UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 1 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 2 FRESNO DIVISION 3 4 In re ) Case No. 18-10306-B-13 ) 5 ALEJANDRO CERVANTES, ) Date: March 16, 2020 ) Time: 11:00 a.m. 6 ) Place: U.S. Courthouse Debtor. ) 2500 Tulare St. 7 ) Fresno, CA 8 ) ) F Ci of ut rh t rF ol oo mo r 1, 3 D e p t . B

) 9

10

11 RULING ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY FEES SHOULD NOT BE 12 DEEMED EXCESSIVE UNDER

(b) 13 14 Parties and their attorneys 15 Thomas O. Gillis, pro se; Michael H. Meyer, Chapter 13 Trustee; 16 Marta E. Villacorta, Esq., Assistant United States Trustee for 17 Tracy Hope Davis, United States Trustee 18 19 Introduction 20 When debtor’s counsel opts to accept a “flat fee” to handle 21 a Chapter 13 case, they assume the risk that they may be under- 22 compensated. The path to additional compensation is narrow but 23 not impassable: convince the court that substantial and 24 unanticipated post-confirmation work was necessary. See Local 25 Rule of Practice 2016-1(c)(3). Counsel here took the wrong 26 path. After assessing the credibility of witnesses and weighing 27 the arguments, the court holds that “flat fee” means what it 28 says. Counsel is ordered to disgorge an excessive fee. 1 Facts 2 A. Before the Order to Show Cause 3 Alejandro Cervantes was having trouble making his Chapter 4 13 plan payments. In May 2019, Alejandro’s income was reduced 5 because he was temporarily disabled.1 He contacted his attorney, 6 Thomas O. Gillis (“Gillis”). He spoke with Gillis’s employee 7 who said they could put his missed payments to the end of the 8 plan or otherwise “take care of it.” Satisfied with the 9 response, Alejandro thought the problem was solved. He was 10 wrong. 11 Several months later, the Chapter 13 Trustee, Michael H. 12 Meyer (“Trustee”), sent Alejandro a notice that his plan was in 13 default and his case could be dismissed.2 Alejandro again 14 contacted Gillis’s office. The employee he spoke with could not 15 explain why Alejandro’s plan was not modified or why the problem 16 was otherwise not straightened out. The employee suggested that 17 Alejandro drive to Gillis’s Modesto office — 95 miles each way — 18 and discuss his predicament. Alejandro did. 19 When he got there, Alejandro was greeted by Gillis’s 20 employee, Kathy Alcaraz. Alejandro met with Gillis for about an 21 hour. Though disputed, Alejandro remembers Gillis telling him 22 that he would need $300.00 cash to file and seek court approval 23 for a modified plan. Alejandro refused to pay, reminding Gillis 24 he had already been paid a flat fee of $4,000.00 for the Chapter 25 26 1The court refers to the debtor, Alejandro Cervantes, as “Alejandro” in 27 this ruling for ease of reference. No disrespect is intended. 28 relying2 L oa nt e tr h ee v “e Nn ot ts i cl ee d o fT r Du es ft ae ue l tt o a nf di l Ie n ta e nm to t ti oo n D it so m id si ss ”m i ps rs o ci en ds ut re ea d i no f C hapter 13 cases permitted by Local Bankruptcy Rule (“LBR”) 3015-1. 1 13 case ($2,000.00 before filing and the remainder through plan 2 payments). Alejandro returned home. 3 Meanwhile, Trustee filed a Motion to Dismiss Alejandro’s 4 case on February 6, 2020. Alejandro and Gillis were served with 5 the motion. Docs. #58-62 and 70. Trustee contended Alejandro 6 was in default under the plan by failing to pay over $3,200.00. 7 The hearing was 20 days later. Alejandro and the Trustee 8 appeared. Alejandro testified to the above facts under oath in 9 response to questions from the court and the Trustee. Doc. #72. 10 Gillis did not appear. 11 12 B. The Order to Show Cause 13 On March 2, 2020 the court issued an Order to Show Cause 14 directing Gillis to appear on March 16, 2020 and show cause why 15 the court should not find the $4,000.00 presumptive flat fee 16 Gillis had received from Alejandro excessive under 11 U.S.C. 17 § 329(b).3 The order also directed Gillis to show cause why he 18 should not be ordered to disgorge $600.00 to Trustee for 19 violating LBR 2016-1(b), which precludes a debtor’s attorney 20 from accepting or demanding payment for services or cost 21 reimbursement without obtaining a specific court order.4 22

