FILED MAY 16 2025 NOT FOR PUBLICATION SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: BAP Nos. NV-24-1115-CLB STEVEN MARK HAYDEN, NV-24-1116-CLB Debtor. NV-24-1117-CLB (Related Appeals) In re: WESTERN STEEL INC., Bk. Nos. 22-50564-gs Debtor. 23-50118-gs

STEVEN MARK HAYDEN, Adv. No. 23-05012-gs Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* WESTERN STEEL INC.; WILLIAM B. CASHION, Appellees.

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada Hilary L. Barnes, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: CORBIT, LAFFERTY, and BRAND, Bankruptcy Judges.

INTRODUCTION

These appeals arise out of orders entered in three related matters—an

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. individual chapter 131 case, an involuntary corporate chapter 11 case, and

an adversary proceeding. All three matters relate to a longstanding dispute

between Steven Mark Hayden (“Hayden”); William B. Cashion

(“Cashion”), Hayden’s uncle; and Western Steel Inc., an Alabama

corporation (“Western Steel Alabama”), Cashion’s company. Hayden filed

motions to recuse Judge Gary Spraker in each case after the judge made

rulings adverse to Hayden. In what might have been an excess of caution,

Judge Spraker referred the recusal motions to Judge Hilary Barnes. Judge

Barnes denied all three recusal motions.

Because the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hayden’s

request for recusal, we AFFIRM.

FACTS 2

In early 2007, Cashion executed a general, durable power of attorney

designating his nephew Hayden as Cashion’s agent and attorney-in-fact. A

few years later, Hayden began using his authority as agent and attorney-in-

fact to take control over Cashion’s assets, without Cashion’s knowledge. In

the summer of 2011, Hayden secretly created two trusts he exclusively

controlled and transferred the bulk of Cashion’s assets to the trusts without

1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the Bankruptcy Code,

and all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 2 We exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of the docket and documents

filed in the underlying bankruptcy cases. See Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood),

, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003). 2 Cashion’s knowledge or consent. As part of this process, Hayden took

control of Cashion’s company, Western Steel Alabama. Hayden informed

Cashion in late 2012 that Cashion no longer owned Western Steel Alabama.

Cashion immediately attempted to revoke Hayden’s power of

attorney. Cashion and Western Steel Alabama (collectively, the “Alabama

Parties”) sued Hayden and his wife in Alabama state court. The complaint

asked the state court to void Hayden’s acts as trustee and enjoin Hayden

from future attempts to control Cashion’s assets, including Western Steel

Alabama. The Alabama Parties also sought damages for breach of fiduciary

duty, conspiracy, and conversion.

On August 20, 2013, the Alabama state court entered a final judgment

(the “First Alabama Judgment”). The First Alabama Judgment included a

permanent injunction, which ordered Hayden to “cease all actions that in

any way relate to William B. Cashion’s assets, interests and rights,” and

prohibited and permanently enjoined Hayden from future attempts to

control Cashion’s assets. Additionally, the First Alabama Judgment

declared that all of “Hayden’s actions as Cashion’s agent under [the]

January 29, 2007 power of attorney are hereby DECLARED to be void ab

initio.” The First Alabama Judgment was affirmed on appeal.

Consequently, since 2013, Hayden has been enjoined from taking any

action against the Alabama Parties.

Despite the permanent injunction, Hayden continued to harass the

Alabama Parties through various legal fora and continued to act in a

3 manner that violated the First Alabama Judgment. For example, Hayden

created a company in Nevada with the same name as Western Steel

Alabama—“Western Steel Inc.”—to intentionally confuse and conflate his

imposter corporation with Western Steel Alabama.

On August 31, 2022, the Alabama state court entered an order

declaring Hayden a vexatious litigant and permanently enjoined Hayden

from serving or filing documents without first obtaining leave of court (the

“Second Alabama Judgment”). At present, Hayden has been assessed

approximately $2 million in fines, sanctions, and attorneys’ fees.

A. Hayden’s chapter 13 bankruptcy case

On October 21, 2022, Hayden filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition.

The case was originally assigned to Judge Natalie Cox.

