People v. Quintanilla CA4/1

Filed 9/16/26 P. v. Quintanilla CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D088199

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. INF1501255) v.

FELIX QUINTANILLA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Arthur C. Hester, Judge. Affirmed.

Denise M. Rudasill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Kristine A. Gutierrez and Randall D. Einhorn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

I INTRODUCTION

Felix Quintanilla appeals a judgment entered after the trial court resentenced him to 17 years in prison pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75.1 Quintanilla argues the court erred while resentencing him because: (1) section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) required the court to dismiss all but one of his four purported sentencing enhancements, and the court did not do so; and (2) the court applied an incorrect legal standard and misunderstood the scope of its sentencing discretion. We reject these arguments and affirm the judgment.

II BACKGROUND

A. Commitment Offense2 On the morning of July 23, 2015, Juan S. broke up an argument between three women, one of whom was Quintanilla’s girlfriend. Later that day, Quintanilla and his girlfriend returned to the area where the argument had occurred. Upon their return, Quintanilla approached Juan S. from behind and stabbed him in the torso with a knife. Quintanilla later told the police that he stabbed Juan S. because he believed Juan S. had disrespected his girlfriend and touched her inappropriately when he broke up the argument.

On May 2, 2016, Quintanilla was charged by amended information with one count of assault with a deadly weapon—to wit, a knife. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) The amended information further alleged that Quintanilla personally inflicted great bodily injury on Juan S. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and suffered two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)), and eight prison prior convictions (former § 667.5, subd. (b)).

On October 15, 2018, pursuant to a plea agreement, Quintanilla pleaded guilty to the assault with a deadly weapon charge and admitted the great bodily injury enhancement, one prior strike, two prior serious felonies, and one prison prior. Quintanilla was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 18 years, consisting of the low term of two years for the assault with a deadly weapon conviction, doubled to four years due to the prior strike, plus a three-year term for the great bodily injury enhancement, plus two five-year terms for the serious felony priors, plus a one-year term for the prison prior.

B. Resentencing Proceeding

On November 8, 2023, the trial court recalled Quintanilla’s sentence and struck the one-year prison prior after receiving a notification from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation that Quintanilla may be eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75. The court also set the matter for a resentencing hearing.

Before the hearing, Quintanilla filed a brief asking the court to strike one or both of his prior serous felony enhancements. He identified two mitigating factors that purportedly weighed in favor of striking the enhancements: (1) multiple enhancements were alleged in a single case (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)); and (2) the enhancements were based on convictions that were more than five years old (id., subd. (c)(2)(H)). He also argued that post-conviction factors warranted a reduced sentence because he had completed or participated in vocational, educational, work assignment, and self-help programs in prison.

The People filed an opposition asking the court to resentence Quintanilla to 17 years in prison (the original sentence minus the now- stricken prison prior). The People opposed a further reduced sentence on grounds that Quintanilla’s commitment offense was violent; he faced a possible life sentence for his commitment offense, but received a favorable sentence under the plea agreement; he had an extensive criminal history; and he had violated parole numerous times. The People also argued that post-conviction factors weighed against a reduced prison sentence, including the fact that Quintanilla physically resisted and threatened to kill prison staff members who tried to move him from one bed to another bed in 2023.

On March 13, 2025, at the resentencing hearing, the court declined to reduce the sentence beyond the one-year reduction resulting from the now- stricken prison prior. In particular, the court denied Quintanilla’s request to strike the prior serious felony conviction enhancements. The court found Quintanilla would be released from prison within a year of the hearing if the court were to strike either prior serious felony conviction enhancement, and he would endanger public safety if he were released from prison at that time.

III DISCUSSION

A. Legal Framework

“Before the year 2020, former section 667.5 … ‘instructed criminal sentencing courts to “impose a one-year term for each prior separate prison term or county jail term” the defendant had previously served for a felony.’ [Citation.] ‘[I]n an effort to reduce the societal and fiscal burdens of incarceration,’ the Legislature amended the Penal Code to eliminate these enhancements, except in cases involving prior terms for sexually violent offenses. [Citation.] It later made these changes retroactive. [Citation.] The operative provision states, as pertinent here, that ‘[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5 ... is legally invalid.’ ” (People v. Espino (2026) 20 Cal.5th 57, 60 (Espino).)

“ ‘A defendant serving a term for a judgment that includes a now- invalid enhancement is entitled to resentencing.’ [Citation.] That resentencing must be a ‘full’ resentencing, at which the trial court must ‘consider a broad range of factors ..., including “changes in law that reduce sentences” [citation] and postconviction factors that inure in the defendant’s favor.’ [Citations.] The resentencing ‘shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.’ ” (Espino, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 60.)

In a resentencing proceeding under section 1172.75, a court maintains discretion to dismiss an enhancement in the “furtherance of justice” under section 1385, subdivision (c). (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1) [“Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so”].) In exercising this discretion, the court “shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) This case concerns one of the nine mitigating circumstances enumerated in section 1385–subdivision (c)(2)(B), which applies when “[m]ultiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B).)