23 3All references to section numbers or chapters refer to the United States Bankruptcy Code

et seq. References to “Rule” shall 24 refer to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. References to “LBR” shall refer to the Local Rules of Court for the United States Bankruptcy Court 25 Eastern District of California. 4The Order to Show Cause explained the basis for the $600.00 26 disgorgement. Gillis allegedly asked for $300.00, which would be the minimum amount of the $4,000.00 flat fee that exceeded the reasonable value of the 27 services. That sum was doubled because the California State Bar had 28 s mu os dp ie fn yd e td h eG i pl ll ai n s af no dr st uw co c ey se sa or rs . co u nA sl ee lj a wn od ur lo d m nu es et d s te oc u fr ae m io lt ih ae rr i zc eo u tn hs ee ml s et lo v es with Alejandro’s predicament. 1 Finally, the order also referenced Gillis’s failure to promptly 2 disclose any payment or agreement not previously disclosed under 3 Rule 2016(b). When Gillis filed this case for Alejandro, they 4 both signed a “Rights and Responsibilities” form and filed it 5 with the bankruptcy schedules. This form provided, among other 6 things, what services Gillis would perform for the $4,000.00 7 flat fee. 8 Gillis timely responded to the Order to Show Cause. First, 9 he argues Trustee’s vendetta against him is designed to “poison 10 the well” against his claims for attorney’s fees in this and 11 other chapter 13 cases. Second, Gillis contends Alejandro’s 12 testimony at the dismissal hearing was uncertain about the 13 particulars of the alleged demand for further fees. Gillis says 14 he never asked Alejandro for $300.00 “to file a motion.” Third, 15 Gillis says he had thorough notes of his December 2019 meeting 16 with Alejandro kept in a “post-petition file” that is now 17 missing despite his staff’s perquisition. Finally, Gillis 18 offers the court a possible resolution to avoid “a full ‘he 19 said, she said’ hearing:” he will disgorge $600.00 to Alejandro. 20 But the court’s findings cannot include language that Gillis 21 asked for a post-petition fee. 22 The United States Trustee (“UST”) filed a “Statement and 23 Reservation of Rights.” The statement notifies parties in 24 interest that the UST may file any action or appropriate 25 pleading in any of Gillis’s cases or related proceedings. The 26 UST also reserves rights to conduct discovery to determine 27 28 1 whether Gillis’s fees are more excessive than what is set forth 2 on the Order to Show Cause.5 3 The hearing on the Order to Show Cause was held on March 4 16, 2020. Appearing were Gillis, Trustee (via telephone), and 5 Alejandro. The court asked Gillis if he wanted to cross-examine 6 Alejandro.6 Gillis declined, saying “it is not that big a (sic.) 7 deal to me.” No other party wished to be heard. The matter was 8 submitted. 9 10 Jurisdiction 11 The United States District Court for the Eastern District 12 of California has jurisdiction of this matter under 28 U.S.C. 13 § 1334(b) since this is civil proceeding arising under title 11 14 of the United States Code. The District Court referred this 15 matter to this court under

(a). This is a “core” 16 proceeding under

(b)(2)(A) and (O). 17 18 Discussion 19 1. The court has discretion to address potential excessive fees 20 and local rules violations. 21 A bankruptcy court’s decision regarding the proper amount 22 of fees to be awarded counsel is reviewed for abuse of 23

24 5Attorney Nancy Klepac, who represents no one in this matter, submitted a declaration (doc. #94) relating that Gillis had earlier approached her 25 saying he would pay her $50.00 per case if she took over representing the debtors in his clients’ chapter 13 cases with confirmed plans. She refused. 26 The declaration also states that when confronted by Ms. Klepac about having heard from her clients and others that Gillis’s law office required post- 27 petition fees exceeding the “no-look fee,” Gillis replied, “I am aware of 28 that.” 6 The transcript of the earlier dismissal hearing including Alejandro’s testimony was attached to the Order to Show Cause. 1 discretion. Neben & Starrett v. Chartwell Fin. Corp. (In re 2 Park-Helena Corp.),

