Filed 12/2/25 In re S.J. CA4/2 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

In re S.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E081498 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J268770) v. OPINION K.J. et al., Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes, Judge. Conditionally reversed and remanded with directions.

Johanna R. Shargel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant K.J.

Terence M. Chucas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant A.W.

Tom Bunton and Laura Feingold, County Counsel, David Guardado, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

I.

INTRODUCTION K.J. (Father) and A.W. (Mother) appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights as to their now 12-year-old daughter S.J.1 The parents argue that the juvenile court and the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) failed to discharge its duty of initial and further inquiry under state law implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.), and therefore substantial evidence did not support the court’s finding that ICWA did not apply.2 In a nonpublished decision, we affirmed the order terminating parental rights on the ground that there was no need for an extended-family initial inquiry under Welfare and Institutions Code3 section 224.2, subdivision (b), because S.J. was taken into protective custody pursuant to a warrant under section 340. (In re S.J. (Dec. 5, 2023, E081498) [nonpub. opn.].)

On October 1, 2025, the Supreme Court transferred the matter back to this court with directions to vacate our opinion and reconsider the cause in light of In re Ja.O. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 271 (Ja.O.). We vacated our opinion and directed the parties to file supplemental briefs limited to matters arising after this court’s previous opinion was filed.

The parties thereafter submitted their supplemental briefs to address issues related to CFS’s efforts to inquire of Father’s extended relatives under ICWA in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ja.O., supra, 18 Cal.5th 271. In their supplemental briefs, the parties agree that the matter must be conditionally reversed for CFS to conduct a sufficient ICWA inquiry of Father’s known extended relatives. We conditionally reverse and remand to allow CFS to conduct a proper ICWA inquiry but otherwise affirm.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The family came to the attention of CFS in December 2016 due to allegations relating to physical abuse of S.J.’s sibling J.J. by Mother’s boyfriend. Due to the concerns in the home, CFS obtained a warrant and detained S.J. and her siblings.

On December 20, 2016, CFS filed section 300 petitions on behalf of S.J. and her siblings. In the Judicial Council ICWA-010(A) inquiry form attached to the petitions, the

social worker checked the box that stated, “The child has no known Indian ancestry.”

Mother filed a Judicial Council ICWA-020 Parental Notification of Indian Status form (ICWA-020 form) indicating that she had no Indian ancestry.

The detention hearing was held on December 21, 2016. Mother was present in court, but Father was not. The juvenile court inquired of Mother whether she had Native American ancestry, and Mother replied, “No.” The court formally detained S.J. and her siblings from parental custody and set the matter for a jurisdictional/dispositional hearing.

Father’s whereabouts remained unknown, and Mother failed to appear for her prescheduled jurisdictional/dispositional interview. Mother was generally uncooperative during CFS’s investigation of the allegations and information concerning her family and background. It was reported that there were no known relatives to consider for placement of the children.

In January 2017, Father filed an ICWA-020 form indicating that he had no known Indian ancestry.

On January 11, 2017, an initial combined jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held. Mother and Father were present. The juvenile court noted that it was Father’s first appearance in the matter and inquired of Father of his Native American heritage. Father denied having any Indian ancestry. At the hearing, Mother’s counsel indicated that contact information was provided for a maternal aunt, R.D. The court set the matter for a contested hearing.

At a hearing on March 7, 2017, Mother’s counsel indicated that she had provided a list of relatives to CFS to be assessed for placement of the children. The juvenile court ordered CFS to assess the relative homes and place the children with a relative upon completion of the assessment and approval.

By March 2017, the children had been placed together in foster care while assessment of the maternal aunt was pending. The paternal grandmother was supervising Father’s visits.

At the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing on March 15, 2017, after the parents waived their rights, the juvenile court found true some of the allegations in the petitions and dismissed some of the others, declared the children dependents of the court, and removed them from parental custody. The parents were provided with reunification services.

By the six-month review hearing in September 2017, Mother had completed her case plan components and was granted transitional overnight visits with the children.

However, there were concerns that Mother was not following visitation rules and allowing unauthorized third parties (allegedly Mother’s boyfriend who had physically abused S.J.’s sibling and was the father of Mother’s fourth child) to be present during her visitation. In addition, Mother had given birth to her fourth child but claimed that the child’s father took the child away and that his whereabouts were unknown. Mother’s overnight visits were suspended and CFS recommended that Mother’s visits be

supervised due to the concerns. The court granted CFS’s request. Father was not compliant with his case plan services.