Shortly after filing his petition, Hayden moved to dismiss his chapter

13 bankruptcy case. The Alabama Parties responded by arguing that

Hayden had filed a meritless petition and requested sanctions plus a 180-

day bar on Hayden refiling a bankruptcy case. The chapter 13 trustee also

sought dismissal of Hayden’s case under § 1307(c), for cause, due to

Hayden’s failure to file required documents and to appear at the first

meeting of creditors.

The bankruptcy court granted Hayden’s motion to dismiss but

retained jurisdiction to decide the Alabama Parties’ request for sanctions.

On March 23, 2023, the Alabama Parties filed a separate motion for

sanctions against Hayden. The sanctions motion sought a two-year

4 nationwide ban on Hayden refiling another bankruptcy petition. Hayden

opposed the sanctions motion.

While the sanctions motion was pending, the case was reassigned to

Judge Spraker. Judge Spraker presided over two evidentiary hearings on

the sanctions motion.

On March 18, 2024, Judge Spraker entered a memorandum decision

granting the Alabama Parties’ motion for sanctions. Judge Spraker

awarded monetary sanctions to the Alabama Parties in the amount of their

attorneys’ fees, finding that Hayden had filed his bankruptcy petition for

the improper purpose of delaying the Alabama Parties’ efforts to collect on

the First and Second Alabama Judgments. However, Judge Spraker

declined to impose a nationwide two-year bar on refiling. Hayden never

appealed the sanctions order.

B. Western Steel Nevada’s involuntary bankruptcy case

On February 24, 2023, approximately one month before the Alabama

Parties moved for sanctions against Hayden in his individual chapter 13

case, Hayden initiated an involuntary chapter 11 bankruptcy petition

against his imposter company, Western Steel Inc., a Nevada corporation

(“Western Steel Nevada”).

In the involuntary petition, Hayden indicated he was the sole

petitioning creditor and also the controlling officer of Western Steel

5 Nevada. Hayden alleged he held a claim for $1,530,000 based on a

“demand promissory note.”

On March 28, 2023, the bankruptcy court held a status hearing on the

involuntary Western Steel Nevada petition, and expressed concerns about

the validity of the petition. The same day, Hayden filed a “Notice of

Default and Consent to Relief” which he signed as the “IRS Responsible

Party” for Western Steel Alabama. In doing so, Hayden was attempting to

consent to relief on behalf of Western Steel Alabama.

The Alabama Parties filed a motion to dismiss the Western Steel

Nevada bankruptcy case. Additionally, the Alabama Parties requested the

court refer Hayden to the United States Attorney for criminal charges of

fraud and perjury. The Alabama Parties asserted the involuntary

bankruptcy was another attempt by Hayden to interfere with Western Steel

Alabama by conflating Western Steel Alabama with Hayden’s Nevada

corporation of the same name.

Hayden opposed dismissal, asserting that he believed Western Steel

Alabama and Western Steel Nevada were the same entity—despite his

previous assertions to the contrary. Hayden also alleged that he was

appointed the responsible party for Western Steel Alabama by the IRS and

therefore could exercise control over Western Steel Alabama.

On April 25, 2023, the Western Steel Nevada case was reassigned to

Judge Spraker. Judge Spraker denied the Alabama Parties’ dismissal

motion, citing Hayden’s statements at a May 18 hearing that the

6 corporation placed into involuntary bankruptcy was Western Steel

Nevada, not Western Steel Alabama.

Hayden, under penalty of perjury, filed the schedules and statements

for Western Steel Nevada. In the documents, Hayden identified the EIN for

Western Steel Nevada as ending in 3168, the same EIN assigned to Western

Steel Alabama.

Shortly after Hayden filed the schedules and statements for Western

Steel Nevada, the United States Trustee filed a motion to dismiss or convert

the involuntary chapter 11 case to a chapter 7 case based on Western Steel

Nevada’s failure to retain counsel. The Alabama Parties supported the

United States Trustee’s motion and advocated for dismissal. Hayden filed a

statement supporting conversion.

After oral argument, Judge Spraker converted the case to a chapter 7.

On February 1, 2024, the chapter 7 trustee entered a report of no

distribution in the Western Steel Nevada case, but the case has not been

closed.

