede, and we agree, the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement of 342 days of presentence custody credits, which were omitted altogether from the abstract of judgment.

DISPOSITION The trial court’s order is affirmed, with directions. On remand the trial court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect presentence custody credit of 342 days, comprised of 298 days credit for actual custody and, under section 2933.1, 44 days

of conduct credit. The court shall then forward the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MILLER J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ P. J.

MENETREZ J.