FILED AUG 15 2025

NOT FOR PUBLICATION SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: BAP No. EC-25-1038-FSC ZAC ZANE FANCHER, Debtor. Bk. No. 24-10440

ZAC ZANE FANCHER, Adv. No. 24-01013 Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* TULARE COUNTY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AGENCY, Appellee.

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California Jennifer E. Niemann, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: FARIS, SPRAKER, and CORBIT, Bankruptcy Judges.

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 7 1 debtor Zac Zane Fancher and his parents refused to abate

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. 1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the Bankruptcy Code,

, all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and all “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of health and safety violations found on their property. After the Fanchers

unsuccessfully contested the violations at the county and state levels,

appellee Tulare County Resource Management Agency (the “County”)

conducted abatement enforcement actions and recorded a lien against the

property for the costs. Mr. Fancher sought bankruptcy protection and filed

an adversary complaint against the County, seeking to have the lien

invalidated. The bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary proceeding,

and Mr. Fancher appealed.

We discern no error and AFFIRM.

FACTS 2

A. Prepetition events

William D. Fancher, Cathy F. Fancher, and appellant Zac Zane

Fancher owned real properly located in Springville, California (the

“Property”).3 In March 2017, the County inspected the Property and sent

the Fanchers a Thirty Day Notice to Abate concerning various violations

observed on the Property. Two months later, the County issued a Notice of

Violation, Order to Correct, Order to Show Cause and Notice of

Civil Procedure. 2 We exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of documents electronically filed in the underlying bankruptcy case and adversary proceeding. See Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood),

, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003). 3 William and Cathy Fancher initially owned the Property. Their son, Zac Fancher, was involved in the abatement proceedings and later obtained an interest in the Property. 2 Assessment of Civil Fines and Penalties against the Property.

The Fanchers appealed the violations and appeared at an

administrative hearing overseen by Inspector Kevin J. Tromborg.

On June 28, 2017, Inspector Tromborg issued a Notice of Decision of

Administrative Hearing Officer (the “Administrative Decision”). He found

multiple violations of the Tulare County Ordinance Code (“TCO”),

including: unapproved remodel; infestation of insect, vermin, or rodents;

general dilapidation; deteriorated foundations, floor supports, and

waterproofing; accumulation of solid waste, junk, garbage, and stagnant

water; and occupied travel trailer and recreational vehicles without a

proper permit. Inspector Tromborg concluded that the violations

constituted a public nuisance and upheld the fines and penalties.4

The Fanchers appealed the Administrative Decision to the Tulare

County Board of Supervisors, but the Board of Supervisors upheld the

Administrative Decision.

The Fanchers then filed a Petition for Administrative Writ of

Mandamus in the state superior court. The superior court entered

judgment in favor of the County in December 2018. The Fanchers appealed,

but the California Court of Appeal upheld the superior court’s ruling.

Fancher v. County of Tulare, No. F078899,

(Cal. Ct. App.

Nov. 4, 2020). The court of appeal held that: substantial evidence supported

4 The County recorded the Administrative Decision with the Tulare County Recorder’s Office on July 25, 2017. 3 the administrative findings and conclusions; the County did not lack

jurisdiction to pursue the code enforcement and abatement action; the

Fanchers received a fair administrative hearing; and Inspector Tromborg

was competent to serve as the hearing officer.

In the meantime, and shortly after the superior court’s ruling, the

County served the Fanchers with a Notice of Intent to Abate by Demolition

and Removal and Final Notice to Correct (the “Notice of Intent to Abate”).5

On February 22, 2019, the County obtained an Abatement Warrant to

conduct an abatement of the Property and posted a Notice of Intent to

Execute Warrant for Public Nuisance Abatement. The Abatement Warrant

was signed by the superior court judge and dated one day prior.

A few days later, the County served the Abatement Warrant on

Mr. Fancher and conducted an inspection, cleanup, and abatement of the

Property. It took three days to demolish multiple structures, remove a half

dozen vehicles, and dispose of thousands of pounds of solid waste. The

process cost $86,772.95.

In September 2019, the County sent the Fanchers a demand for

payment for the cost of the abatement. The Fanchers refused to pay and

asserted that they did not receive notice of the abatement hearing, thus

5 The Notice of Intent to Abate advised the Fanchers that failure to correct the violations would result in the County immediately seeking a civil abatement warrant to proceed with demolition and removal, and “[a]ll Administrative Costs and the Cost of Abatement/Demolition will be recorded as a lien against your property and will be specially assessed against the real property . . . .”

