Filed 11/4/25 P. v. Sanchez CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A171121 v. GUILLERMO GARCIA SANCHEZ, (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 5-170849-4) Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 Eight years ago, defendant Guillermo Sanchez was sentenced to years to life in prison for the murder of Isela Moreno. He now appeals from a judgment imposing the same sentence, which was entered after this court remanded for the trial court to decide whether to strike a five-year enhancement under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a) (section 667(a)) based on his prior conviction of street terrorism.2 (People v. Sanchez (Dec. 20, 2021, A157538) [nonpub. opn.].) Sanchez claims the matter must be remanded again, this time for retrial of the section 667(a) enhancement in light of Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill

Sanchez appealed from the judgment, and in 2021 this court affirmed, except we remanded for the trial court to exercise its new discretion under Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) to determine whether to strike the section 667(a) enhancement in the interest of justice under amended section 1385. On July 11, 2024, the trial court declined to strike the enhancement and left the sentence as-is, except for waiving or staying certain fines and fees based on Sanchez’s inability to pay. The issue of the enhancement’s potential invalidity in light of Assembly Bill No. 333 was not raised.

Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 333 amended section 186.22 to “change[] the elements of gang offenses and enhancements by narrowing the definitions of ‘criminal street gang,’ ‘pattern of criminal activity,’ and ‘what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang.’ ” (People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583 (Fletcher); People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206.) Assembly Bill No. 333 is retroactive under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, meaning it applies to cases like this one where the judgment is not yet final. (Tran, at pp. 1206– 1207.)

A qualifying “serious felony” for purposes of a section 667(a) enhancement includes “any felony offense, which would also constitute a felony violation of Section 186.22.” (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(28); see § 667(a)(4).)

Our state Supreme Court recently held that Assembly Bill No. 333 “applies to a sentencing court’s determination of whether a defendant’s conviction under the prior version of section 186.22 qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction for purposes of prior serious felony enhancements” under section 667(a). (Fletcher, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 582–583.) In other words, whether a prior conviction was for an offense that constitutes “a felony violation of Section 186.22” is determined by applying the current version of section 186.22. (Fletcher, at p. 607.)

Section 186.22, subdivision (a), the provision under which Sanchez was previously convicted, provides that “[a] person who actively participates in a criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for a period not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or two or

three years.” As we have said, Assembly Bill No. 333 narrowed the definitions of both “criminal street gang” and “pattern of criminal activity.”

And as was true in Fletcher, nothing in the record establishes that the prior conviction at issue “was obtained under Assembly Bill [No.] 333’s more stringent requirements.” (Fletcher, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 607.) Thus, as the Attorney General concedes, “the appropriate remedy is reversal of the finding[] on the[ section 667(a)] enhancement[] for retrial under the correct law.” (Ibid.)

The five-year enhancement under section 667(a) is reversed, and the matter is remanded for resentencing. On remand, the People may elect to retry, under current law, the allegation that Sanchez’s prior conviction under former section 186.22 qualifies as a serious felony under section 667(a). The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

_________________________ Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________ Banke, J.

_________________________ Smiley, J.

People v. Sanchez A171121