C. Adversary proceeding

On August 24, 2023, Hayden filed an adversary complaint (the

“Adversary Action”) against the Alabama Parties, alleging the Alabama

Parties: (i) violated the automatic stay in the Western Steel Nevada

bankruptcy case by participating in a March 28, 2023 status hearing on

Western Steel Nevada’s involuntary petition; and (ii) fraudulently

conveyed property in Alabama because the “purchase of the Sheriffs [sic]

7 sale by Western Steel Inc[.] check was not an exchange for fair market

value.”

Approximately three months after he commenced the Adversary

Action against the Alabama Parties, Hayden simultaneously sought: (i) an

extension of time to serve the summons and complaint, and (ii) an entry of

default against defendant Western Steel Alabama.

On December 6, 2023, the bankruptcy court issued an order to show

cause why the Adversary Action should not be dismissed because Hayden

failed to provide a sufficient substantive basis for his legal claims. The

same day the bankruptcy court entered the order to show cause, Hayden

filed a notice on behalf of defendant Western Steel Alabama, asserting

Western Steel Alabama would consent to entry of judgment. In other

words, Hayden was attempting to act as the representative of both plaintiff

and defendant Western Steel Alabama in the Adversary Action. The

bankruptcy court sua sponte issued an order to show cause why Hayden

should not be sanctioned.

Hayden filed a notice of dismissal of the Adversary Action on

December 15, 2023. The bankruptcy court entered an order acknowledging

the notice of dismissal was effective to dismiss the Alabama Parties but

retained jurisdiction to hear and decide the order to show cause regarding

sanctions.

On January 30, 2024, the bankruptcy court heard Hayden’s

arguments related to why he should not be sanctioned. At the hearing, the

8 bankruptcy court determined that Hayden’s filing of the “Notice of

Consent to Entry of Judgment” on behalf of defendant Western Steel

Alabama—after Hayden had dismissed the Adversary Action—was

sanctionable conduct. However, the bankruptcy court declined to impose

monetary sanctions against Hayden.

Unbeknownst to the court, earlier that same day, Hayden had filed a

“Notice of Corporate Ownership Statement of Western Steel In[c.]” in the

dismissed Adversary Action. The notice indicated that Hayden was the

corporate owner of Western Steel Alabama. Hayden failed to disclose this

filing, or its purpose, during the show cause hearing.

In light of this conduct, the court reexamined the decision to refrain

from sanctioning Hayden. The bankruptcy court entered an order setting a

scheduling conference on the order to show cause regarding sanctions,

related to Hayden’s attempt to conflate Western Steel Nevada with

Western Steel Alabama. Hayden did not appear at the in-person hearing on

the order to show cause.

On April 15, 2024, the Alabama Parties filed documents in support of

their motions for sanctions and filed an application to declare Hayden a

vexatious litigant, asserting Hayden’s actions in the bankruptcy court were

frivolous and harassing towards the Alabama Parties.

On March 31, 2025, while the present appeals were pending, Judge

Spraker entered a memorandum decision determining that Hayden was a

9 vexatious litigant, imposing a pre-filing review, and discharging all prior

orders to show cause.

D. Recusal

In each of the above three referenced matters, Hayden filed

substantially similar motions to recuse Judge Spraker (“Recusal Motions”). 3

Primarily, Hayden alleged that Judge Spraker was “corrupted” by

Cashion, “who has millions of dollars to pay him.” Hayden “supported”

these allegations by citing to several of Judge Spraker’s court rulings. For

instance, Hayden argued that Judge Spraker “hit Hayden with his motion

for sanctions to benefit [Cashion].” Hayden also argued that several acts

evidenced Judge Spraker’s bias, including: (i) taking judicial notice of the

First Alabama Judgment; (ii) failing to take notice that the chapter 7

trustee’s abandonment of approximately $6 million in assets was done “for

[Cashion’s] benefit and enjoyment” in the Western Steel Nevada

bankruptcy; 4 (iii) failing to acknowledge calls made by Cashion’s attorney

to the chapter 7 trustee Christopher Burke in the Western Steel Nevada

3 The Recusal Motions were filed at different points in time in each case. The first recusal motion was filed in the Adversary Action on March 14, 2024, the same day that Hayden failed to appear at the show cause scheduling conference. The second recusal motion was filed in Hayden’s chapter 13 case on March 22, 2024, shortly after the sanctions order was entered in that case. The third and final recusal motion was filed in the Western Steel Nevada case on April 11, 2024, approximately two months after the chapter 7 trustee entered a report of no distribution in that case. 4 Hayden bases this allegation on the chapter 7 trustee’s report of no distribution