4 rendering the Administrative Decision void.

The County of Tulare Board of Supervisors informed the Fanchers

that it would review the abatement costs at a meeting on March 17, 2020.

The Board of Supervisors held a public hearing, but no one offered public

testimony. Mr. Fancher admitted that he received notice of the hearing but

did not attend. The Board of Supervisors confirmed the costs asserted by

the County and ordered such costs to be placed on the county tax roll as a

special assessment against the Property. It also ordered the County to

record a Notice of Abatement Lien against the Property.

Mr. Fancher’s father passed away. In 2021, his mother quitclaimed

her interest in the Property to Mr. Fancher. Although Mr. Fancher

contacted the Tulare County Assessor’s Office in late 2021 about payment

of the outstanding taxes on the Property, he never paid the taxes.

The County recorded the Notice of Abatement Lien on February 17,

2022, nearly two years after the Board of Supervisors’ decision. The County

served Mr. Fancher with a copy of the notice.

B. Mr. Fancher’s bankruptcy case

Approximately two years later, Mr. Fancher filed a chapter 7

bankruptcy petition. He scheduled an unsecured claim in favor of the

County in the amount of $148,378.22 for the “special assessment, abatement

lien.” Mr. Fancher asserted that the County’s special assessment was

“wholly void” and that he did not acknowledge it as a secured claim.

The chapter 7 trustee filed a no-asset report. Mr. Fancher received his

5 discharge in June 2024.

C. The adversary proceeding

In the meantime, Mr. Fancher, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint in

bankruptcy court against the County, seeking to void the County’s

abatement lien. The court twice dismissed the complaint with leave to

amend.

Mr. Fancher’s second amended complaint asserted six claims for

relief: (1) failure to comply with regulatory deadlines (to record the

abatement lien); (2) declaratory relief (confirming that the County did not

comply with TCO § 7-15-3800); (3) determination of tax liability;

(4) disallowance (of the defective abatement lien); (5) lack of statutory

jurisdiction (because Inspector Tromborg was not an administrative law

judge); and (6) lack of personal jurisdiction (because the Notice of Intent to

Abate did not inform the Fanchers of their right to appeal to the Board of

Supervisors). Mr. Fancher also filed a request for judicial notice and

numerous documents in support of the second amended complaint.

D. The motion to dismiss the second amended complaint

The County filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint

(the “Motion to Dismiss”), arguing (in summary) that it had complied with

all applicable legal requirements, that the claim preclusive effect of the

state courts’ decisions barred most of Mr. Fancher’s arguments, and that all

of Mr. Fancher’s arguments were wrong.

Mr. Fancher filed a written opposition to the Motion to Dismiss but

6 did not appear at the hearing.

The bankruptcy court granted the Motion to Dismiss in a thorough

and carefully written decision. It entered an order granting the Motion to

Dismiss and dismissing with prejudice all claims for relief except for the

third claim, which it dismissed without prejudice.6

Mr. Fancher timely appealed.

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under

and

157(b)(1). We have jurisdiction under

.

ISSUE

Whether the bankruptcy court erred in dismissing Mr. Fancher’s

second amended complaint.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the bankruptcy court’s decision to grant a Civil

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Calise v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,

,

738 (9th Cir. 2024). “De novo review requires that we consider a matter

anew, as if no decision had been made previously.” Francis v. Wallace (In re

Francis),

(9th Cir. BAP 2014).

6 Mr. Fancher complains on appeal that the bankruptcy court did not take judicial notice of documents he filed, despite granting the County’s request for judicial notice. But the bankruptcy court clearly reviewed the documents that Mr. Fancher submitted and explicitly stated in its order that it considered the “Supporting Exhibits” that were filed with the second amended complaint. It also stated in its civil minutes that it took judicial notice of all documents filed in the bankruptcy case “in its entirety.”

7 DISCUSSION

Mr. Fancher’s arguments on appeal are largely an impermissible

collateral attack on the Administrative Decision, the Board of Supervisors’

affirmance of that decision, the superior court’s mandamus decision, and

the court of appeal’s affirmance. See Rein v. Providian Fin. Corp.,

(9th Cir. 2001) (“The collateral attack doctrine precludes litigants

from collaterally attacking the judgments of other courts.”); Richards v.