Mother stated that she had no relatives appropriate for placement of the children.

CFS noted that Mother had worked with the social worker to build a community network that included her aunt and her children’s caregiver. The social worker had met with the paternal grandmother and a paternal aunt and had engaged in a Child and Family Team meeting. The paternal grandmother and paternal aunt had begun the assessment process for relative placement but failed to complete the assessment. CFS reported that ICWA did not apply.

A contested six-month hearing was held on December 4, 2017. Mother sought return of the children to her care. Following testimony and argument by counsel, the juvenile court maintained S.J. and her siblings in out-of-home care, provided the parents with additional reunification services, and set the matter for a 12-month review hearing.

By the 12-month review hearing, CFS recommended services be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing be set to establish a permanent plan for the children. CFS reported that ICWA did not apply. S.J. and her sibling J.J. remained in the foster home of Ms. B. Mother had listed a number of relatives as possible placement resources.

Assessments of the paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt had lapsed. The children enjoyed their visits with the maternal and paternal grandmothers.

At the February 16, 2018, 12-month review hearing, Mother and Father were both present. The court terminated reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.

In October 2019, CFS recommended that a section 366.26 hearing be set to establish a legal guardianship for S.J. and her siblings. CFS reported that ICWA did not apply. S.J.’s siblings J.J. and K.J. were placed together in the home of Mr. and Mrs. B., while S.J. was placed in the home of her maternal aunt J.W. and her husband (Mr. and Mrs. W.).

CFS reported that ICWA did not apply. At the October 16, 2019, section 366.26 hearing, neither Mother nor Father were present. As services were still pending for the children, the court continued the hearing to April 9, 2020. Due to the pandemic, the matter was ultimately continued to June 18, 2020.

At the continued June 18, 2020, section 366.26 hearing, the court adopted CFS’s recommendation, established legal guardianship for S.J., dismissed the petition, and terminated its jurisdiction.

On March 21, 2022, Father filed a section 388 petition seeking to have S.J. returned to his care. The court set a hearing to determine whether to grant a full evidentiary hearing and ordered CFS to respond to Father’s petition. CFS recommended Father’s section 388 petition be denied.

At the hearing on the petition, both Mother and Father were present. Following argument, the juvenile court denied Father’s section 388 petition.

On April 28, 2022, CFS filed a section 388 petition seeking to have the court set a section 366.26 hearing to establish a permanent plan of adoption for S.J. with her relative caregivers, Mr. and Mrs. W.

At the June 6, 2022, hearing on CFS’s petition, neither parent was present. The court granted the petition and set the matter for a section 366.26.

On June 15, 2022, CFS contacted Mother to notice Mother of the section 366.26 hearing, as well as to inquire regarding ICWA. Mother reported that she “thinks” her grandmother, S.J.’s maternal great-grandmother, who was deceased, was a member of the Blackfeet Tribe but could provide no further information. Mother could not provide any further information about the inquiry and did not provide any information when the social worker asked if Mother herself was a member of a tribe. The social worker inquired of other relatives who may have additional information. Mother indicated that she would contact her aunt and uncle and provide any further information to the social worker.

When the social worker followed up with Mother, she stated that she was not a member of a tribe and noted that she was unable to obtain any additional information about her grandmother. Father continued to deny having any Native American ancestry.

At an ICWA notice review hearing on July 25, 2022, the juvenile court ordered CFS to informally notice the Blackfeet Tribe.

On November 2, 2022, CFS sent a letter to the Blackfeet Tribe providing information regarding the parents and S.J. and to verify whether the child had any Native

American heritage. CFS noted that the Blackfeet Tribe did not accept email or phone calls regarding ICWA inquiry.

At another ICWA notice review hearing held November 16, 2022, CFS’s counsel acknowledged that another ICWA inquiry letter needed to be sent to the Blackfeet Tribe with certified mail receipt and to include the name of the maternal great-grandmother R.G. The juvenile court ordered CFS to conduct a new ICWA informal notice with the Blackfeet Tribe and to include the names of both maternal and paternal relatives, including S.J.’s grandparents and great-grandparents in the informal notice.