in the Western Steel Nevada case, which provides that “no property [was] available for distribution from the [Western Steel Nevada] estate over and above that exempted by law.” 10 case; (iv) ignoring the “prepayment of attorney fees” as a favor to Cashion;

and (v) ensuring Cashion received “the benefit of twenty million dollars in

scheduled assets” in the Western Steel Nevada bankruptcy case.

Hayden also alleged Cashion was “in business” with certain

Alabama judges who were purportedly trustees for a cemetery. Hayden

further asserted that Cashion “told me he had paid $250,000 for legal

services from an Alabama Supreme Court judge” and that Cashion stated,

“everyone has their price.” However, Hayden did not explain how these

statements were relevant to Judge Spraker. Instead, Hayden attempted to

portray himself as the victim of Cashion’s bad acts and repeated his

argument that he owned Western Steel Alabama, asserting Judge Spraker

knew or should have known Cashion was not the “true owner” of Western

Steel Alabama based on Hayden’s explanation of events.

Hayden also challenged the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to

continue hearing matters in a “dismissed” case. Specifically, Hayden

disputed the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to enter the sanctions order in

his dismissed chapter 13 case.

Finally, Hayden alleged that Cashion, “a wealthy nonparty,”

influenced Judge Spraker by allowing Cashion’s attorney, Joel Schwarz, “to

appear and participate in the January 30, 2024 hearing as a corporate

attorney without filing required corporate disclosure statements.” Hayden

also pointed to the March 14, 2024 hearing on the bankruptcy court’s order

to show cause regarding sanctions in the Adversary Action (which Hayden

11 did not attend) as evidence of another purportedly improper appearance

by Schwarz.

The Alabama Parties filed oppositions to the Recusal Motions.

1. Recusal hearing

Judge Spraker referred the Recusal Motions to Judge Hilary Barnes

for determination.

On June 21, 2024, Judge Barnes heard oral argument on the

consolidated Recusal Motions. At the hearing, Judge Barnes determined

she had jurisdiction to decide all three Recusal Motions and clarified that

the sole issue to be addressed at the hearings was recusal.

When Hayden was asked to substantiate his allegations of

“corruption” against Judge Spraker with specific evidence aside from court

rulings, Hayden was unable to provide evidence. Instead, Hayden

continued to argue that Judge Spraker’s rulings evidenced his bias.

Hayden also continued to assert inferences of bias based on

statements made by Cashion, such as Cashion purportedly “bragg[ing]”

about paying judges and sheriffs in Alabama at some point in the past.

Judge Barnes questioned how this alleged statement by Cashion related to

Judge Spraker. Instead of responding, Hayden repeated his disagreements

with Judge Spraker’s rulings. Hayden also alleged that the chapter 7 trustee

in the Western Steel Nevada bankruptcy reported that Cashion’s attorney

warned the trustee “not to touch the assets in Alabama.” Hayden stated

this conversation demonstrated Cashion was contacting a “judicial official”

12 and “persuading them outside the record not to go and get the assets.”

2. Recusal Order

On July 8, 2024, in each of the three cases, Judge Barnes entered an

identical order denying Hayden’s Recusal Motions (the “Recusal Order”).

The Recusal Order found that Hayden’s arguments and allegations did not

arise from an extra-judicial source, and Hayden failed to demonstrate that

Judge Spraker showed any bias or favoritism towards the Alabama Parties.

