FILED AUG 8 2025 NOT FOR PUBLICATION SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: BAP No. NV-24-1133-LGB VICTORIA GIAMPA, Debtor. Bk. No. 23-13014-nmc VICTORIA GIAMPA, Appellant, Adv. No. 23-01147-nmc

v. MEMORANDUM∗

U.S. BANK TRUST, Not In Its Individual Capacity But Solely As Owner Trustee For RCF2 Acquisition Trust; ALEXA MARTINI STINSON, An Officer Of The Court; THE LAW OFFICES OF ROBERTSON, ANSCHUTZ, SCHNEID, CRANE AND PARTNERS, PLLC; NATHAN FREDERICK JONES SMITH, An Officer Of The Court; THE LAW OFFICES OF MALCOLM & CISNEROS, LLC; SELENE FINANCE LP; TIFFANY AND BOSCO, PA; KRISTA J. NIELSON, An Officer Of The Court; TRICIA ANN MORRA; WOLFE & WYMAN, LLP; DAVID TUCKER BLAKE, An Officer Of The Court, Appellees.

∗ This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for

whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. 1 Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada Natalie M. Cox, Chief Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: LAFFERTY, GAN, and BRAND, Bankruptcy Judges.

INTRODUCTION

Victoria Giampa (“Debtor”) appeals the bankruptcy court’s order

dismissing an adversary proceeding she initiated against several entities

she alleges conspired to draft and enforce a fraudulent deed of trust against

her property. 1

After the court dismissed Debtor’s chapter 13 2 case, the court elected

not to retain jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding. Applying the

analysis set forth in Carraher v. Morgan Electronics, Inc. (In re Carraher),

(9th Cir. 1992), the court concluded that the relative infancy of the

litigation and Debtor’s assertion of primarily noncore claims militated

against the bankruptcy court’s retention of jurisdiction over the action

following dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case.

1 Prior to oral argument on July 31, 2025, Debtor had informed the Panel that she intended to dismiss this appeal. However, the Panel has not received an effective notice of dismissal from Debtor; to date, the dismissal documents submitted by Debtor pertain to other appeals. In any event, this matter was called for oral argument as scheduled. Appellees’ counsel appeared and the matter was submitted. Because Debtor has not yet filed a notice of dismissal in this appeal, and because we do not believe disposing of this matter via this Memorandum would prejudice any of the parties, we issue this disposition as we normally would after oral arguments. 2 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532, and “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 We AFFIRM.

FACTS 3

On July 24, 2023, Debtor filed a chapter 13 petition. Subsequently,

U.S. Bank Trust, Not in Its Individual Capacity but Solely as Owner Trustee

for RCF2 Acquisition Trust (“U.S. Bank”), filed a proof of claim, asserting a

$617,022.56 claim secured by a deed of trust against Debtor’s real property

located in Henderson, Nevada (the “Henderson Property”).

On November 27, 2023, Debtor filed a complaint against U.S. Bank

and several other entities (collectively, “Defendants”), initiating the subject

adversary proceeding. In Debtor’s operative third amended complaint,

Debtor asserted several state law claims against Defendants, including for

civil conspiracy, abuse of process, and a determination regarding the

validity of the lien against the Henderson Property. Debtor also asserted a

claim under RICO and a claim under certain federal criminal statutes for

the alleged filing of a fraudulent proof of claim. The crux of Debtor’s

factual allegations was that U.S. Bank fabricated its deed of trust, lacked

authority to enforce it, and that the other Defendants conspired with U.S.

Bank in the execution and enforcement of a false deed of trust and false

claim against Debtor’s estate.

3 We have taken judicial notice of the bankruptcy court docket and various documents filed through the electronic docketing system. See O'Rourke v. Seaboard Sur. Co. (In re E.R. Fegert, Inc.),

(9th Cir. 1989); Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood),

, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003). 3 On May 30, 2024, after Debtor failed to confirm a chapter 13 plan, the

court dismissed Debtor’s bankruptcy case. As we discussed in Giampa v.

Selene Finance, LP (In re Giampa), BAP No. NV-24-1111-CBG,

(9th Cir. BAP June 5, 2025) (“Giampa I”), dismissal of Debtor’s case

was prompted by the chapter 13 trustee’s and U.S. Bank’s objections to

confirmation of Debtor’s proposed plan as well as a motion to dismiss

Debtor’s case filed by the chapter 13 trustee and joined by U.S. Bank.