(9th Cir. 1995) (cert. den. 3

(1996)); Hale v. U.S. Tr.,

, 1146 4 (9th Cir. 2007). In employing the fee setting criteria of 5 § 330(a), the bankruptcy judge is accorded wide discretion. In 6 re Fin. Corp. of Am.,

(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990). 7 The Bankruptcy Code’s threshold for awarding fees to most 8 professionals is § 330(a). When evaluating the reasonableness 9 of a professional’s fee, § 330(a)(3) instructs courts to 10 consider time spent, rates charged, necessity or beneficial 11 nature of the service, timeliness, skill of the professional and 12 customary compensation by comparably skilled professionals 13 outside of the bankruptcy field. But, when evaluating 14 compensation for a debtor’s attorney in a chapter 13 case, the 15 focus is slightly different:

16 In a chapter 12 or chapter 13 case in which the debtor is an individual, the court may allow reasonable 17 compensation to the debtor’s attorney for representing 18 the interests of the debtor in connection with the bankruptcy case based on a consideration of the 19 benefit and necessity of such services to the debtor and the other factors set forth in this section. 20 21 § 330(a)(4)(B). See also, In re Pedersen,

, 448 22 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999). 23 The court can critically evaluate debtor’s counsel’s 24 compensation under § 329. Subdivision (b) provides:

25 If such [debtor’s attorney’s] compensation exceeds the reasonable value of any such services, the court may 26 cancel any such agreement, or order the return of any 27 such p (a 1y )m en Tt h, e t eo s tt ah te e ,e x it fe n tt h ee x pc re os ps ei rv te y, tt ro a n– s f erred – 28 1 (A) Would have been property of the estate; 2 or (B) Was to be paid by or on behalf of the 3 debtor under a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of this title; or 4 (2) The entity that made such payment. 5 6 Rule 2017 implements § 329 and gives the court authority “on the 7 court’s own initiative” after notice and a hearing to determine 8 whether any payment or transfer by the debtor to an attorney 9 either before or after the petition was filed is excessive. 10 Rule 2017(a) and (b).7 Section 330 sets the standard by which fees are evaluated under § 329. Am. Law Ctr. PC, V. Stanley (In 11 re Jastrem),

(9th Cir. 2001); Law Offices of 12 David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo),

, 401 13 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003) (affirmed in part, reversed in part and 14 remanded by Law Office of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re 15 Eliapo),

(9th Cir. 2006)). 16 Review of a local rule-based sanction is for abuse of 17 discretion. Abdul Habib Olomi v. Tukhi (In re Tukhi),

(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2017); Price v. Lehtinen (In re 19 Lehtinen),

(9th Cir. 2009). So is a court’s 20 interpretation and application of local rules. Kalitta Air 21 L.L.C. v. Cent. Tex. Airborne Sys. Inc.,

(9th 22 Cir. 2013). 23 A trial court’s findings based on its views of the 24 evidence, even if disputed, is accorded great deference. Where 25 there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact 26

27 7 Rule 2017 (a) only requires the examination of pre-petition payments 28 m ea xd ae m i“ ni an t ic oo nn t oe fm p fl ea et si o pn a io df at fh te e rf i tl hi en g o ro df e ra fp oe rt i rt ei lo in e. f” i m pR lu il ce a t2 e0 s1 7 “( sb e) r vs ia cy es s any way related to the case.” 1 finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. In re

B.R. 347, 352 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) (citing 3 Anderson v. Bessemer City,

