In re Wong Fock
In re Wong Fock
Opinion of the Court
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in this court by Wong Sing on behalf of Wong Pock, the detained, in which it is alleged that Wong Fock is unlawfully imprisoned, detained, confined, and restrained of his liberty by L. Ezekiel, a deputy United States marshal of the territory of Arizona, in the county jail of the city and county of San Francisco, state and Northern district of California; that the illegality of the imprisonment consists in the fact that said deputy United States marshal holds and keeps said Wong Pock in confinement for the purpose of deporting him to China, for an alleged violation by said Wong Fock of an: act of congress of May 5, 1892, in not procuring the certificate of residence required by said act. It is further alleged in said
Upon the return of the writ in this court, the matter was referred' to E. H. Seacock, Esq., the special referee and examiner, to ascertain the facts and report his opinion thereon. It was contended before him that the commissioner of the Third judicial district of the territory of Arizona, who made and issued the order of deportation, had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the alleged violation of the acts of congress referred to, for the reason that it is provided by section 6 of the act of May 5, 1892 (27 Stat. 25), that Chinese laborers, within the limits of the United States, who shall neglect to comply with its provisions, may be arrested, etc., “and takenbéfore a United States judge whose duty it shall be to order that he be deported,” etc. It is contended by counsel for the petitioner that it necessarily follows that the judicial power so conferred by this section upon “a United States judge” is exclusive, and can be exercised by him alone, and that a United States commissioner is not “a United States judge.” The special referee held that this contention was untenable, inasmuch as section 3 of the same act provides that a Chinese person may “be adjudged to be unlawfully within the United States * * * ’ by a justice, judge, or commissioner,” and that the expression, “a United States judge,” found in section 6, must be read in connection with section 3. He held, therefore, that the commissioner had full jurisdiction and power to hear and- determine the question whether or-'not Wong Pock was lawfully Within the United States. He recommended that the, writ be dismissed, and the detained remanded to the custody of the United States marshal of the territory of Arizona, to be by him deported to China in pursuance of said order of -deportation. To this recommendation, exceptions have been taken by counsel for the petitioned.
It is unnecessary to consider at length the question involved. The whole -matter was critically discussed and considered by the special referee in his opinion and findings filed May 3, 1897. I agree with him that section 3 of the act is to be read in connection with section 6. Section 2 of the same act is also consistent with and fortifies the interpretation to be given to the expression “a United States" judge.” That congress intended' that United States commissioners should have the power to determine whether Chinese persons were lawfully within the United States, and to make the appropriate order of deportation, if they were found to be-within the United States in violation of section 6 of the act, is, I think, patent from a reading of the act of May 5, 1892, as amended by the act of November 3, 1893, in its entirely, and also- from previous acts upon the subject; See section "13 of the act of September 13, 1888 (25: Stat. 476); section 12 of the act of May 6, 1882, as amended by the act of July 5, 1884 (23 'Stat. 117). 'The expression “a United States judge,” found in section 6 of the act of May 5, 1892, is; in my opinion, a general one, and refers to those judicial officers
“The designation of the judge, in genera) terms, as ‘a. United States judge,' is an apt and suiIU-ient description oí a judge oí a court of the United States, and is oqunalent to or synonymous with the designation in other statutes of the judges authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus, or warrants to arrest persons accused of crime;” citing sections 752 and 1014 of the Revised Statute^.
Section 1014 provides that:
“For any crime or offense against the United States, the offender may, by any justice or judge of the United Stales, or by any commissioner of a circuit court, * * * be arrested and imprisoned,” etc.
While in the case above referred to the supreme court were considering the term “a United States judge” as applied to a district judge, still it would seem that the definition they then gave to the expression “a United States judge,” in the sense in which it is used in the acts referred to, is broad enough to include United States commissioners, for they have the power to issue “warrants to arrest persons accused of crime.” I come to the conclusion that United States commissioners not only have the power to adjudge whether a Chinese person is unlawfully in the United States, under sections 2 and 3 of the act, but that they have also the power to order a deportation, under section 6. I make this deduction, not alone by reason of the construction to which the several sections of the act in question seem to be reasonably susceptible, but because it would result, if judges of the district or circuit court only could take cognizance of this class of eases, that in many cases it would become almost impracticable to enforce the law, and certainly very expensive to do so, on account, as is very persuasively observed by the special referee in his opinion, of our extended territory, the limited number of our United States judge's, and the great distance frequently intervening between the place of arrest and tin: place of trial. One of the strongest reasons for the appointment of United States commissioners in certain localities is because distance, or the difficulty of travel, render the court and the judge thereof difficult of access. It. seems 1o me that congress must have had this in mind when it provided in sections 2 and 3 that United Slates commissioners, among other judicial officers, should adjudge whether persons of Chinese descent, arrested under the provisions of the act or the acts thereby extended, were or were not lawfully within the United States. In statutory construction, arguments of convenience often address themselves strongly to the court. As was aptly said by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 386, “Where great inconvenience will result: from a particular construction, that construction is to be avoided, unless the meaning of the legislature is plain, in which ease; it must be obeyed.” In the case of U. S. v. Wong Dep Ken, 57 Fed. 203, it appeared that a Chinese person had been adjudged by a United States commission
Reference
- Full Case Name
- In re WONG FOCK
- Cited By
- 1 case
- Status
- Published