Giampa I,

at *1. As outlined in those pleadings, the

chapter 13 trustee and U.S. Bank sought dismissal based on the following

deficiencies, among others: (i) the Debtor self-reported negative income; (ii)

Debtor’s proposed plan did not provide for all of her disposable income as

required by the Code; (iii) the plan did not satisfy the liquidation test; and

(iv) Debtor failed to provide required documents or cure defective filings

by amendment.4

In June 2024, after dismissal of Debtor’s bankruptcy case, the

bankruptcy court issued an Order to Show Cause why the adversary

proceeding should not be dismissed (the “OSC”). In the OSC, the court

explained that the four factors set forth in Carraher warranted dismissal of

the adversary proceeding based on “the dismissal of the underlying

4 As noted by the Panel in Giampa I, Debtor’s response to these pleadings “followed a familiar, although almost always unsuccessful, refrain used by many debtors – that the creditor asserting a security interest in the real property (U.S. Bank in this case) was not the entity entitled to enforce payment on the claim because of alleged infirmities in the loan and assignment documents.” Giampa I,

at *1. 4 bankruptcy case, the seemingly non-core nature of the asserted claims, and

the infancy of [the] adversary proceeding.”

Debtor filed two lengthy responses to the OSC. In her responses,

Debtor reiterated many of the allegations from her complaint, including

that Defendants had filed false and fraudulent documents before the court,

were not real parties in interest with standing to enforce the deed of trust

against the Henderson Property, or had otherwise engaged in unethical

and fraudulent conduct. In light of these allegations, Debtor argued that

the bankruptcy court should retain jurisdiction over the adversary

proceeding.

On August 6, 2024, the court held a hearing on the OSC. Debtor

appeared and repeated her arguments from her filed responses. In its oral

ruling dismissing the adversary proceeding, the court again noted the

noncore nature of the claims asserted by Debtor and the relative infancy of

the litigation. As a result, in accordance with Carraher, the court concluded

that dismissal of the adversary proceeding was appropriate.

In addition, the court acknowledged Debtor’s allegations regarding

Defendants’ lack of authority to enforce the deed of trust and alleged

fraudulent conduct. The court concluded that Debtor’s claims based on

these allegations “exist outside of the bankruptcy process” and that Debtor

could assert such claims in a different forum.

5 On August 22, 2024, in accordance with its ruling, the bankruptcy

court entered an order dismissing the adversary proceeding (the

“Dismissal Order”). 5 Debtor timely appealed.6

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under

and

157(b)(2)(A) and (K). We have jurisdiction under

.

ISSUE

Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion by dismissing the

adversary proceeding?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review for an abuse of discretion the bankruptcy court’s decision

declining to retain jurisdiction over Debtor’s adversary proceeding after

dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case. In re Carraher,

.

The bankruptcy court abused its discretion if it applied an incorrect

legal rule or its factual findings were illogical, implausible, or without

support in the record. TrafficSchool.com v. Edriver Inc.,

(9th

5 At the time the court dismissed the adversary proceeding, certain motions remained pending, including a request for default, a motion to compel compliance with discovery, and motions to dismiss. In its oral ruling, the court denied all pending matters as moot. 6 On June 24, 2025, Debtor filed a “Motion to Challenge the Insufficiency of Krista

J. Nielson’s Certificate of Interested Parties.” Through this motion, Debtor requests that the Panel strike Ms. Nielson’s Certificate of Interested Parties based on an alleged violation of BAP Rule 8015(a)-1. Debtor has not demonstrated that Ms. Nielson violated BAP Rule 8015(a)-1 and has not otherwise articulated any reason to strike the Certificate of Interested Parties. Consequently, we DENY Debtor’s motion. 6 Cir. 2011). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record,

regardless of whether the bankruptcy court relied upon, rejected or even

considered that ground. Fresno Motors, LLC v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC,

(9th Cir. 2014).

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Debtor asserts that the bankruptcy court should have

retained jurisdiction and that the court incorrectly applied the Carraher

analysis. Debtor also argues that: (i) the court did not properly assess

subject matter jurisdiction; (ii) there was an improper substitution of U.S.

