People v. Reeves CA4/1

Filed 9/24/26 P. v. Reeves CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D086695

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCD306935) v.

AARON REEVES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Francis M. Devaney, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded with instructions.

Aude Ruffing, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Donald W. Ostertag, James Spradley, Seth M. Friedman, Connor O. Sakati and Sahar Karimi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Aaron Reeves entered a negotiated plea for carrying a concealed dirk or dagger in violation of Penal Code § 21310,1 and the trial court sentenced him to formal probation. Reeves raises several contentions regarding the conditions of his probation. He asserts the trial court erred by relying on his juvenile record to impose certain gang conditions; that the gang conditions are either unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent), or unconstitutionally overbroad; that the trial court improperly delegated its authority to the probation department by ordering counseling if directed by the probation officer; and that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay for such counseling.

We agree that there is not sufficient nexus with the current offense or with future criminality to justify the imposition of the gang conditions. In addition, the People concede, and we agree, that payment for counseling cannot be a condition of probation. However, we do not agree that trial court improperly delegated its authority by ordering counseling if directed by the probation officer. We direct the trial court to strike the gang conditions and to modify the counseling provision to clarify that payment of costs is not a condition of probation. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND At 5:40 p.m. on March 3, 2025, a San Diego Police Department officer responded to a call of a disturbance at the Horton Plaza parking garage. The reporting party indicated that the subject, later identified as Reeves, was holding a knife, refusing to leave the area, and had been observed being aggressive with security earlier in the day. The officer detained Reeves and patted him down for weapons. The officer found a fixed blade kitchen knife with a serrated edge in Reeves’s left front pants pocket, a glass narcotics pipe in his right front pocket, and a small bag of white, crystalline substance in his sock.

The People charged Reeves with carrying a concealed dirk or dagger (§ 21310—count 1) and possession of paraphernalia used for narcotics (Health & Saf. Code § 11364— count 2). They alleged that Reeves had three felony priors. Reeves pled guilty to count one and the People agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and agreed to a stipulated sentence of credit for time served plus two years of formal probation. As contemplated by the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Reeves to time served and entered an order granting formal probation.

Relevant to the present appeal, paragraph 7 of the formal probation order entered by the trial court contains the following conditions related to treatment, therapy, and counseling, which we will refer to herein as the counseling conditions:

“a. Take psychotropic medications if prescribed / ordered by doctor. “b. Participate in treatment, therapy, counseling, or other course of conduct as suggested by validated assessment tests.

“c. Provide written authorization for the P.O. [probation officer] to receive progress or compliance reports from any medical/mental health care provider, or other treatment provider rendering treatment/services per court order under the terms of this grant of probation.

“d. Attend and successfully complete Psychiatric-IF,

Individual-IF, Group-IF cognitive behavior-IF counseling program approved by the P.O. if directed by the P.O. Authorize the counselor to provide progress reports to the probation office or court when requested; all costs to be borne by defendant.”

In addition, paragraph 12 contains the following conditions related to gangs, which we will refer to herein as the gang conditions:

“b. Do not associate with any person who you know, or who a P.O. or other law enforcement officer informs you, is a West Coast Crips gang member. ‘Gang’ means a ‘criminal street gang’ as defined in Pen Code 186.22(e) and (f).

“e. Do not knowingly display any gang signs or gestures. “i. Do not knowingly wear, display, use, or possess any insignias, photographs, emblems, badges, buttons, caps, hats, jackets, shoes, flags, scarves, bandanas, shirts, or other articles of clothing evidencing affiliation with / membership in the West Coast Crips gang.”

After the trial court entered the formal probation order, Reeves filed a motion to reconsider and to modify the terms of probation, asserting that the trial court should exclude the gang conditions because there was insufficient nexus to the underlying conviction. The trial court refused to strike the gang conditions in their entirety but did modify the probation order to specify: “Defendant cannot associate/affiliate with any West Coast [Crips] gang members unless they are relatives of the defendant.”

Reeves filed a timely notice of appeal, limited to the probation conditions.