On November 30, 2022, CFS reported that the social worker had reached out to S.J.’s legal guardian (maternal aunt J.W.). The maternal aunt was unaware of any Native American ancestry in the family and did not know the names or dates of birth for S.J.’s paternal and maternal grandparents or great-grandparents. The maternal aunt also did not have any contact information for any extended family. Mother was unable to provide further information about the inquiry. Further attempts to contact Father about ICWA were unsuccessful.

On November 2, 2022, CFS sent an informal notice letter to the Blackfeet Tribe.

The Blackfeet Tribe sent a letter on February 13, 2023, indicating the child was not a member of the tribe. CFS noted the response letter from the Blackfeet Tribe consisting of one page was attached to its April 20, 2023, additional information to the court report (additional report).4

The contested section 366.26 hearing was held on May 15, 2023. Neither Mother nor Father were present in court. The juvenile court found that ICWA did not apply, and when the court asked whether there were any objections concerning the finding, all the parties stated, “No.” The court thereafter found S.J. to be both generally and specifically adoptable and terminated parental rights. The parents timely appealed.

III.

DISCUSSION Mother and Father contend CFS failed to comply with its duty of inquiry with respect to ICWA because the record does not reflect that inquiry was undertaken of the paternal grandmother and paternal aunt and that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s finding ICWA did not apply. In its supplemental brief, CFS concedes the record does not reflect that inquiry was undertaken of the paternal grandmother and paternal aunt. As to Mother’s claims, CFS asserts that it had satisfied its duty of inquiry.

A. Legal Background Congress enacted ICWA “‘to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture.’” (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 7-8; see 25 U.S.C. § 1902.) Both ICWA and state law define an “‘Indian child’” as “any unmarried person

who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224.1, subd. (a) [adopting federal definition].)

“ICWA . . . establish[es] minimum federal standards that a state court must follow before removing [Indian children] from [their] famil[ies].” (In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 287; see, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 23.107 (2023); § 224.2; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481.) California law implementing ICWA also imposes requirements to protect the rights of Indian children, their families, and their tribes. (See §§ 224-224.6; In re Abbigail A. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83, 91 [“persistent noncompliance with ICWA led the Legislature in 2006 to ‘incorporate[ ] ICWA’s requirements into California statutory law’”].)

“‘“‘Federal regulations implementing ICWA . . . require that state courts “ask each participant in an emergency or voluntary or involuntary child-custody proceeding whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian child.” [Citation.] The court must also “instruct the parties to inform the court if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know the child is an Indian child.”’”’ [Citations.] ‘State law, however, more broadly imposes on social services agencies and juvenile courts (but not parents) an “affirmative and continuing duty to inquire” whether a child in the dependency proceeding “is or may be an Indian child.”’” (In re J.C. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 70, 77.)

Under California law, the juvenile court and county child welfare department have “an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire” whether a child subject to a section 300 petition may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566 (D.F.); In re Ricky R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 671, 678, disapproved on another ground in In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1152, fn. 18 (Dezi C.).) “This continuing duty can be divided into three phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.” (D.F., at p. 566.) As to Mother, this case arguably does concern the duty of further inquiry, which arises only if the court or the department has “reason to believe that an Indian child is involved” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)). This case does not involve the duty to provide formal ICWA notice, which occurs only if the court or the department has reason to know that an Indian child is involved (25 C.F.R. § 23.107(c)(1)-(6) (2025); § 224.2, subd. (d)(1)-(6)).

The duty of initial inquiry begins with the initial contact when CFS must ask “the party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any information that the child may be an Indian child.” (Former § 224.2, subd. (a).) (Stats. 2022, ch. 420, § 43.) Part of the initial inquiry also includes requiring each party to complete an ICWA-020 Parental Notification of Indian Status form. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(2)(C).)

The initial duty applies in every dependency. (In re J.S. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 678, 686 (J.S.); see § 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) The initial duty expands under subdivision (b)(2) of section 224.2, when a child is removed from their home. Under that provision, if a child is taken into custody, the department’s obligation “includes, but is

not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).) Extended family members include adults who are the child’s stepparents, grandparents, aunts, uncles, brothers, sisters, nieces, nephews, and first or second cousins. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).)

Effective September 2024, Assembly Bill No. 81 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.