Bank as a party; (iii) the court erred by denying pending matters as moot;

(iv) the court lacked authority to enter a final judgment; (v) Debtor is

entitled to a jury trial; and (vi) Defendants should be sanctioned based on

Debtor’s allegations of misconduct.

A. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the adversary proceeding. As a preliminary matter, Debtor’s arguments regarding subject

matter jurisdiction are perplexing. Debtor makes two contradictory

assertions: first, that the Dismissal Order is void because the court did not

assess whether it had subject matter jurisdiction over the adversary

proceeding and, second, that the court had and continues to have subject

matter jurisdiction and should have retained such jurisdiction over the

adversary proceeding.

7 A federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own

jurisdiction. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization v. Harleston (In re Harleston),

(9th Cir. BAP 2002). And although it is true that orders

entered without subject matter jurisdiction are void, the fact that the

bankruptcy court did not explicitly make jurisdictional findings does not

mean the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See Owens–Corning

Fiberglas Corp. v. Ctr. Wholesale, Inc. (In re Ctr. Wholesale, Inc.),

(9th Cir. 1985) (“[A judgment] is void only if the court that rendered

judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or if the

court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.” (citation

omitted)).

Under

(b), bankruptcy courts may exercise

jurisdiction over matters that are “related to” a bankruptcy case. An action

is “related to” a bankruptcy case if the outcome of the proceeding could

conceivably alter the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options or freedom of action

(either positively or negatively) in such a way as to impact the

administration of the bankruptcy estate. Fietz v. Great W. Sav. (In re Fietz),

, 457 (9th Cir. 1988) (adopting the definition articulated in

Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins,

(3d Cir. 1984)).

Here, at the time Debtor filed her complaint, the court had “related

to” jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding because successful recovery

of damages from Defendants would impact the size of Debtor’s estate as

well as her ability to fund a chapter 13 plan. In any event, even if the court

8 lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the appropriate result would be

dismissal of the adversary proceeding, not reinstitution of the action as

Debtor appears to be requesting.

In light of the above, the pertinent question is not whether the court

had subject matter jurisdiction but whether the court erred in refusing to

retain jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit has provided a four-part test to

determine whether courts should retain jurisdiction over an adversary

proceeding after dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case. In re

Carraher,

.

Prior to discussing the factors, we address Debtor’s contention that

the bankruptcy court “failed to apply” the Carraher factors. Despite

Debtor’s statements to the contrary, it is clear from the transcript of the

hearing on the OSC that the court explicitly referenced Carraher and

discussed the relevant facts of this case applicable to a Carraher analysis.

That the court did not expressly state each factor on the record does not

mean that the court failed to consider Carraher or make its decision using

the Carraher framework.

Under Carraher, courts consider the following factors when assessing

whether dismissal is appropriate: (i) judicial economy; (ii) convenience;

(iii) fairness; and (iv) comity. Id.; see also Linkway Inv. Co. v. Olsen (In re

Casamont Invs., Ltd.),

(9th Cir. BAP 1996).

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that

retention of jurisdiction was not warranted in this case.

9 With respect to the first factor of judicial economy, the bankruptcy

court found that the adversary proceeding was in a relatively infant stage

of litigation. Debtor has not articulated why this conclusion was illogical,

implausible, or without support in the record. As is evident from the

record, the matter did not progress beyond the pleading stage; the court

dismissed the adversary proceeding before ruling on the most recent

motions to dismiss the operative complaint.

The court also discussed the factor of comity by noting that Debtor

exclusively asserted noncore claims and that such claims “exist outside of

the bankruptcy process.” Again, Debtor has not articulated why this

observation was illogical, implausible, or without support in the record.

Debtor almost exclusively asserts nonbankruptcy claims.7

Finally, with respect to the factors of fairness and convenience, the

court noted that Debtor would be able to bring her claims in a different

forum, presumably to explain that Debtor would not be significantly

prejudiced by the dismissal of the adversary proceeding.