“In a resentencing proceeding under section 1172.75, we review the court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. [Citations.] However, questions of law involving statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.” (People v. Lua (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 472, 477.)

B. The Court Did Not Err by Failing to Dismiss All but One Enhancement

Quintanilla claims the trial court erred when it resentenced him to 17 years in prison because the court imposed all four of the following purported enhancements—the prior strike, the great bodily injury enhancement, and the two serious felony priors. According to Quintanilla, the court was required to dismiss at least three of these alleged enhancements, without considering whether a reduced sentence would endanger public safety, because section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B), using supposedly mandatory language, states that “all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed” when multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case.

As an initial matter, we reject Quintanilla’s argument insofar as he claims that his prior strike is an enhancement that should have been dismissed—or otherwise factored into the court’s exercise of its discretion— under section 1385, subdivision (c). In People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237 (Burke), the court explained that “[t]he term ‘enhancement’ has a well- established technical meaning in California law. [Citation.] ‘A sentence enhancement is “an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term.” ’ [Citations.] It is equally well established that the Three Strikes law is not an enhancement; it is an alternative sentencing scheme for the current offense.” (Burke, at p. 243.) The court presumed the Legislature “was aware of, and acquiesced in, both this established judicial definition of enhancement and the distinction between an enhancement and an alternative sentencing scheme such as the Three Strikes law” when it added subdivision (c) to section 1385. (Ibid.) Further, the court noted, “[t]he Legislature did not otherwise define the word ‘enhancement’ in section 1385.” (Ibid.) For these reasons, the Burke court determined that the “clear and unambiguous” language of section 1385 showed that its “provisions regarding enhancements do not apply to the Three Strikes law.” (Id. at p. 244.)

Since Burke, “courts have uniformly rejected the contention that the mitigating factors identified in subdivision (c) of section 1385 apply to a request to dismiss a prior strike because the Three Strikes is an alternate sentencing scheme, not an ‘enhancement.’ ” (People v. Granberry (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 14, 19; see People v. Guevarra (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 919, 930 [section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) “applies to sentences involving multiple ‘enhancements,’ whereas defendant’s sentence involved an ‘alternative sentencing scheme’—the Three Strikes law”]; People v. Dain (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 235, 247 [“Section 1385(c) does not apply to a decision whether to dismiss a strike”]; People v. Dowdy (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1, 9 [“It is well established… that section 1385, subdivision (c) applies by its terms to a sentence ‘enhancement,’ but not to a sentence derived from the alternative sentencing scheme of the Three Strikes law.”]; People v. Olay (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 60, 69 [the legislative history of Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1), which added subdivision (c) to section 1385, “confirms” that the Legislature did not intend “to reject the well-established legal meaning of ‘enhancement’ ”]; People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 776, fn. 2 [“section 1385, subdivision (c) does not apply to prior strike convictions”]; see also Cal. Rules Ct., rule 4.405(5) [“ ‘Enhancement’ means an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term.”].)

We interpret section 1385, subdivision (c) in the same manner as this broad chorus of well-reasoned judicial decisions and reject Quintanilla’s contrary construction of the statute. Quintanilla’s prior strike derives from an alternative sentencing scheme and is not an “enhancement” under section 1385, subdivision (c). Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the prior strike in addition to the three sentencing enhancements.

We also reject Quintanilla’s claim that the trial court was required to dismiss both of his serious felony priors or, alternatively, the great bodily injury enhancement and one of the serious felony priors. As noted, section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) provides that a mitigating circumstance exists when “[m]ultiple enhancements are alleged in a single case,” and it further states that, “In this instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed.” According to Quintanilla, the Legislature’s use of a mandatory modal verb (“shall”) demonstrates that it intended to “express a command or exhortation” obligating a sentencing court to dismiss all but one enhancement in every case in which multiple enhancements are alleged, without any assessment of whether dismissal of the enhancement or enhancements would endanger public safety.

However, “California courts have consistently rejected this mandatory dismissal argument in construing the ‘shall be dismissed’ language of subdivision (c)(2)(B) and (C),” and our court has “agree[d] with the reasoning of these cases on this point.”3 (People v. Mazur (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 438, 444, 445 (Mazur), review granted Feb. 14, 2024, S283229, review dismissed Oct. 23, 2024 [“Construed as a whole, the statute makes clear that all the mitigating circumstances listed in subdivision (c)(2) merely guide the court’s discretion in determining whether a dismissal is in furtherance of justice.”].)