2024, ch. 656) amended section 224.2 to clarify that this duty applies whenever “a child is placed into the temporary custody of a county probation department pursuant to Section 307, or received and maintained in temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 306, or taken into or maintained in the temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 306, or if they were initially taken into protective custody pursuant to a warrant described in Section 340.”5 (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2); Assembly Bill No. 81 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.); see, e.g., Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 81 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 19, 2024, p. 5 [the bill “[c]larifies the timing, duration, and scope

Our Supreme Court recently held that Assembly Bill No. 81 clarified, rather than changed, the law, and therefore this duty applies in all cases, including cases that pre-date the enactment of Assembly Bill No. 81. (See Ja.O., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 282; Carter v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 922 [“A statute that merely clarifies, rather than changes, existing law is properly applied to transactions predating its enactment.”].) Assembly Bill No. 81 “amended former section 224.2 to add language specifying that the extended-family inquiry duty applies whenever a child is placed into a county welfare department’s temporary custody, regardless of how the child is removed from the home.” (Ja.O., supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 277, 291.) Hence, Assembly Bill No. 81 amended the language of the statute now to explicitly require extended-family inquiry regardless of the manner in which the child is removed from parental custody and placed into protective custody. (Ibid.)

If the initial inquiry gives the juvenile court or social worker a “reason to believe that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding,” then the court or social worker must “make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) This further inquiry includes, but is not limited to: “(1) interviewing the parents and extended family members to gather [the] . . . information [required to include in notices sent under section 224.3]; (2) contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and State Department of Social Services for assistance in identifying the tribes in which the child

may be a member or eligible for membership in; and (3) contacting the tribes and any other person that may reasonably be expected to have information regarding the child’s membership or eligibility.” (D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at pp. 566-567, fn. omitted; § 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)-(C); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4).) Contact with a tribe must include, at a minimum, “telephone, facsimile, or electronic mail contact to each tribe’s designated agent” and include information “necessary for the tribe to make a membership or eligibility determination.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C).) There is “reason to believe” a child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child whenever the court or social worker “has information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.” (Former § 224.2, subd. (e)(1), as amended by Stats. 2020, ch. 104, § 15, effective Sept. 18, 2020, italics added.)

“[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a deferential standard of review.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) Therefore, if “a juvenile court’s findings that an inquiry was adequate and proper and ICWA does not apply are found to be supported by sufficient evidence and record documentation as required by California law [citation], there is no error and conditional reversal would not be warranted even if the agency did not inquire of everyone who has an interest in the child.” (Ibid.) This rule only applies, however, when there is a well-developed record, and “ ‘ “the less developed the record, the more limited that discretion necessarily

becomes.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “If a child welfare agency fails to obtain meaningful information or pursue meaningful avenues of inquiry—by, for example, failing to discover that a parent was adopted, or failing to inquire further after a parent identified an extended family member with more information about the child’s potential Indian ancestry—those facts would be relevant to whether the initial Cal-ICWA inquiry is adequate.” (Id. at p. 1151.)

Here, we are not reviewing a fact that comes through a juvenile court’s resolution of an evidentiary conflict, but the juvenile court’s finding that the department’s “inquiry and due diligence were ‘proper and adequate.’ ” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1134.)

We are thus “not concerned with the outcome” (id. at p. 1144) as to the likelihood of whether the child is Indian and do not limit our review to “[e]nforcing the requirement of an adequate inquiry only in cases in which the record affirmatively demonstrates a reason to believe the child is an Indian child.” (Id. at p. 1147.) Instead, we are “ensuring that tribal heritage is acknowledged and inquired about in dependency cases.” (Id. at p. 1148.) This mission requires that we engage in a searching review to protect compelling and legally protected tribal interests. (See id. at p. 1147.) Yet the deferential standard requires that we not find error just because the inquiry was not flawless.

Finally, if our review reveals “error resulting in an inadequate initial Cal-ICWA inquiry,” then we must order “conditional reversal with directions for the child welfare agency to comply with the inquiry requirement of section 224.2, document its inquiry in compliance with [California Rules of Court], rule 5.481(a)(5), and when necessary,

comply with the notice provision of section 224.3.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1136.)

B. Father’s Claim of Initial ICWA Error We conclude the juvenile court’s finding that CFS’s ICWA inquiry was adequate is not supported by substantial evidence as to Father’s claims of ICWA error. CFS had contact information for, and, at least at some point had been in communication with, both the paternal grandmother and a paternal aunt. Under these circumstances, CFS concedes that it failed to discharge its duties of inquiry under ICWA as to Father’s relatives.

