FILED OCT 22 2021

NOT FOR PUBLICATION SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: BAP No. CC-21-1046-GHL WESTWOOD PLAZA NORTH, a California general partnership, Bk. No. 2:84-bk-10894-BR Debtor.

SHMUEL ERDE, Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* IRSFELD, IRSFELD & YOUNGER, LLP, Appellee.

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California Barry Russell, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: GAN, HESTON,** and LAFFERTY, Bankruptcy Judges.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades, Appellant Shmuel Erde (“Erde”) has filed

at least six lawsuits in state and federal court, multiple bankruptcy cases,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. ** Hon. Mary Jo Heston, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Western District

of Washington, sitting by designation. and at least nineteen adversary proceedings to recover losses resulting

from a failed partnership nearly forty years ago. His lawsuits have been

dismissed with prejudice and his numerous motions for post-judgment

relief have been denied. His appeals in these actions have failed, and he has

been declared a vexatious litigant in state court, in federal district court,

and in the bankruptcy court.

Erde’s present appeal is from the bankruptcy court’s order denying

his third motion for reconsideration (“Third Motion”) of the court’s order

denying his motion to vacate the dismissal of chapter 111 debtor Westwood

Plaza North’s (“Debtor”) 1984 bankruptcy case (the “2020 Motion to

Vacate”). Erde continues to assert arguments that he has repeatedly made

in several prior cases which were denied and affirmed on appeal.

Erde appealed the order denying his motion to vacate to the United

States District Court for the Central District of California (“District Court”).

That appeal was subsequently dismissed. The present appeal is limited to

review of the order denying the Third Motion. But Erde argues only the

merits of the 2020 Motion to Vacate and raises no argument that the court

abused its discretion in denying the Third Motion. Furthermore, he did not

establish any basis for relief in his Third Motion. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532, all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and all “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2 FACTS 2

A. Erde’s History With Debtor

In 1984, Debtor filed a chapter 11 petition. Erde asserts that he was a

partner in Debtor and its largest creditor. Five months after the petition

date, the bankruptcy court dismissed the case. After the dismissal, the

partnership failed and Erde lost everything. In 2001, Erde began a string of

lawsuits against his former partner Theodor Bodnar, his attorneys, and

others. 3

After ten years of litigation involving the partnership’s assets, Erde

filed a motion in 2012 to reopen Debtor’s bankruptcy case, seeking to have

the assets administered by the bankruptcy court. He argued that the

bankruptcy case must be reopened because he did not have notice of the

dismissal. The bankruptcy court denied the motion and specifically found,

“I believe you knew very well, Mr. Erde, that it was dismissed.” Erde filed

a motion to alter or amend the order pursuant to Civil Rule 60(a), made

applicable by Rule 9024, which the court denied. Erde appealed, and the

District Court affirmed. In re Westwood Plaza North, No. CV 13-00318-BRO,

(C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2013). Undeterred, Erde continued his

2 We exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of documents electronically filed in the bankruptcy court’s docket in this case and in other cases involving Mr. Erde. See Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood),

, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003). 3 For a comprehensive history of Erde’s litigation, see Erde v. Dye (In re Erde), BAP

No. CC-18-1321-FLS,

(9th Cir. BAP June 6, 2019), and In re Westwood Plaza North, CV 13-00318-BRO,

(C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2016). 3 litigation efforts through multiple bankruptcy cases and adversary

proceedings. See Erde v. Dye (In re Erde), BAP No. CC-18-1321-FLS,

(9th Cir. BAP June 6, 2019). In 2016, Erde requested leave from the District Court to file a motion

to correct errors in the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing Debtor’s case,

pursuant to Civil Rules 60(b)(4) and (b)(6). In re Westwood Plaza North, CV

13-00318-BRO,

(C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2016). The District

Court denied the request and held that the 1984 dismissal order was not

void because notice was provided to at least one member of the

partnership and, under partnership principles, the knowledge and actions

of one partner were imputed to all others. Id. at *2. The District Court

further held that Debtor failed to provide any grounds for relief under

Civil Rules 60(b)(4) and (b)(6). Id.

In a 2018 personal chapter 11 case, Erde filed a motion to vacate the

1984 dismissal order and consolidate Debtor’s chapter 11 case with his own

(the “2018 Motion to Vacate”). See Erde v. Bodnar (In re Erde), BAP No. CC-

19-1023-STaL,

(9th Cir. BAP Nov. 12, 2019). He argued

that Debtor’s 1984 case was dismissed in violation of his due process rights

because he was not served with notice of the motion to dismiss or the order

dismissing the case, and consequently the dismissal order was void and

must be vacated under Civil Rule 60(b)(4). See

The bankruptcy court denied the 2018 Motion to Vacate. We affirmed

on the basis that Erde’s due process claim was an impermissible collateral

4 attack on the bankruptcy court’s 2012 decision not to reopen Debtor’s case.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Erde v. Bodnar (In re Erde),

(9th Cir. Dec. 15, 2020).

B. The 2020 Motion To Vacate And Erde’s Motions For Reconsideration

In December 2020, Erde filed the 2020 Motion to Vacate the 1984

dismissal order pursuant to Civil Rule 60(b)(4) and again argued that the

dismissal order was void for lack of due process. Debtor’s former

attorneys, and the target of much of Erde’s prior litigation, Irsfeld, Irsfeld &

Younger, LLC (“Appellee”), filed an opposition to the motion and

provided a description of Erde’s numerous prior cases.