Richards (In re Richards),

, 798 (9th Cir. BAP 2023) (affirming

dismissal order where the causes of action “necessarily required the

bankruptcy court to disregard state court orders and judgments . . .

[because] [s]uch a determination is patently barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine”). Some of his arguments are also barred by claim preclusion,

since the claims raised in the second amended complaint were or could

have been raised as defenses in the state courts. The remainder of

Mr. Fancher’s arguments have no merit.

A. Civil Rule 12(b)(6) requires Mr. Fancher to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

“[W]e apply the same legal standards governing motions to dismiss

under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) that apply in all federal courts.” Barnes v. Belice (In

re Belice),

(9th Cir. BAP 2011). Under Civil Rule 12(b)(6), a

court must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. To survive a Civil Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion, a

complaint must present cognizable legal theories and sufficient factual

8 allegations to support those theories. See id.; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly,

(2007) (A plaintiff must allege “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”).

A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that

“allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009)

(citation omitted). While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading of

specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief

above the speculative level[.]” Twombly,

. In other

words, a complaint must contain more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and

conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do.” Iqbal,

(cleaned up).

In deciding whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief

can be granted, the court accepts the allegations as true and draws all

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Usher v. City of Los

Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1987). But the court is not required to

accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted

deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Hartman v. Gilead Scis., Inc.

(In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig.),

(9th Cir. 2008).

B. Mr. Fancher is precluded from relitigating his defenses that were already decided or that could have been decided in state court.

Mr. Fancher’s overarching argument is that the underlying

9 Administrative Decision was void, so all of the subsequent proceedings –

including the abatement lien – are similarly void. But the state court

already adjudicated the County’s claims and Mr. Fancher’s defenses in a

final decision, and we will not second-guess the state court.

Claim preclusion prevents parties from asserting any claims or

defenses that were raised or could have been raised in a prior action.

Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp,

(9th Cir. 2002); see also Robi v. Five

Platters, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1988) (“Claim preclusion treats a

judgment, once rendered, as the full measure of relief to be accorded

between the same parties on the same claim or cause of action. Claim

preclusion prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery

that were previously available to the parties, regardless of whether they

were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.” (cleaned up)).

Federal courts must “refer to the preclusion law of the State in which

judgment was rendered.” Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons,

(1985); see also Robi,

(applying California law to

a California judgment and stating that federal courts must “apply the res

judicata rules of a particular state to judgments issued by courts of that

state” (citation omitted)). Thus, we must apply California preclusion law to

the state court judgment.

Under California law, “[c]laim preclusion arises if a second suit

involves (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same parties (3) after a

final judgment on the merits in the first suit. If claim preclusion is

10 established, it operates to bar relitigation of the claim altogether.” Gray v.

La Salle Bank, N.A.,

, 949 (2023) (cleaned up), as modified

on denial of reh’g (Sept. 27, 2023). California recognizes that claim preclusion

is also applicable to defenses that a party did assert or could have asserted:

If the matter was within the scope of the action, related to the subject matter and relevant to the issues, so that it could have been raised, the judgment is conclusive on it despite the fact that it was not in fact expressly pleaded or otherwise urged. . . . If it has been determined in a former action, it is binding notwithstanding the parties litigant may have omitted to urge for or against it matters which, if urged, would have produced an opposite result. . . . This principle also operates to demand of a defendant that all of its defenses to the cause of action urged by the plaintiff be asserted under the penalty of forever losing the right to thereafter so urge them.

City of Glendale v. Roseglen Constr., Inc.,

(Ct. App.

1970) (cleaned up); see also Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions

Grp., Inc.,

(2020) (“[P]reclusion of defenses must, at a

minimum, satisfy the strictures of issue preclusion or claim preclusion.”).

It is clear that Mr. Fancher is attempting to relitigate claims that the

County asserted in the state courts – and defenses to those claims that he

asserted (or could have asserted) – and that the state courts finally decided.

The superior court did not find any merit to the writ of mandamus, and the

court of appeal “reject[ed] the Fanchers’ conclusory and unsupported

assertion that the county either lacked subject matter jurisdiction or acted

in excess of its jurisdiction.” Fancher,

, at *8. It similarly

11 did not find any merit to the Fanchers’ defenses that “the proceedings were

unfair, unlawful, or that a fair hearing or trial was not provided.”