We agree and accept CFS’s concession. CFS has an affirmative duty of inquiry, not a passive one. They are obligated, within reason, to contact or attempt to contact all extended family members as defined under ICWA and Cal-ICWA. Frequently this is not possible, either because the parents lack contact information or the family members are unwilling to make themselves available. Neither issue presents itself here. CFS had contact information for and had been in communication with the paternal grandmother and a paternal aunt, but there is no evidence in the record that CFS made any concerted effort to inquire as to their Native American ancestry.

Accordingly, we conditionally reverse and remand to permit CFS to complete its ICWA inquiry as to Father’s known relatives.

C. Mother’s ICWA Claims Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s finding ICWA did not apply because the social worker failed to file the

February 13, 2023, response letter from the Blackfeet Tribe and the court, CFS and trial counsels failed to verify if the letter was attached to the social worker’s April 2023 additional report to the court. Mother believes the matter should be remanded with directions to CFS to fully comply with section 224.2, subdivision (e).

As noted previously, “where the facts are undisputed, we independently determine whether ICWA’s requirements have been satisfied.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1051; accord, In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 314 (A.M.), disapproved on other grounds in Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1152, fn. 18; D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 565.) “However, ‘we review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings under the substantial evidence test, which requires us to determine if reasonable, credible evidence of solid value supports the court’s order. [Citations.] We must uphold the court’s orders and findings if any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them, and we resolve all conflicts in favor of affirmance.’ [Citations.]” (D.F., at p. 565, quoting A.M., at p. 314 & In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 885.) In this case, Mother has the burden to show the evidence was not sufficient to support the ICWA finding. (Austin J., at p. 885.)

As discussed ante, pursuant to section 224.2, subdivision (e), when CFS has a “reason to believe,” it has three requirements: contacting the extended family, contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and contacting the relevant tribes. Here, CFS interviewed Mother, the maternal aunt, and continued to inquire of Mother to obtain additional relative information, in accordance with section 224.2, subdivision (e)(1). Mother could

not provide additional relatives for CFS to contact to inquire further as to her belief the maternal great-grandmother had Blackfeet heritage. Mother denied membership in a tribe. The maternal aunt denied any knowledge of Native American ancestry in the family and could not provide additional information regarding S.J.’s ancestry. Mother’s sibling is among those “extended family members” whom CFS interviewed in gathering information to determine whether the proceeding involves an Indian child. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4)(A); 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2).)

Once Mother stated that she thought she had Blackfeet heritage through maternal great-grandmother R.G., CFS contacted Mother and the maternal aunt to gather additional information and then sent two informal notices to the Blackfeet Tribe.

According to the social worker, the Blackfeet Tribe responded in February 2013 and indicated S.J. was not a member of the tribe. Although the social worker erred in failing to attach the response letter to the April 2023 additional report to the court,6 based on the record before us, we find CFS made a good faith effort to gather information about S.J.’s membership status or eligibility. In addition, no party objected to the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply at the May 15, 2023, hearing, or object that the letter was not attached to the social worker’s additional report to the court. A social worker’s report is generally competent and admissible proof in a dependency proceeding. (See In re Jonique W. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 685, 698.)

CFS’s repeated efforts to gather information concerning S.J.’s maternal ancestry constitute substantial evidence that CFS met its duty of further inquiry. (D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 570.) CFS’s further inquiry obligation “is ‘not an absolute duty to ascertain or refute Native American ancestry’” but rather a duty to make “a good faith effort to gather information about the [child’s tribal] membership status or eligibility.” (Ibid.; see J.S., supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 690; see also In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 709 [duty of inquiry involves making “a meaningful effort to locate and interview extended family members”].) Thus, the absence of a response letter from the tribe, although helpful for verification purposes, does not per se preclude a finding that CFS fulfilled its duty of further inquiry. Substantial evidence includes all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633) and, “[w]e must uphold the court’s orders and findings if any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them . . . .” (A.M., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 314.)

IV.

DISPOSITION We conditionally reverse the order terminating the parents’ parental rights. We remand the matter to the juvenile court with directions to comply with the inquiry provisions of ICWA and of sections 224.2 and 224.3—and, if applicable, the notice provisions as well—consistent with this opinion. If, after completing the inquiry, neither CFS nor the court has reason to know that the child is an Indian child, then the court shall

reinstate the order terminating parental rights. If CFS has reason to know the child is an Indian child, the court shall proceed accordingly.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS CODRINGTON Acting P. J.

We concur:

FIELDS J.

RAPHAEL J.