Debtor has not articulated why any of these findings are illogical,

implausible, or without support in the record, or otherwise referenced facts

that would undermine the bankruptcy court’s conclusions with respect to

7 The only bankruptcy-related claim asserted by Debtor is for fraudulently filing a proof of claim. However, Debtor lacks standing to assert this claim because it is based “entirely on criminal statutes (

, 157 and 3571) for which there is no private right of action.” Aziz v. U.S. Bank, NA (In re Aziz), BAP No. AZ-16-1133-BTaF,

, at *3 n.7 (9th Cir. BAP Aug. 3, 2017). 10 the Carraher factors. Rather, Debtor simply argues that the court erred in its

Carraher analysis because Debtor alleged misconduct on the part of

Defendants. However, the merits of Debtor’s claims are not a relevant

consideration under Carraher. In addition, because the litigation between

Debtor and Defendants did not progress beyond the pleading stage,

Debtor’s contentions are merely allegations. Debtor has not yet proven her

claims in a court of law, and the record does not contain any evidence of

misconduct beyond Debtor’s allegations.

B. Debtor has not otherwise articulated a reversible error by the bankruptcy court. Debtor’s remaining arguments do not establish any error by the

bankruptcy court.

Before diving into these arguments, we note that Debtor repeatedly

weaves arguments on the merits of her complaint throughout her briefs

before this Panel. However, the bankruptcy court did not make any

findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding the merits of Debtor’s

complaint. The bankruptcy court simply dismissed the adversary

proceeding because it elected not to preside over the action and, as a result,

not to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law on Debtor’s claims.

Thus, Debtor’s arguments regarding the merits of her complaint are not

properly before this Panel.

Turning to the specific arguments made by Debtor, first, Debtor

contends that the bankruptcy court improperly substituted U.S. Bank in

11 place of “U.S. Bank Trust National Association Not In Its Individual

Capacity But Solely As Owner Trustee For RCF2 Acquisition Trust.”

However, the record is devoid of any indication that the court ordered

substitution of any parties, or even that any party attempted a substitution.

It appears Debtor may be referring to the court’s occasional shorthand use

of “U.S. Bank” in place of the full legal name of the entity quoted above.

But using such shorthand is not error.

Second, Debtor asserts that the court erred by denying certain

pending motions as moot, such as a motion for default judgment. Debtor

does not articulate why such motions are not moot, instead simply

reiterating her arguments on the merits of her complaint. Again, because

the court declined to preside over Debtor’s complaint, the court need not —

and cannot upon dismissal — entertain any motions related to disposition

of Debtor’s claims.

Third, Debtor argues that the court should have retained jurisdiction

over a motion for sanctions for violation of the automatic stay. However,

Debtor never filed any such motion. Instead, Debtor references an objection

to a status report she filed in which she argued that the court should retain

jurisdiction because Debtor asserted a violation of the automatic stay. That

objection did not itself request damages or any other relief; instead, Debtor

simply referenced her request for damages arising from a violation of the

stay, presumably via her complaint, as a reason why the Carraher factors

favored retention of the adversary proceeding. Notwithstanding Debtor’s

12 statement in this status report, the operative complaint does not state a

claim for violation of the automatic stay, and Debtor has not filed a motion

for such violation on either the adversary or bankruptcy dockets.

Fourth, Debtor’s argument that the court lacked authority to enter

final judgment is misplaced. The bankruptcy court did not enter a final

judgment on the merits. Debtor is free to seek a final judgment from a

different forum with authority to enter a final judgment. Debtor’s assertion

that she is entitled to a jury trial is similarly misplaced. The bankruptcy

court’s ability to conduct a jury trial is a moot question upon dismissal of

the action. Again, to the extent Debtor is entitled to a jury trial on her

claims, Debtor may pursue a judgment from a court that may preside over

a jury trial.

Finally, Debtor has not set forth any basis for this Panel to sanction

Defendants. Debtor asserts that Defendants violated Civil Rule 11, but she

does not reference any specific violation of Civil Rule 11 in the papers filed

before this Panel. Debtor bases her request for sanctions – whether under

Civil Rule 11 or for violation of the automatic stay – on the same factual

allegations contained in her complaint. Because the bankruptcy court has

not adjudicated the merits of any request for sanctions, Debtor’s arguments

are not properly before this Panel. We therefore deny Debtor’s request for

this Panel to sanction Defendants.

For the reasons set forth above, Debtor has not articulated an error by

the bankruptcy court.

13 CONCLUSION

The bankruptcy court did not err in dismissing the adversary

proceeding. We therefore AFFIRM.

14