Specifically, the Recusal Order found that Hayden’s demand for

recusal was based solely on Judge Spraker’s rulings, statements, and

conduct in the bankruptcy cases and Adversary Action. The Recusal Order

noted that Judge Spraker’s remarks and rulings did not reveal “deep-

seated favoritism or antagonism,” but instead demonstrated Judge

Spraker’s fair judgment by carefully examining the facts and applying the

appropriate legal standards. The Recusal Order noted several of Judge

Spraker’s rulings on substantive issues, some of which favored Hayden—

such as converting the Western Steel Nevada case (instead of dismissing it),

declining to impose a two-year bar on refiling against Hayden, and

declining to impose monetary sanctions against Hayden in the Adversary

Action. The Recusal Order stated that if Hayden disagreed with the

rulings, the proper avenue to contest the rulings was an appeal, not a

motion for recusal.

Moreover, the bankruptcy court concluded that Hayden lacked

tangible evidence to support his allegations, and merely provided

13 “suspicions, allegations, and innuendo” of purported corruption. These

“suspicions” were insufficient to satisfy the required showing of

“extrajudicial” evidence. The bankruptcy court additionally found

Hayden’s assertions suggested a “pattern of behavior to circumvent the

judicial process and to shop for a judge who might rule in his favor.”

Hayden appealed the Recusal Order entered in each of the three

cases.

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under

and

157(b)(2)(A). We discuss our jurisdiction below.

ISSUE

Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying

Hayden’s Recusal Motions.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A bankruptcy court’s denial of a motion to recuse is reviewed for

abuse of discretion. United States v. Hernandez,

(9th Cir.

1997); Hale v. U.S. Tr. (In re Basham),

(9th Cir. BAP 1997).

A bankruptcy court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong

legal standard or when its findings of fact or its application of law to fact

are “illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be

drawn from the record.” United States v. Hinkson,

(9th

Cir. 2009) (en banc).

14 DISCUSSION

A. Scope of the appeal

Although each of Hayden’s notices of appeal identified the Recusal

Order as the order appealed, in his appellate briefing, Hayden indicated he

sought to appeal more than the recusal issue. For example, Hayden raised

arguments related to the sanctions order and the alleged failure of the

attorney for the Alabama Parties to file a “Corporate Ownership

Statement.”

An appeal “from a bankruptcy court’s judgment, order, or decree to a

district court or BAP may be taken only by filing a notice of appeal with the

bankruptcy clerk within the time allowed by Rule 8002.” Rule 8003(a)(1).

However, we must construe pro se filings liberally. Morrison v. Hall,

, 899 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001). Although Hayden attempts to appeal the

sanctions order, that appeal is untimely, as further explained below, and

the Panel lacks jurisdiction to consider that issue.

First, an appeal of the sanctions order in Hayden’s chapter 13 case is

untimely. Hayden appealed each Recusal Order on July 22, 2024. In

Hayden’s chapter 13 case, the sanctions order was entered on March 18,

2024, nearly four months before Hayden’s notice of appeal of the Recusal

Order. “[A] notice of appeal must be filed . . . within 14 days after the

judgment, order, or decree to be appealed is entered.” Rule 8002(a)(1); see

also Melendres v. Maricopa Cnty.,

(9th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e are

not at liberty to overlook a defect with the notice of appeal no matter how

15 compelling an appellant’s argument may be.”); Anderson v. Mouradick (In re

Mouradick),

(9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he untimely filing of a

notice of appeal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to review the

bankruptcy court’s order.”). Therefore, Hayden’s appeal of the sanctions

order is untimely.

Second, although Hayden raised the issue of the Alabama Parties’

alleged failure to file a “Corporate Ownership Statement” in his Recusal

Motions, the issue was unrelated to recusal and therefore not addressed by

the Recusal Order. The Panel has jurisdiction to hear appeals of final

orders.

(a), (b). Because there was no final order on the issue

of the “Corporate Ownership Statement,” we lack jurisdiction over that

matter. 5

B. Jurisdiction

Hayden argues on appeal that the bankruptcy court lacked

jurisdiction to decide the recusal issue because it was initiated after

5 To the extent Hayden’s filings could be liberally construed to include that issue, Rule 7007.1(a) requires a nongovernmental corporation to file a corporate ownership statement when it is “a party to an adversary proceeding.” Hayden’s chapter 13 bankruptcy and Western Steel Nevada’s involuntary bankruptcy are not adversary proceedings, and thus, no statement is required. In the Adversary Action, Western Steel Alabama was dismissed as a defendant on January 9, 2024, well before Hayden filed his motion for recusal in the Adversary Action on March 14, 2024. Hayden’s argument that the Recusal Order should be reversed on jurisdictional grounds for failure to file a corporate ownership statement is without merit. 16 dismissal in two of the cases.6 Hayden further argues in his reply brief that

the district court rather than the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction.