The

court of appeal specifically rejected the argument that Inspector Tromborg

was not qualified to oversee the administrative hearing; the court first

stated that it would not consider the issue because it had not been raised in

the opening brief, but even if it did, it held that “the Fanchers have failed to

show that a person of Tromborg’s experience and qualifications could not

fairly and competently resolve the underlying factual matters and code

violations involved here.”

. 7

The court of appeal also rejected all of Mr. Fancher’s challenges to

Inspector Tromborg’s factual findings:

the evidence adequately supported—either directly or by reasonable inference—the findings made by the hearing officer

7 Even if we were to consider anew Mr. Fancher’s challenge to Inspector Tromborg’s qualifications, we would affirm. As the bankruptcy court correctly stated, California Government Code § 27720 provides that “[t]he board of supervisors of any county may establish the office of county hearing officer.” (Emphasis added.) The use of the word “may” means that a county is permitted but not required to establish such an office. If a hearing officer is “appointed pursuant to this chapter,” he or she “shall be an attorney at law . . . .” Cal. Gov’t Code § 27724. Tulare County did not create the office of the county hearing officer until it adopted TCO § 1-31-110, which became effective in June 2019. Thus, the requirement that a hearing officer possess a law license only arose in Tulare County two years after Inspector Tromborg issued the Administrative Decision on June 28, 2017. Mr. Fancher also argues on appeal that claim preclusion is inapplicable because the Administrative Decision has no preclusive effect. He ignores the fact that the state court entered judgment approving of the Administrative Decision. The state court judgments have preclusive effect, so we need not consider whether the Administrative Decision has independent preclusive effect.

12 and confirmed by the trial court that the condition of the Fanchers’ real property not only violated code standards but constituted an appreciable risk to public health or safety. On this record, it was not error to declare the condition of the property to be a public nuisance, and the Fanchers have failed to meet their burden to show otherwise.

Id. at *8. We will not reexamine or overturn the state court rulings.

Mr. Fancher argues on appeal that claim preclusion is not applicable

because the Administrative Decision was void, so any subsequent decision

affirming that decision was similarly invalid. This is nonsensical. The

Fanchers already challenged the validity of the Administrative Decision

before the state superior court and court of appeal, both of which ruled that

the Administrative Decision was correct and valid. Mr. Fancher had an

opportunity to convince the state courts that the Administrative Decision

was void. He failed. The doctrine of claim preclusion prevents Mr. Fancher

from endlessly repeating that argument.

Therefore, the bankruptcy court correctly rejected all of Mr. Fancher’s

attempts to overturn the Administrative Decision.

C. Mr. Fancher’s challenges to the County’s abatement actions are meritless.

Mr. Fancher’s remaining arguments concern abatement events

occurring after the court decisions. None of his contentions warrant

reversal.

13 1. Mr. Fancher failed to state a claim that the abatement lien is invalid.

Mr. Fancher contends that the bankruptcy court erred when it

rejected his many arguments concerning the recording (or nonrecording) of

the Notice of Abatement Lien and the special assessment. The court did not

err.

Mr. Fancher relies on Title 25, Article 6, Section 70 of the California

Code of Regulations, which provides that, in the event of nonpayment of

the net expense of abating a nuisance, “the governing board shall, at any

time within 60 days after the decision of the governing board on the

statement, cause to be filed in the office of the county recorder of the

county in which the property is located a certificate substantially” in a

prescribed form. Cal. Code Regs. Title 25, § 70(b). But the statute permits

counties to opt out of this procedure and instead create their own

abatement procedures. Cal. Code Regs. Title 25, § 52. As the bankruptcy

court pointed out, Tulare County enacted TCO § 7-15-3500, which provides

that Article 35 of the Tulare County Ordinance is “equivalent to the

procedures provided in Article 6 . . . of Title 25 . . . of the California Code of

Regulations.” Thus, the controlling provision is TCO § 7-15-3770, and that

section contains no such deadline. 8

8 TCO § 7-15-3770(c) makes no mention of a deadline: If the Board orders the costs and fees to be specially assessed against the real property, the Board may also order that a notice of abatement lien be recorded against the affected real property until such costs and fees have 14 Mr. Fancher argues that the County failed to record the special

assessment as ordered by the Board of Supervisors and that the assessment

is therefore invalid. But the Board of Supervisors did not require

recordation of the special assessment. Rather, it directed the county tax

collector to “place such costs on the County tax roll as a special assessment

against the [Property].” The tax collector did just that. The Board of

Supervisors “[o]rder[ed] that the costs as confirmed be recorded in the

office of the Tulare County Recorder[.]” But that is exactly what the County

did when it recorded the Notice of Abatement Lien.