II. DISCUSSION

Reeves argues, as he did in the trial court, that the gang conditions are invalid as unreasonable under Lent and that they are unconstitutionally overbroad. He asserts that trial court erred in considering his juvenile record when it refused to strike those conditions. Although he objected only to the gang conditions in the trial court, Reeves asserts further that the counseling condition in paragraph 7(d) should also be struck, because it improperly delegates authority to the probation department and because it requires him to pay for counseling despite a demonstrated inability to pay.

A. Relevant Legal Principles and Standards of Review

When a trial court grants probation, section 1203.1, subdivision (j) provides that “[t]he court may impose and require any or all of the terms of imprisonment, fine, and conditions specified in this section, and other reasonable conditions, as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer . . . .” Accordingly, courts have “broad discretion to impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety.” (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.)

However, there are limits to the conditions a court may impose. Under Lent, a condition of probation will be invalid if it “ ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .’ ” (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) “This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379 (Olguin).)

We review the trial court’s decision to impose a given probation condition for an abuse of discretion, considering the facts of the underlying offense and the defendant’s background. (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 379; People v. Patillo (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1576, 1579.) We review constitutional challenges to specific conditions of probation—including assertions that a condition improperly delegates the trial court’s authority—de novo. (People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902 (Smith).)

B. The Gang Conditions

We turn first to the gang conditions in paragraph 12 (b), (e), and (i). Reeves asserts the trial court erred by considering his juvenile record in imposing these conditions, and that they are unreasonable under Lent and unconstitutionally overbroad.

1. Additional Background The Probation Department recommended the gang conditions in the probation officer’s report that it submitted to the trial court. The report stated, under a “Gang Affiliation” heading, that Reeves “has been affiliated with the West Coast Crips his entire life. Members of his father’s side of the family are also affiliated with the gang.”

Reeves objected to the gang conditions at the sentencing hearing and asserted that there was insufficient nexus to the underlying crime. The trial court responded, “Given his admitted affiliation with the West Coast Crips, I’m going to order those.”

The trial court noted this same statement at the hearing on the motion to modify the terms of probation. Defense counsel argued that statement alone was not sufficient nexus to impose the gang conditions, that Reeves was only associated with the gang “because of his family ties,” and that there was nothing to suggest that the crime he pled to was gang related, or that any of his prior offenses were gang related. The prosecutor agreed and stated “we don’t see a nexus as well as to the particular facts of this case and to the gang conditions. Although we do note what probation had indicated in their report.”

The trial court also agreed “that this was not a gang-related offense” but pointed the parties to page 8 of the probation report. The probation report noted that Reeves had three prior juvenile offenses, in 2012 and 2013. On page 8, it stated that Reeves was supervised on juvenile probation from 2012 to 2015, that he sustained several probation violations, including “failing to adhere to his gang conditions[ and] failing to register as a gang member,” and that “his overall performance on juvenile probation is deemed unsatisfactory.”

Defense counsel asserted that the juvenile information should not have been made public without a Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 petition. The court acknowledged the argument but continued to discuss the circumstances of the juvenile offenses. The trial court noted that Reeves had been arrested with a group of males when he was 16 years old, and stated, “I don’t have to be, you know, a wizard to read between the lines. I know what was going on.”

The trial court modified the probation order to specify that Reeves could associate with known West Coast [Crips] Gang members if they were relatives of Reeves and otherwise denied the motion.

2. Analysis First, Reeves asserts that the trial court should not have considered his juvenile record without obtaining the juvenile court’s authorization under Welfare and Institutions Code section 827.

“In general, juvenile court records are confidential.” (City of Eureka v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 755, 761.) Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 governs the release of juvenile court records. It enumerates a list of persons who may inspect a juvenile case file without a court order, which includes, among others, “[c]ourt personnel,” “the district attorney, a city attorney, or city prosecutor authorized to prosecute criminal or juvenile cases under state law,” “attorneys for the parties, judges, referees, other hearing officers, probation officers, and law enforcement officers who are actively participating in criminal or juvenile proceedings involving the minor,” and “[a]ny other person who may be designated by court order of the judge or the juvenile court upon filing a petition.” (§ 827, subd. (a)(1)(A), (B), (E) and (Q), italics added; see also City of Eureka, at p. 761.)