In People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, for example, the court declined to read the “shall be dismissed” language of section 1385 in isolation so as to impose a mandatory dismissal duty on a court, without consideration for whether dismissal of the enhancement would endanger the public safety. Instead, the court considered the statutory text at issue in light of the “statute as a whole,” which enumerates “ ‘mitigating circumstance[s]’ for the court to consider in the exercise of its ‘discretion’ to strike the enhancement[s]—consideration which, as noted, does not apply at all where the court finds that striking the enhancement would endanger public safety.” (Id. at p. 18.) The Lipscomb court also noted that a contrary “interpretation of the statute would produce absurd consequences.” (Id. at p. 20.)

Every published appellate authority to address this issue has reached the same conclusion as the Lipscomb court. (See Mazur, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 444; People v. Renteria (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276, 1288 [section 1385’s “shall be dismissed” language “can be interpreted to apply when public safety is not endangered and the trial court is considering whether dismissal of the enhancement would be ‘in the furtherance of justice’ ”]; People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 335 (Cota) [“We agree with those courts that have held section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) does not mandate dismissal of all enhancements beyond a single enhancement.”]; People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 297 [“we reject Mendoza’s interpretation of section 1385(c)(2)(C) as requiring a court to dismiss every enhancement resulting in a sentence of greater than 20 years regardless of whether dismissal would endanger public safety”]; People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 241, review granted Apr. 19, 2023, S278786, review dismissed Oct. 23, 2024 [concluding “that a trial court is not required to dismiss all but one enhancement or an enhancement that could result in a sentence of more than 20 years, but rather that the trial court has discretion in deciding whether to do so”].) We adopt the thorough and well-reasoned analyses from these judicial decisions, and conclude that the “shall be dismissed” language of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) does not require a court to forego a public safety analysis and automatically dismiss all but one enhancement in every case in which multiple enhancements are alleged.

Quintanilla acknowledges that every published appellate decision has rejected his argument thus far, but claims these decisions were wrongly decided. In support of this argument, Quintanilla points to the Legislature’s enactment of Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 15), a public safety bill that went into effect about six months after the effective date of Senate Bill No. 81. “Because Assembly Bill No. 200 left the ‘shall be dismissed’ language intact, [Quintanilla] contends the Legislature must have meant for this phrase to be mandatory.” (Cota, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 339.) However, as another appellate court explained when it rejected this same argument, Quintanilla’s “argument merely assumes what it attempts to prove. … This history does not reflect any legislative intent with regard to the phrase ‘shall be dismissed.’ ” (Ibid.)

In sum, we conclude that section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) does not impose a mandatory duty on a sentencing court to strike all but one enhancement in every case in which multiple enhancements are alleged. Thus, we reject Quintanilla’s claim that the trial court erred by conducting a public safety analysis and, based on the outcome of its analysis, imposing the great bodily injury enhancement and both serious felony priors.

C. The Court Did Not Misapprehend the Scope of its Discretion or Apply the Wrong Legal Standard When Conducting its Public Safety Review Quintanilla also claims that the trial court erred because it applied the wrong legal standard and misunderstood the scope of its discretion when it conducted the public safety analysis required by section 1385, subdivision (c). He argues the court erred because it focused solely on the danger he would pose to the public if his prior serious felony enhancements were stricken and he were released from prison one year after the resentencing proceeding. According to Quintanilla, the court failed to understand that it could order his release from prison in two or three years—rather than one year—by striking the prior strike and/or the great bodily injury enhancement.

“ ‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court. [Citations.] A court which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that “informed discretion” than one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record.’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 (Gutierrez).) “Further, an abuse of discretion is shown where a trial court applies the wrong legal standard.” (Littlefield v. Littlefield (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 815, 828.) “It is appellant’s burden on appeal to establish an abuse of discretion and prejudice.’ ” (People v. Pacheco (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 207, 213.)

With respect to the court’s imposition of the prior strike, Quintanilla has not demonstrated that the court was unaware that it had the discretion to strike the prior strike under section 1385, subdivision (c), nor has he shown that the court applied the wrong legal standard when it conducted the public safety analysis, because a prior strike is not an enhancement subject to dismissal under section 1385, subdivision (c). (Ante § III(B).)

Quintanilla also has not shown that the trial court was unaware of the scope of its discretion, or that it applied the wrong legal standard, with respect to the great bodily injury enhancement. “Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court knew and applied the governing law.” (Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1390; see People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042 [“Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court knew the law and followed it.”].) Quintanilla has not affirmatively directed us to anything in the appellate record showing that the court was unaware of the governing law or disregarded it. At the resentencing hearing, the trial court discussed only the public safety threat that Quintanilla would pose if the court were to strike the prior serious felonies. However, Quintanilla only asked the court to strike his prior serious felonies—not the great bodily injury enhancement. It is therefore quite understandable that the court would focus its attention on whether the dismissal of the prior serious felonies would endanger the safety of the public.

Applying the presumption that the trial court was aware of the governing law and adhered to it, we conclude Quintanilla has failed to show that the court applied the wrong legal standard or misunderstood the scope of its discretion when it resentenced him.4

IV DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

McCONNELL, P. J. WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

KELETY, J.