Mr. Fancher claims that the Notice of Abatement Lien contained an

incorrect description of the Property, rendering it void. The description of

the Property in the Notice of Abatement Lien is identical in substance to

the description he thinks is correct, except his description refers to Parcel

Map No. 1070, while the Notice of Abatement Lien refers to Parcel Map

No. 10705. But he offers no authority for the proposition that this single-

digit discrepancy rendered the lien void.

Most importantly, any discrepancy in the Notice of Abatement Lien,

or the recording (or nonrecording) of these documents, had no effect on

been paid in full. The notice shall, at a minimum, identify the record owner or possessor of property, set forth the last known address of the record owner or possessor, set forth the date upon which abatement of the nuisance was ordered, and the date the abatement was complete, and include a description of the real property subject to the lien and the amount of the abatement cost and fees.

15 Mr. Fancher. A county tax assessment creates a statutory lien that is not

dependent upon recording. “Every tax, penalty, or interest, including

redemption penalty or interest, on real property is a lien against the

property assessed.”

. “When the county

assesses a tax against a property, the imposition of the tax is a lien against

the property assessed. The lien attaches by operation of law . . . [and]

constitutes an encumbrance on the title to the land and does so without any

prior recording in the county recorder’s office.” Meyer v. Sheh,

, 839 (2022) (cleaned up). In other words, the special assessment

automatically became a lien pursuant to statute when it was added to the

tax roll. The County’s failure to record the special assessment and any error

in the legal description of the Property in the Notice of Abatement Lien did

not adversely affect Mr. Fancher.

Mr. Fancher contends that the County needed to record the special

assessment to put the world on notice that the special assessment attached

to the Property. Mr. Fancher does not explain why he is entitled to make

this argument; there is no question that he had ample notice of the special

assessment; and he is not “the world.” Further, the statute he relies on does

not require the recording of a special assessment (which, as discussed

above, becomes a lien by operation of California Revenue and Taxation

Code § 2187) but merely addresses the effect of recordation. See Cal. Gov’t

Code § 53932 (“From and after the time for filing or recording the

assessment, as provided in the law pursuant to which it is levied, it shall

16 impart notice to all persons.”). His reliance on Tharp Family Ltd. Partnership

v. County of Tulare, No. F066231,

(Cal. Ct. App. June 12,

2014), is also unavailing; while a notice of decision was recorded in that

case, the ruling does not mandate that a special assessment must be

recorded in order to be valid, and it does not otherwise suggest that the

County failed to follow the correct procedure in this case.

Mr. Fancher claims that TCO § 7-15-3800 required the County to

immediately record notice of the Board of Supervisors’ decision. That

ordinance provides: “The enforcement officer shall record notice of final

disposition of any action or proceeding instituted pursuant to this Article

immediately following final resolution of the action or proceeding.” The

Notice of Abatement Lien fulfilled this requirement: it was a notice that the

Board of Supervisors had finally decided the abatement costs and liability.9

In other words, the Board of Supervisors’ ruling as memorialized in the

Notice of Abatement Lien was the final resolution of the action or

proceeding, and the County was not required to record separately the

Board of Supervisors’ decision.10

9 We also reject Mr. Fancher’s argument that the County’s failure to record the Notice of Abatement Lien “immediately” voids the lien. Mr. Fancher does not explain how he was injured by such a delay or why he is entitled to the benefit of that deadline. 10 We similarly reject Mr. Fancher’s reliance on California Government Code §§ 39577 and 38773.5, because they are inapplicable to this appeal. 17 2. Mr. Fancher failed to state a claim that he is entitled to an offset.

Mr. Fancher argues that the County received state or federal funds to

pay for the costs of abating the violations, so the judgment would result in

an impermissible double recovery. We reject this argument for multiple

reasons.

First, as the bankruptcy court correctly held, the relevant state

statutes hold property owners fully liable for abatement costs. California

Government Code § 25845, which controls “liability for costs and fees,”

provides that “the owner of a parcel upon which the nuisance is found to

exist shall be liable for all costs of abatement incurred by the county,

including, but not limited to, administrative costs, and any and all costs

incurred in the physical abatement of the nuisance.” Cal. Gov’t Code

§ 25845(b) (emphasis added). Mr. Fancher does not point to any state

statute or county ordinance that mandates an offset.