Welfare and Institutions Code section 828, subdivision (a)(2) states further, “A court shall consider any information relating to the taking of a minor into custody, if the information is not contained in a record that has been sealed, for purposes of determining whether adjudications of commission of crimes as a juvenile warrant a finding that there are circumstances in aggravation pursuant to Section 1170 of the Penal Code or to deny probation.” (Italics added.)

Here, Reeves does not assert, nor is there any indication in the record, that his juvenile records have been sealed. Thus, court personnel, the prosecutor, and the probation department were permitted to inspect the records without court order. (See Welf. & Inst. Code § 827, subd. (a)(1)(A), (B), and (E).) Moreover, the court was permitted to consider information related to the taking of Reeves into custody for the purpose of determining whether to grant or deny probation. (See id., subd. (b).)

Reeves asserts the court was not permitted to consider that same information in exercising its discretion to set conditions of probation once it decided not to deny probation, absent a petition and court order pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 827, subdivision (a)(1)(Q). We are not convinced. The trial court did not inspect the entire juvenile case file or records; rather, it considered information provided by the probation department relevant to the decision to grant probation, which necessarily includes setting terms of probation. It is illogical to conclude that the trial court can consider information in deciding whether to grant probation but then ignore that same information when setting the terms of probation.

Regardless, though, we do not find Reeves’s juvenile record to be particularly enlightening in this case. The specific incident that the trial court referred to occurred in 2013 and the probation violations for failing to register as a gang member and failing to adhere to his gang conditions happened sometime between 2013 and 2015. Although Reeves had several additional criminal cases, and associated probation violations, in the ten years between 2015 and the March 3, 2025 offense at issue in the present case, none of the facts or charges surrounding those cases suggest any gang involvement. Rather, they stem primarily from trespassing incidents and appear to be related to substance abuse. In the case at hand, Reeves was arrested while trespassing, alone, in a commercial parking garage, with a kitchen knife and drugs on his person. The trial court noted “that this was not a gang-related offense” and the prosecutor agreed that there was no nexus between the particular facts of this case and the gang conditions.

We acknowledge that probation conditions need not relate directly to the underlying conviction, and may, instead, be reasonably related to future criminality. (See Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) But here we cannot conclude that the gang conditions are reasonably related to future criminality. As discussed, even if appropriately considered, Reeves’s juvenile record is 10 years old, and in the intervening 10 years, there is no indication that Reeves has engaged in any criminal activity related to gangs. He told the probation officer that he “has been affiliated with the West Coast Crips his entire life,” but the word “affiliated” is vague and, regardless, there is no indication in the record that the affiliation has resulted in criminal activity over the past 10 years. Notably, the same probation reports states, “Acquaintances: [Reeves] sticks to himself and does not have close friends or acquaintances,” which belies any suggestion that Reeves is actively associating with members of the West Coast Crips. Moreover, allowing Reeves to associate with gang members so long as he is related to them actually undermines the conditions’ connection to future criminality, by allowing Reeves to maintain a close relationship with those gang members most likely to influence him.

Again, we acknowledge that “courts may properly base probation conditions upon information in a probation report that raises concerns about future criminality unrelated to a prior offense.” (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1122.) “Yet Lent’s requirement that a probation condition must be ‘ “reasonably related to future criminality” ’ contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition.” (Ibid.) Thus, “[n]ot every probation condition bearing a remote, attenuated, tangential, or diaphanous connection to future criminal conduct can be considered reasonable.” (People v. Brandão (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 568, 574.) Particularly relevant here, courts are not authorized to impose “conditions to shield probationers from exposure to people and circumstances that are less than ideal but are nonetheless unrelated to defendant’s current or prior offenses or any factor suggesting a risk of future criminal conduct.” (Id. at p. 577.)