(1985)). See also, 4 Amadeo v. Zant,

(1988). When findings are based on 5 determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, an even 6 greater deference to the trial court’s findings is demanded. 7 Only the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor 8 and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s 9 understanding of and belief in what was said. Anderson, 470 10 U.S. at 574. When a trial judge’s finding is based on her 11 “decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more 12 witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially 13 plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, 14 that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually 15 never be clear error.” Id. at 575. Now, the court will review 16 the evidence that Gillis’s fees were excessive since he asked 17 for unapproved post-petition fees. 18 19 2. Gillis’s fees were excessive and he should disgorge $600.00 20 to Alejandro’s bankruptcy estate. 21 Gillis told Alejandro that $300.00 had to be paid to his 22 office before the plan could be modified. Gillis disputes this. 23 The court, though, heard Alejandro’s live testimony and examined 24 him under oath. The court observed Alejandro’s demeanor at the 25 dismissal hearing. He was forthright in answering the 26 questions. The court asked direct questions and leading 27 questions and received the same answers. Alejandro was direct 28 in his responses; he did not waiver or shift his focus when 1 asked the questions. The court finds Alejandro’s testimony 2 credible and believable. 3 The court has also carefully reviewed the declarations and 4 arguments Gillis presented in opposition. Alejandro’s testimony 5 is more credible for several reasons. First, Alejandro’s 6 recollection of when he was disabled and the timeline of his 7 visit to Gillis’s office are consistent with Gillis’s own 8 recollection and that of his staff. Second, Gillis declined to 9 cross examine Alejandro who was present at the March 16 hearing 10 on this order to show cause. Alejandro did not have to be 11 there. 12 Third, Gillis’s “clear recollection” does not dispute 13 Alejandro’s pertinent testimony. Much of Gillis’s opposition 14 discusses his office’s inability to locate documents. This is 15 inconsistent with having a clear recollection. Gillis’s 16 declaration (doc. #91) says in part: “I never asked him 17 (Alejandro) for $300 to file a motion.” This does not dispute 18 Alejandro’s testimony (doc. #72) that “they [said] we can do an 19 adjustment, or they can do something.” Gillis’s statement does 20 not dispute that he requested $300.00 just that he did not 21 request $300.00 to “file a motion.” Gillis does not dispute 22 Alejandro’s many attempts over a seven-month period to resolve 23 his plan defaults.8 24 Fourth, Ms. Alcaraz’s declaration (doc. #89) does not 25 sufficiently dispute Alejandro’s testimony. Ms. Alcaraz states: 26 she was Gillis’s secretary in December 2019; that her desk was

27 8Curiously, Gillis offered to accept a ruling requiring he disgorge 28 D$ e6 c0 e0. m0 b0 e r i 2f 0 1t 9h .e r e T hw ia ss sn uo p pf oi rn td si n tg h et h fa it n dG ii nl gl i ts h aa ts ke Gd i lA ll ie sj a cn od nr do i tf io or n e$ d3 0 t0 h. e0 0 p lai nn modification. The court declines to engage in chaffer. 1 “next” to Gillis; she also spoke with Alejandro and his wife 2 before their meeting with Gillis in the Modesto office. She 3 states that she never heard Gillis tell Alejandro to pay $300.00 4 “to work on his case.” But there is no foundation that Ms. 5 Alcaraz heard everything in Alejandro’s meeting with Gillis, 6 which lasted about an hour. 7 The court dismisses Gillis’s contention that Trustee has a 8 “vendetta” against him. This is no more than side-eyed 9 commentary. Trustee filed a motion to dismiss Alejandro’s case 10 due to defaulted payments. Notice of hearing on the motion was 11 served on Gillis 20 days before. Doc. #62. The dismissal 12 hearing was not “impromptu” as Gillis suggests. Gillis chose 13 not to appear. 14 The purported vendetta claim also ignores Trustee’s 15 statutory duties. Section 1302(b)(4) requires a chapter 13 16 trustee to advise and assist the debtor in performance under the 17 plan. The trustee can advise the debtor on other than legal 18 matters. Id. See also, Ferrell v. Countryman,

, 19 867 (E.D. Tex. 2009). The trustee is also the representative of 20 the estate. See § 323(a). Alejandro was in default under the 21 plan. Trustee brought the default to the court’s attention. 22 Trustee is also obligated to advise and assist Alejandro in 23 performance under the plan. Inquiring about Alejandro’s 24 circumstances is part of that. Logically, that inquiry would 25 include whether Alejandro brought his circumstances to his 26 attorney’s (Gillis) attention. The “vendetta” argument is 27 meritless. 28 1 What is more, Gillis did not disclose the modification of 2 the “Rights and Responsibilities.” Rule 2016(b) requires that a 3 supplemental statement disclosing any payment or agreement not 4 previously disclosed must be filed by debtor’s counsel and 5 transmitted to the UST within 14 days. Gillis modified the 6 “Rights and Responsibilities” by conditioning the modification 7 of the plan upon a post-confirmation payment the court did not 8 approve. Gillis did not file a supplemental disclosure. Gillis 9 shall disgorge $600.00 to Trustee in Alejandro’s bankruptcy 10 case.9 11 12 3. Alternatively, Gillis should disgorge $600.00 for violating 13 a local rule of court. 14 LBR 2016-1 deals with attorneys’ fees in Chapter 13 cases. 15 Subdivision (b)provides:

