People v. Gonzalez CA4/1

Filed 9/18/26 P. v. Gonzalez CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085130

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCN426808) v.

JUAN LUIS GONZALEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Kelly C. Mok, Judge. Affirmed

Mark Alan Hart, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Paige B. Hazard and Steve Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Juan Luis Gonzalez appeals from a judgment following a jury trial in which he was convicted of murdering Felipe Facundo. Gonzalez contends that there was not sufficient evidence to support a finding that injuries he had inflicted on Facundo were a substantial factor in causing Facundo’s death, and that the murder conviction should be reversed for this reason. Resolving this matter by memorandum opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847), we affirm.

The murder charge arose from an incident in which Gonzalez admitted that, in September 2021, he knocked his girlfriend and her 67-year-old neighbor, Facundo, to the ground, repeatedly struck each of them in the face, bound each of them, and then fled to Texas.1 First responders arrived at the bloody scene and transported the girlfriend and Facundo by helicopter to a hospital.

Facundo then spent the next 132 days at hospitals and skilled nursing facilities. Specifically:

− He was treated at the hospital to which he had been transported by the first responders and discharged several weeks later to a skilled nursing facility; − Then he was admitted to a hospital and discharged to a skilled nursing facility a second time; and − Thereafter, he was admitted to a hospital and discharged to a skilled nursing facility a third and final time.2

Five days after the third and final discharge—and 132 days after the beating he had received from Gonzalez—Facundo died. At no time during those 132 days had Facundo returned home from the medical facilities.

1 Gonzalez was convicted of seven offenses in addition to the murder of Facundo; however, the murder conviction is the only matter placed in issue on this appeal.

2 The date of the beating was September 18 or 19, 2021. The dates Facundo was admitted to a hospital were September 19 and November 17, 2021, and January 13, 2022. The dates he was discharged from a hospital to a skilled nursing facility were October 10 or 11 and December 10, 2021, and January 24, 2022. Facundo died January 29, 2022.

Gonzalez concedes, in keeping with the testimony of medical personnel at trial, that the injuries Facundo sustained in the beating “were diagnosed as traumatic brain injury” and that those injuries “would have a long-lasting impact on his life.” But he contends the beating should not be considered a substantial cause of Facundo’s death. In support of this contention, he focuses on two aspects of the evidence presented at trial. Those two aspects are: (1) that, each time Facundo was hospitalized, his health stabilized to a point at which he could be discharged to a skilled nursing facility; and (2) that, during his second or second and third hospitalizations, Facundo was diagnosed with Covid.

In making this argument, Gonzalez’s counsel characterizes and assesses a portion of the medical evidence against Gonzalez as follows:

“Covid was [originally] reported as the cause of death . . . “The medical examiner later opined that Facundo’s brain injury placed him at a higher risk of death if he contracted Covid-19. A pathologist, who was not present during the autopsy but reviewed the report and photographs, opined that the injuries Facundo sustained on [the day of the beating], together with Covid-19, played a significant role in the death. That doctor agreed with conclusions made by the doctor who performed the autopsy that the cause of death was complications of blunt force head trauma, but Covid-19 was a contributing factor along with Facundo’s other pre-existing medical conditions of high blood pressure and heart disease. Those other conditions, as well as the brain injury, also put him at a higher risk of death from Covid-19.

“A pathologist who conducted an autopsy on Facundo’s brain . . . considered the length of time Facundo survived after the injuries inflicted in September 2021. That doctor opined the injuries could have been survivable, even if they could be a contributing factor to a disease.

“The combination of multiple medical conditions possibly contributing to Facundo’s death from Covid-19 support the inference that the head injury was not a dependent cause. Inferring [otherwise] is not supported by solid and credible evidence. . . . [N]othing about the injury to Facundo’s brain was fatal. Facundo was stabilized before he contracted Covid-19. Covid was the substantial factor causing death. “Opinion testimony that Facundo’s brain injury put him more at risk of Covid, even after he was stabilized and not in danger of dying from the injury, does not elevate the injury to the level of a substantial concurrent cause of his death . . . . This Court should reverse the murder conviction as lacking substantial evidence of causation.”

In examining Gonzalez’s argument that his beating of Facundo was too remote a cause to be considered a sufficient proximate cause of Facundo’s death 132 days later, we focus on the concept of concurrent causation. So doing, we begin with our Supreme Court’s observation that “there is no bright line demarcating a legally sufficient proximate cause from one that is too remote. Ordinarily the question will be for the jury, though in some instances undisputed evidence may reveal a cause so remote that a court may properly decide that no rational trier of fact could find the needed nexus.” (People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 320, fn. 11.)

For the conduct of a defendant in a criminal case to be considered the proximate cause of a victim’s death, that conduct must be deemed “a substantial factor contributing to” the death, rather than just an “insignificant or merely theoretical” factor. (People v. Carney (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130, 1138; see also 1 Witkin, Cal. Criminal Law (5th ed. 2026) Elements, § 36 [“A defendant may be criminally liable for a result directly caused by his or her act, even though there is another contributing cause.”].) If the jury finds that death would not have occurred when it did without the defendant’s conduct, then it need not determine whether that conduct or some other concurrent cause should be considered the principal or primary cause of the victim’s death. (Carney, at p. 1139.)

In analyzing Gonzalez’s argument that the evidence did not suffice to establish that his conduct was a proximate cause of Facundo’s death, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. Under this standard, we review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—meaning, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Jones (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 83, 90.) So doing, we look only at the evidence supporting the successful party, resolving all conflicts in that party’s favor. (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465.) Consequently, “ ‘[a] jury’s finding of proximate causation will be not disturbed on appeal if there is “evidence from which it may be reasonably inferred that [the defendant’s] act was a substantial factor in producing” the death.’ ” (Jones, at p. 90.)

Here there plainly was such evidence. As Gonzalez himself concedes, the testimony of medical professionals at trial included statements to the effect that injuries Facundo sustained in the beating “played a significant role in [his] death” and that the cause of Facundo’s death was “complications of blunt force head trauma.” (See ante.) That some of the evidence presented to the jury might have supported contrary conclusions is of no consequence. As settled case law makes clear:

“ ‘[A defendant] raising a claim of insufficiency of the evidence assumes a “daunting burden.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The test ‘is simply whether there is substantial evidence in favor of the respondent. If this “substantial” evidence is present, no matter how slight it may appear in comparison with the contradictory evidence, the judgment must be upheld. As a general rule, therefore, we will look only at the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the successful party, and disregard the contrary showing.’ ”

(People v. Overstock.com, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1064, 1079.)

As we have stated ante, there was evidence in this case from which it may be reasonably inferred that Gonzalez’s conduct was a substantial factor in producing Facundo’s death. We discern no basis on which to conclude that that evidence was not reasonable, credible, and of solid value.

Hence the judgment is affirmed.

KELETY, J. WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.