Hayden argues that his Recusal Motions, which were filed and

reviewed post-dismissal, were improper because “[i]n all events, a

‘bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction . . . to grant new relief

independent of its prior rulings once the underlying action has been

dismissed.’” See In re Soria, No. 19-01812-WLH7,

, at *2

(Bankr. E.D. Wash. Feb 28, 2020) (quoting Tsafaroff v. Taylor (In re Taylor),

(9th Cir. 1989)). Hayden’s jurisdiction arguments fail.

A bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction “continues over related, post-

closing motions.” Menk v. Lapaglia (In re Menk),

(9th Cir.

BAP 1999). Furthermore, a “bankruptcy court retains subject matter

jurisdiction to interpret orders entered prior to dismissal of the underlying

bankruptcy case, and to dispose of ancillary matters.” In re Taylor,

(internal citations omitted). Courts have jurisdiction, and have a

duty, to decide recusal motions. United States v. Studley,

(9th Cir. 1986). Recusal is an ancillary matter which does not grant new

6 Hayden also argues the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over the sanctions and vexatious litigant motions. As discussed in the preceding section, the scope of Hayden’s appeal does not include the sanctions matter because such an appeal would not be timely. Therefore, the issue of the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over the sanctions motion is not before us. Similarly, Hayden raises arguments concerning the vexatious litigant matter. However, Hayden has appealed the bankruptcy court’s vexatious litigant order in a separate, unrelated appeal. Accordingly, the question of the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over the vexatious litigant matter is similarly not before us. 17 relief. Hayden’s arguments that the bankruptcy court lacked post-dismissal

jurisdiction over the issue of recusal lacks merit.

Furthermore, we find it dubious that Hayden would argue lack of

jurisdiction over his own Recusal Motions.

Accordingly, the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to decide the

Recusal Motions. 7

C. Was recusal required?

“A bankruptcy judge’s disqualification is governed by

. The judge is disqualified from presiding over a proceeding or

contested matter in which a disqualifying circumstance arises—and, when

appropriate, from presiding over the entire case.” Rule 5004(a). A judge has

a “duty to sit when there is no legitimate reason to recuse.” Clemens v. U.S.

Dist. Ct.,

(9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Nichols v. Alley,

(10th Cir. 1995)). In evaluating recusal motions, judicial

impartiality is presumed, and the substantive standard is “whether a

reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the

judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Seidel v. Durkin (In re

7 Hayden additionally questions jurisdiction based on mandatory withdrawal of reference under

(d), claiming the present case is premised on “interpretation of state and federal securities laws.” In general, the Panel will not consider an argument on appeal that was not raised and adequately argued in the bankruptcy court. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills,

(9th Cir. 2003). Because Hayden did not raise this issue in the underlying bankruptcy case, the Panel declines to consider the issue. 18 Goodwin),

(9th Cir. BAP 1996) (cleaned up); see also Liteky

v. United States,

, 548–55, (1994).

If the basis of the recusal motion is allegations of bias or prejudice,

then generally, the bias or prejudice must stem from some extrajudicial

source. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554–56. An extrajudicial source is a source other

than “conduct or rulings made during the course of the proceeding.” Toth

v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1988). “[J]udicial

rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality

motion” absent evidence that the ruling was based on a high degree of

favoritism or antagonism. Liteky,

.

If no evidence of extrajudicial sources of bias or prejudice exists, then

a charge of partiality must be supported by evidence that the judge

exhibited “such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair

judgment impossible.”

Importantly, “factual allegations do not have to

be taken as true,” and a “judge should not recuse . . . on unsupported,

irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.” Lopez v. Behles (In re Am. Ready

Mix, Inc.),

, 1501 (10th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see also

Com. Paper Holders v. Hine (In re Beverly Hills Bancorp),

(9th Cir. 1984) (adverse rulings alone are legally insufficient to require

recusal, even when the number of such adverse rulings is extraordinarily

high on a statistical basis).