The People rely on People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, to assert that association with a gang is a recognized precursor to criminal activity, but there, Lopez admitted membership in a gang, and the information before the court showed an “increasing pattern of criminal behavior.” (Id. at p. 626.) Here, although Reeves stated that he has always had some affiliation with gang members, in part due to his familial relationships, there is no indication he is actually a gang member, and, perhaps more importantly, there is limited, if any, information in the record to suggest that he has a likelihood of participating in future criminal activity because of that affiliation. We acknowledge that past or current gang “affiliation” may support the imposition of a gang condition based on the totality of the evidence in some cases, but given the tenuous nature of his stated “affiliation” with a gang, and his lack of gang-related criminal activity over the past 10 years despite that affiliation, we cannot conclude that the burden imposed on Reeves by the gang conditions in this case—including restrictions to his rights to free speech and association—is proportional to the interests served by those conditions.

Accordingly, we conclude that the gang conditions are not reasonable under Lent and must be stricken.

C. The Counseling Conditions

We turn next to the counseling condition in paragraph 7(d). Reeves asserts that this condition improperly delegates the trial court’s authority to the probation officer and also improperly requires him to pay for any such counseling.

As an initial matter, Reeves did not object to the counseling provisions in the trial court. Generally, challenges to probation conditions must be raised in the trial court, or they are forfeited. (People v. Brand (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 861, 867.) Constitutional claims raising pure questions of law, however, are not forfeited by counsel’s failure to object. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887–889 [preservation by objection not necessary when appellant raises facial challenge to constitutionality of probation conditions].) Because Reeves’s improper delegation argument is a facial challenge to the condition’s constitutionality, we will address the merits of that contention. (See Brand, at pp. 867–868.) Doing so, however, we conclude that the contention is without merit.

“The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by [the] Constitution.” (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3.) Trial courts have the authority to determine if a defendant is eligible for probation and if so, which conditions would be appropriate under the circumstances. (§ 1203, subd. (b)(3); Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 379.) A probation officer may oversee and enforce the trial court’s orders but “may not create conditions not expressly authorized by the court.” (People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358.) At the same time, courts have acknowledged that a trial court “is poorly equipped to micromanage selection of a [specific treatment or counselling] program, both because it lacks the ability to remain apprised of currently available programs and, more fundamentally, because entry into particular program may depend on mercurial questions of timing and availability.” (People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 308.)

Here, although the trial court did select several types of therapy, which Reeves must participate in if directed by his probation officer, the selected categories are similar and interrelated. Paragraph 7(d) requires that Reeves must participate in psychiatric and cognitive behavior counseling, in an individual or group setting, if directed by the probation officer. Moreover, the court also mandated, in paragraph 7(b), that Reeves must participate in treatment, therapy, and counseling as suggested by validated assessment test. The additional provision in paragraph 7(d) simply allows the probation officer to manage Reeves’s participation in an appropriate counseling program(s). Unlike the condition at issue in Smith, the provision does not permit the probation officer to require Reeves to submit to residential treatment. (Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 897.) Nor does the probation officer have the discretion to determine if counseling was required or to expand on the type or nature of the requisite counseling. We do not find any improper delegation of authority in this condition.

As to the clause indicating that all costs are to be borne by Reeves, the People again assert that he forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the trial court but concede that it should be modified to clarify that payment is not a condition of probation. We agree. The “trial court may order a defendant to pay for reasonable costs of probation; however, such costs are collateral and their payment cannot be made a condition of probation.” (Brown v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 313, 321.) Accordingly, we will direct the trial court to modify the condition with this clarification. Reeves’s remaining arguments are forfeited. (See People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 858–859 [defendant waived arguments regarding ability to pay probation costs by failing to raise them in the trial court].)

III. DISPOSITION

The matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to modify the order granting formal probation to strike the gang conditions in paragraph 12(b), (e), and (i) and to clarify that payment of the costs associated with any counseling program mandated by paragraph 7(d) is not a condition of probation, such that a failure to cover those costs will not result in a probation violation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

KELETY, J. WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.