16 After the filing of the petition, a debtor’s attorney 17 shall not accept or demand from the debtor or any other person any payment for services or cost 18 reimbursement without first obtaining a court order authorizing the fees and/or costs and specifically 19 permitting direct payment of those fees and/or costs 20 by the debtor.

21 The evidence establishes Gillis requested that Alejandro pay 22 $300.00 to modify the plan. No court order authorized the fees. 23 The court orders Gillis to disgorge $600.00 to Trustee for 24 violating the local rules.10 25 9Gillis has also been ordered to disgorge $1,400.00 to Trustee in 26 another matter involving this debtor (MHM-4). That order is independent of this order. This order relates to a specific post-petition task; not 27 Gillis’s pre-petition remissness or his inability, because of the State Bar 28 suspens 10i o Tn h, e t ro a tp ie or nf ao lr em fn oe rc e os rs da er ry i ns ge r Gv ii lc le is s t to o c do im sp gl oe rt ge e A $l 6e 0j 0a n id sr o d’ is s cc ua ss se e. d

earlier. See footnote 4 above. 1 There is no question that a bankruptcy court has the 2 power to sanction for violations of local rules. Miranda 3 v. S. Pac. Transp. Co.,

, 519-20 (9th Cir. 4 1983). But the court must consider several factors. See 5 Lee v. Roessler-Lobert (In re Roessler-Lobert),

(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2017). In this circuit, 7 Zambrano v. Tustin,

(9th Cir. 1989) 8 instructs that these factors should be considered:

9  The sanction must be consistent with governing statutes 10 and court rules.

11  It must be necessary for the court to carry out the 12 conduct of its business.

13  There must be a close connection between the sanctionable 14 conduct and the sanctity of the federal rules.

15  The order should be consistent with principles of right 16 and justice, proportionate to the offense, and commensurate with principles of restraint and dignity 17 inherent in judicial power. 18 19 Application of the sanctions should be supported by the 20 violator’s recklessness, repeated disregard for court rules, 21 gross negligence, or willful misconduct. More than simple 22 negligence is necessary. Id.; see also Colville Confederated 23 Tribes v. Walton, Nos. 91-35490, 91-35755,