Hayden’s Recusal Motions asserted vague allegations of Judge

Spraker’s purported partiality towards the Alabama Parties. On appeal,

19 Hayden argues that we should remand the Recusal Order in each case on

jurisdictional grounds, rather than because the bankruptcy court abused its

discretion in denying recusal. As previously discussed, the bankruptcy

court properly determined it had jurisdiction to decide the Recusal

Motions.

The Recusal Order found that Hayden’s demand for recusal was

based solely on Judge Spraker’s rulings, statements, and conduct in the

bankruptcy cases and Adversary Action. This finding is supported by the

record. The conduct Hayden cited to support recusal occurred almost

entirely within the bankruptcy cases, and Hayden failed to assert that the

bias or prejudice stemmed from an extrajudicial source.

For instance, Hayden implausibly asserted that Judge Spraker’s

judicial notice of the First Alabama Judgment evidenced Judge Spraker’s

“loyalty” to Cashion. Hayden also argued that Judge Spraker permitted

Schwarz to participate at a hearing without filing corporate disclosure

statements, and this revealed that Cashion used his wealth to influence

Judge Spraker. In sum, these arguments concern conduct within the

bankruptcy cases and fail to attribute the allegations of bias to any

extrajudicial source. Nor does any of Hayden’s cited conduct demonstrate

favoritism or antagonism. See Strand v. Clark (In re Clark), No. CC-11-1322-

KiMkH,

, at *1 n.4 (9th Cir. BAP May 25, 2012) (quoting

Kowalski v. Gagne,

(1st Cir. 1990)) (“‘It is well-accepted that

federal courts may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts if

20 those proceedings have relevance to the matters at hand.’”); see also supra

note 5 (explaining why Western Steel Alabama did not need to file a

“Corporate Ownership Statement” in the Adversary Action).

Hayden alleges a purported “ex parte” communication between

Judge Spraker and Schwarz occurred at the March 14, 2024 hearing on the

order to show cause in the Adversary Action. Hayden asserts that at this

hearing, Judge Spraker instructed Schwarz to file a motion for declaratory

relief. However, the hearing transcript is devoid of Judge Spraker

providing legal advice or otherwise directing Schwarz to file a motion for

declaratory relief. Accordingly, the record supports the bankruptcy court’s

finding that Hayden failed to provide extrajudicial evidence to support his

allegation of Judge Spraker’s bias or prejudice.

The bankruptcy court additionally concluded Hayden lacked

tangible evidence to support his allegations, and merely provided

“suspicions, allegations, and innuendo” of purported corruption. This

conclusion is similarly well-supported by the record. Hayden’s allegations

are, at best, unfounded suspicions. Hayden had multiple opportunities to

provide proof of the alleged “corruption,” but failed to make the necessary

showing in his pleadings or at any hearing. No extrajudicial source

indicates Judge Spraker was biased or prejudiced against Hayden, and

Hayden does not provide any extrajudicial source or evidence on appeal.

In addition, the bankruptcy court recited several of Judge Spraker’s

rulings towards Hayden on substantive issues to demonstrate a lack of

21 favoritism or antagonism. This conclusion is well-supported by the record.

In Hayden’s chapter 13 bankruptcy case, the case had already been

dismissed by the time Judge Spraker was assigned. Moreover, although the

bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction to hear the remaining issue of

sanctions against Hayden, Judge Spraker awarded sanctions solely in the

amount of attorneys’ fees and declined to impose a two-year nationwide

ban on filing. In the Western Steel Nevada case, Judge Spraker denied the

Alabama Parties’ motion to dismiss and converted the case to a chapter 7

instead of dismissing it. In the Adversary Action, Judge Spraker granted

Hayden’s request for dismissal but retained jurisdiction to hear and decide

the issue of sanctions. The sanctions issue had not yet been resolved by the

time Hayden moved for recusal in that case. As the bankruptcy court

properly concluded, Hayden failed to provide specific instances of Judge

Spraker’s conduct that suggest a high degree of favoritism or antagonism.

Accordingly, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Hayden’s recusal motions in any of the three cases and the

Recusal Orders should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM.

22