FILED OCT 29 2021 SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK NOT FOR PUBLICATION U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: BAP No. MT-20-1192-TBG MICHEAL DAVID SOTO AND KALONI RAE WILLIAMS-SCOW, Bk. No. 2:20-bk-20082 Debtors. Adv. No. 2:20-ap-02006 JACOB SMITH, Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* MICHEAL DAVID SOTO; KALONI RAE WILLIAMS-SCOW, Appellees.

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana Benjamin P. Hursh, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: TAYLOR, BRAND, and GAN, Bankruptcy Judges

Appellant Jacob Smith asserted a substantial claim against debtor

Michael David Soto, sued him in state court, and obtained entry of

Mr. Soto's default. Before entry of judgment, however, Mr. Soto filed

bankruptcy.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. Mr. Smith then commenced a timely adversary proceeding seeking to

avoid Mr. Soto's discharge of his claim under

(a)(6) and

(11). But he did not pay the adversary proceeding filing fee. Given his

incarcerated status, he credibly claims that he could not afford to do so.

Thus, even though the bankruptcy court gave him an opportunity to

remedy this defect, he failed to do so, and the bankruptcy court dismissed

his adversary proceeding. Mr. Smith appealed.

Mr. Smith argues on appeal that he was entitled to a filing fee waiver.

Before the bankruptcy court, he relied on

(f). But that

statutory fee waiver relates only to the filing fee paid by a chapter 7 debtor

and required to initiate a chapter 7 bankruptcy case. It does not broadly

allow a fee waiver to other parties including creditors.

Further, while Congress gave the Judicial Conference the ability to

more broadly allow bankruptcy fee waivers, the Judicial Conference has

never promulgated a fee waiver for a creditor filing a nondischargeability

action. See

(f)(3); Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 4, Ch. 8

(available at https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/vol04_ch08.pdf ).

So, Mr. Smith cannot rely on any statute or Judicial Conference enactment

to support his fee waiver request.

Finally, the bankruptcy court had no independent discretion to allow

a fee waiver. An Article I court has no ability to waive required fees. See

Perroton v. Gay (In re Perroton),

(9th Cir. 1992).

2 As a result, the bankruptcy court had no discretion to allow the fee

waiver and necessarily could not have abused its discretion or otherwise

erred in dismissing the case as a consequence. We note that the bankruptcy

court acted cautiously and allowed Mr. Smith an extended time to pay the

fee. And the record is devoid of any evidence or argument that Mr. Smith

could have paid the fee if additional reasonable delay was allowed.

We AFFIRM.

3