Second, Mr. Fancher does not present any plausible allegation that

state or federal funds were used to abate the Property. Even construing the

second amended complaint’s allegations in the light most favorable to

Mr. Fancher, he does not tie any particular funding source or amount of

money to the abatement of his Property or otherwise plausibly allege that

the County received such funds for that specific purpose. His allegation

that the County used certain state and federal funds in his case is mere

speculation that is not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

18 Third, if Mr. Fancher’s argument were correct, state and federal

grants to counties to abate hazardous conditions would (in effect) subsidize

property owners who create or permit such conditions, and owners like

Mr. Fancher would get a free pass to ignore health and safety ordinances.

This would be an absurd policy.

3. Mr. Fancher failed to state a claim that he was not provided proper notice of an abatement hearing.

Mr. Fancher contends that the County denied him and his parents

due process because the County did not give adequate notice before it

executed the abatement on February 26, 2019. He is wrong.

Section 28545(a) of the California Government Code provides, in

relevant part:

The board of supervisors, by ordinance, may establish a procedure for the abatement of a nuisance. The ordinance shall, at a minimum, provide that the owner of the parcel, and anyone known to the board of supervisors to be in possession of the parcel, be given notice of the abatement proceeding and an opportunity to appear before the board of supervisors and be heard prior to the abatement of the nuisance by the county. Mr. Fancher appears to believe that the 2017 administrative

proceedings (before Inspector Tromborg and the Board of Supervisors)

were distinct from the issuance of the 2019 Abatement Warrant, such that

he was entitled to a second hearing before the Board of Supervisors prior to

any abatement action. Mr. Fancher misunderstands the notice requirement.

The abatement authorized by the Abatement Warrant was merely the

19 enforcement mechanism resulting from the Board of Supervisors’

affirmance of the Administrative Decision. Although Mr. Fancher is correct

that there was a two-year gap between the 2017 decisions and the 2019

enforcement, the reason is simple and of his own making: the County did

not act while Mr. Fancher’s mandamus proceedings were pending; it only

moved forward with the Notice of Intent to Abate and the Abatement

Warrant after the superior court ruled against Mr. Fancher. 11 Mr. Fancher

does not provide any authority that he was entitled to another notice or

hearing after he challenged the initial decision in state court and lost.

Mr. Fancher admits that the Fanchers did avail themselves of the

opportunities to appeal. While it is true that the Notice of Intent to Abate

did not include any notice of a right to appeal, none was necessary; the

Fanchers had already exhausted their right to be heard by the Board of

Supervisors.

4. Mr. Fancher failed to state a claim that the Abatement Warrant was deficient.

Finally, Mr. Fancher claims that the superior court denied him due

process when it issued the Abatement Warrant. He claims that the superior

court judge signed the Abatement Warrant a day before holding a hearing

and implies elsewhere that the signatures may have been forgeries.

11 The County was not required to extend this benefit to the Fanchers. They did not obtain a stay pending appeal, so the County did not need to wait until the resolution of the appeal to proceed with abatement.

20 Mr. Fancher’s argument that this was error is wrong; his implication of a

“conspiracy” is frivolous.

First, there is no indication (aside from Mr. Fancher’s bald

accusations) that any of the signatures on official documents are forgeries.

Second, as the bankruptcy court correctly explained, the discrepancy

between the dates of the signing and entry of the Abatement Warrant does

not indicate any wrongdoing or procedural error. The judge signed the

warrant on one day and the clerk entered it the following day.

Third, there is no evidence in the record to support Mr. Fancher’s

assumption that the superior court judge conducted an “abatement

hearing” on February 22, 2019 that occurred after the judge signed the

warrant. As the bankruptcy court stated, the applicable state statutes and

county ordinances do not require a hearing prior to the issuance of an

abatement warrant. See Cal. Code Civ. P. 1822.50-1822.60; TCO § 4-01-1310.

California Government Code § 25845(a) only mandates “an opportunity to

appear before the board of supervisors,” which the Fanchers did in 2017.

Accordingly, his claim that the Abatement Warrant was defective is not

plausible.

CONCLUSION

The bankruptcy court did not err in dismissing the second amended

complaint. We AFFIRM.

21