On January 5, 2021, after a thorough review of all documents and

exhibits filed, the bankruptcy court entered an order denying the motion

with prejudice. The court held that Erde did not establish any grounds for

relief and the motion was “simply a continuation of many years of abuse of

the judicial system by Mr. Erde in filing meritless pleadings in many

courts.”

On January 11, 2021, Erde filed his first motion for reconsideration

(the “First Motion”) and claimed that the court: (1) failed to address

constitutional due process; (2) did not address that Debtor concealed assets

in its 1984 case; and (3) improperly relied on evidence of Erde’s prior acts

in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The bankruptcy court denied the First

5 Motion, stating, “[t]his Motion is a continuation of the abuse of the judicial

system by Mr. Erde and is without merit.”

On January 18, 2021, Erde filed a second motion for reconsideration

(the “Second Motion”) arguing that Appellee, and not Erde, was abusing

the judicial system, and demanding that the court further explain its

decision. The court denied the Second Motion for reconsideration on

January 20, 2021, and it provided a “brief yet thorough” history of Erde’s

abusive filings. The court held that the Second Motion was also without

merit and was simply a continuation of the many years of abuse of the

judicial system by Erde.

On January 28, 2021, Erde filed the Third Motion and argued that the

court erred in its previous rulings. While the Third Motion was pending,

Erde filed a motion to disqualify Judge Russell for alleged bias.

On February 25, 2021, the court entered a memorandum decision and

order denying Erde’s motion to disqualify. The court also entered an order

denying the Third Motion. The court again determined that Erde’s motion

was lacking in merit and was simply a continuation of many years of abuse

of the judicial system.

Erde appealed to the District Court the order denying the 2020

Motion to Vacate. Pursuant to the District Court’s vexatious litigant order,

the appeal was not accepted for filing. Erde appealed the District Court’s

decision, and the Ninth Circuit dismissed his appeal as frivolous.

6 On March 5, 2021, Erde filed a separate notice of appeal of the order

denying the Third Motion.

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under

and

157(b)(2)(A). We have jurisdiction under

.

Erde’s arguments on appeal pertain to the propriety of the order

denying the 2020 Motion to Vacate, but we previously entered an order

limiting the scope of this appeal to the order denying the Third Motion

because consecutive reconsideration motions do not toll the time to appeal

an original order. See Nat’l Loan Invs., L.P. v. Brewster (In re Brewster),

(9th Cir. BAP 1999); Martinez v. City of Chicago,

, 725-

26 (7th Cir. 2007).

ISSUE

Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion by denying Erde’s

Third Motion?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review for an abuse of discretion the bankruptcy court’s denial of

a motion for reconsideration. Carruth v. Eutsler (In re Eutsler),

(9th Cir. BAP 2017). A bankruptcy court abuses its discretion if it

applies an incorrect legal standard or its factual findings are illogical,

implausible, or without support in the record. TrafficSchool.com v. Edriver,

Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2011).

7 DISCUSSION

In his opening brief, Erde argues that the bankruptcy court should

have granted the 2020 Motion to Vacate, but he makes no argument that

the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by denying the Third Motion.

Erde filed the Third Motion more than fourteen days after the original

order denying the motion to vacate. We therefore treat it as a motion for

relief under Civil Rule 60(b). Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Constr.

Corp.,

, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001).

“Ninth Circuit decisions have settled that Rule 60(b) is not a

substitute avenue for appeal[.]” Atkins v. Fiberglass Representatives, Inc. (In re

Atkins),

(9th Cir. BAP 1992). A movant seeking relief

under Civil Rule 60(b) after the appeal period has expired “is not permitted

to revisit the merits of the underlying judgment or argue that the trial court

committed some legal error in arriving at that judgment.” United

Student Funds, Inc. v. Wylie (In re Wylie),

(9th Cir. BAP

2006). The movant cannot use a Civil Rule 60(b) motion to reargue points

already made, or that could have been made, in dispute of the underlying

motion. Branam v. Crowder (In re Branam),

(9th Cir. BAP

1998), aff'd,

(9th Cir. 1999) (table).

Instead, the movant is limited to the narrow grounds enumerated

in Civil Rule 60(b).4 “These grounds generally require a showing that

4 Civil Rule 60(b) provides that the court can relieve a party from a final order for the following reasons: 8 events subsequent to the entry of the judgment make its enforcement

unfair or inappropriate, or that the party was deprived of a fair

opportunity to appear and be heard in connection with the underlying

dispute.” In re Wylie,

.

On an appeal from a Civil Rule 60(b) order, we review an appellant's

arguments “solely as they bear on the [bankruptcy] court’s exercise of

discretion on the Rule 60(b) motion. [Appellant] cannot prevail merely by

showing that the [underlying] judgment itself was erroneous.” Sec. & Exch.

Comm'n v. Seaboard Corp.,

, 415-16 (9th Cir. 1982).

None of Erde’s arguments on appeal bear on the bankruptcy court’s

exercise of discretion in denying the Third Motion. And he made no

argument relevant to any of the grounds for relief under Civil Rule 60(b) in

the Third Motion. He merely reasserted arguments which were made, or

which could have been made, in the 2020 Motion to Vacate. The

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under [Civil] Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.

9 bankruptcy court properly denied the Third Motion and we perceive no

error.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy court’s order

denying the Third Motion.

10