, 24 at *8 (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 1992). The court examines the factors 25 now. 26 Consistency with statutes and rules. Sections 329 and 330 27 govern compensation of attorneys representing Chapter 13 28 debtors. Section 329 gives the court authority to order the 1 return of any compensation payment deemed excessive. The court 2 has explained the basis for the sanction applying both §§ 329 3 and 330. Rule 2017(b) sets forth the authority of the court on 4 its’ “own initiative” after notice and a hearing to determine 5 whether any payment of money to counsel was excessive. 6 The $600.00 disgorgement order will be issued after the 7 court noticed a hearing on an order to show cause. Gillis had 8 notice and he opposed. The proscription of LBR 2016-1(b) 9 against unauthorized payments made to debtor’s counsel is 10 consistent with the court’s authority over counsel’s 11 compensation under the bankruptcy code and rules. 12 Necessity for the court to carry out its business. Without 13 LBR 2016-1(b), it is conceivable that counsel will be able to 14 prevail on their debtor client to pay more for services within 15 the scope of services counsel originally agreed to perform. LBR 16 2016-1(b) gives the court a tool to monitor counsel’s compliance 17 with their duties and provides some assurance debtor’s counsel 18 will complete the tasks required to navigate a Chapter 13 case. 19 This is necessary so the court can conduct its business deciding 20 disputes in Chapter 13 cases. 21 Connection of conduct to federal rules. Section 329(a) as 22 implemented by Rule 2016(b) requires timely disclosure of the 23 terms of counsel’s representation of a debtor. If those terms 24 change, that too must be timely disclosed. The conduct here — 25 conditioning services on an additional $300.00 payment — is 26 precisely the type of conduct requiring disclosure. Also, as 27 discussed below, both Alejandro and Gillis signed a “Rights and 28 Responsibilities” agreement when this bankruptcy case was filed. 1 That agreement precludes what occurred here. Gillis elected a 2 “fixed fee” compensation arrangement. Under the local rules, 3 additional fees may be approved by the court only if 4 “substantial and unanticipated post-confirmation work is 5 necessary.” See LBR 2016-1(c)(3). The conduct here was an 6 attempt to skirt that rule. 7 Consistency with “right and justice”. The sanction ordered 8 here is minor and limited. Section 329 would permit the court 9 to cancel the entire agreement leaving Alejandro and Gillis in a 10 ruckus over the reasonable value of Gillis’s services. Gillis 11 did file the case and a plan was confirmed. So, some portion of 12 Gillis’s fee is not excessive. The amount awarded here is 13 restrained since Gillis has already been ordered to return a 14 larger portion of his “flat fee” for unrelated reasons.11 15 Other sanctions would be ineffective. Alejandro must find 16 other counsel because Gillis’s privilege to practice law in 17 California is suspended. For that reason, there is no point in 18 the court suspending any of Gillis’s court privileges. Also, 19 the sanction, if paid, may give Alejandro some ability to seek 20 other counsel. That leaves the option of a higher monetary 21 sanction. But here, Alejandro did not pay the additional 22 $300.00. The sanction here is appropriate for the improper 23 conduct. 24 State of mind. When a violator knowingly violates a court 25 rule or order, that is considered willful conduct. See 26 generally ZiLOG, Inc. v. Corning (In re ZiLOG, Inc.),

(9th Cir. 2006). Gillis knew of the proscription 28

11See MHM-4 1 |jagainst asking Alejandro for additional fees without a court |jorder. First, Gillis himself said he would accept a ruling 3 ||requiring him to disgorge $600.00 as long as there was no 4 ||}finding that he violated the rule. Second, Ms. Klepac’s 5 ||declaration (doc. #94) states Gillis acknowledged he was aware 6 |[that she heard from her clients and others that his office 7 |jrequired post-petition fees despite his use of the no-look fee. 8 Third, Gillis signed a “Rights and Responsibilities” agreement 9 the beginning of this case. Doc. #13. The last phrase of 10 |ithe agreement just above the signature block is the following: 11 ||*“The attorney may not receive fees directly from the Debtor.” 12 ||}Gillis was aware of the rule before asking Alejandro to “hand 13 jiover” $300.00. Finally, Gillis is presumed to know the rules. 14 has been practicing bankruptcy for a long time. He has filed 15 ||many cases in this and other districts. He clearly knew he was 16 ||}violating a rule. 17 Gillis intentionally asked for the money. Alejandro was 18 |}clear it was Gillis himself, not a staff member, who asked for 19 extra funds. Gillis did not mistakenly ask for the extra 20 |ifunds. This amounts to willful conduct. 21 22 Conclusion 23 For the foregoing reasons, Gillis is ordered to disgorge 24 |}$600.00 to Trustee. A separate order will issue. 25 26 Dated: Apr 14, 2020 By the Court

27 a“ a | Ko 28 ort streto II, Judge United States Bankruptcy Court

15

1 Instructions to Clerk of Court 2 Service List - Not Part of Order/Judgment 3 The Clerk of Court is instructed to send the Order/Judgment 4 or other court generated document transmitted herewith to the parties below. The Clerk of Court will send the Order via the 5 BNC or, if checked X , via the U.S. mail. 6

7 Alejandro Cervantes 701 W. Magill Ave 8 Fresno CA 93704 9 Michael H. Meyer 10 PO Box 28950 Fresno CA 93729-8950 11

12 Office of the U.S. Trustee United States Courthouse 13 2500 Tulare Street, Room 1401 Fresno CA 93721 14

15 Thomas O. Gillis 1006 H St #1 16 Modesto CA 95354 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28