Center for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Management
Center for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Management
Opinion of the Court
ORDER RE CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(Re: Docket No. 28, 32)
Plaintiffs Center for Biological Diversity and Sierra Club bring their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701-706. They challenge the decision of Defendants Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) and Interior Secretary Ken Salazar to sell four oil and gas leases for approximately 2,700 acres of federal land in Monterey and Fresno counties. Plaintiffs now seek summary judgment that the leases were sold in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act and the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. Defendants oppose the motion and seek a summary judgment of their own. The court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. On January 15, 2013, the parties appeared for hearing.
Having considered the evidence of record and the arguments of counsel, the court holds that the BLM violated NEPA in its environment assessment of the leases by unreasonably relying on an earlier single-well development scenario. That scenario did not adequately consider the development impact of hydraulic fracturing techniques popularly known as “fracking” when used in combination with technologies such as horizontal drilling. Not only was the environment assessment erroneous as a matter of law, the BLM’s finding of no significant impact based on the assessment and resulting decision not to prepare an environmental impact statement also was erroneous as a matter of law. The court further holds that although the leases were issued in violation of NEPA, the lease terms do not separately violate the MLA. Accordingly, the court GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART the parties’ motions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Monterey Shale Formation and Hydraulic Fracturing
Central California’s Monterey Shale Formation is a massive sedimentary rock formation estimated to contain over 15 billion barrels of oil, equal to 64 percent of the nation’s total shale oil reserve, most of which is not retrievable through conventional drilling techniques.
Fracking is the artificial propagation of fractures in a rock layer by injecting large quantities of water and fracturing fluids at high volume and pressure.
The effect of fracking on the oil and gas economies has been tremendous. An April 2011 Congressional report -notes that “[a]s a result of hydraulic fracturing and advances in horizontal drilling technology, natural gas production in 2010 reached the highest level in decades.”
Whatever one view’s of the virtue and vices of fracking, it is undisputed that fracking’s potential — both good and bad— has not gone unnoticed. Advocates herald the technology as an economic method to meet our nation’s energy needs by extracting vast amounts of formerly inaccessible hydrocarbon supplies.
B. Resource Management Plan for the Hollister Field Office Area (June 2006)
BLM manages federal onshore oil and gas resources subject to the requirements of the MLA and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”).
In June 2006, BLM’s Hollister Field Office. (“HFO”) prepared a Proposed Resource Management Plan/Final Environmental Impact Statement (“PRMP/FEIS”) to govern management of the Southern Mountain Diablo Range and Central Coast of California.
The PRMP/FEIS included a Reasonably Foreseeable Development Scenario for Oil and Gas (“RFD”) for the HFO area, which projected that no more than 15 wells would be drilled within the next 15-20 years, based on a survey of past oil and gas activities within the boundaries of the HFO and the very small amount of federal mineral estate within the areas of high development potential.
HFO also analyzed the environmental impacts of proposed leasing in the HFO area.
After publishing the report and receiving comments from the public, BLM adopted the PRMP/FEIS in September
C. Environmental Assessment (June 2011)
Several years later, in response to expressions of interest from members of the oil and gas industry, BLM proposed a competitive oil and gas lease sale for approximately 35,000 acres in the HFO area.
The final EA consists of a 125-page assessment of the proposed lease sale. After describing the purpose and need for the lease sale, the EA discussed environmental issues, including: (1) the oil and gas resources in the FIFO area;
The EA evaluated the environmental impacts of three alternatives.
Critically, the EA also provided a projection on the extent of drilling activity to be conducted and the impact of such drilling activity.
The EA.did not discuss fracking in great detail beyond noting that it was “not relevant to the analysis of impacts ... because the reasonable foreseeable development scenario anticipates very little (if any) disturbance to the human environment.”
The EA did, however, briefly discuss “existing credible scientific evidence,” concerning fracking.
Also on June 16, 2011, relying on the analysis contained within the EA, BLM’s Acting California State Director executed a Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”), announcing his determination that the proposed action would not result in any significant environmental impact requiring further analysis under NEPA.
E. Protests Against the Sale
Before the lease sale took place, environmental groups and nearby municipalities expressed concern over the potential impacts of the lease sale. The lease areas within Monterey County are part of the Salinas River watershed and “play an important role in recharging fresh water aquifers.”
The planning area of the lease sale is also a habitat for many species protected under the Endangered Species Act. Among those are the endangered San Joaquin kit fox, blunt-nosed leopard lizard, and California condor, and threatened South Central Coast steelhead.
Given the increasing applications of and the growing concerns over fracking’s impact on the environment, numerous groups, including Plaintiffs, as well as the Monterey County government itself, publicly protested the lease sale.
In our May 6, 2011 letter to the Bureau of Land Management, we expressed our concerns vfith deficiencies in the environmental review for the proposed Competitive Oil and Gas Lease Sale pending September 14, 2011. That letter ex*1150 pressed that Monterey County had not been consulted in the preparation of the EA, and that there were substantive deficiencies in the Environmental Assessment.69
In the letter, the Monterey County voiced its concerns on “the potential to induce seismic activity and the lack of scientific study related to potential impacts to drinking water and groundwater.”
After the issuance of the Decision Record, Plaintiffs filed a protest of the lease sale, asserting that BLM’s EA was inadequate and that a detailed environmental impact statement (“EIS”) was required.
F. Lease Sales
On September 14, 2011, BLM successfully auctioned leases in three parcels: a 2,343-acre parcel in Monterey County, a 200-acre parcel in Fresno County, and a 40-acre parcel in Fresno County.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Where the district court is reviewing an agency determination under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”),
With the goal of “declaring] a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment,”, the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)
The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (“MLA”)
III. DISCUSSION
At the outset, the court must emphasize what lies before it, and what does not. What is before it is the legal question of whether the BLM actions at issue in this case were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”
A. National Environmental Policy Act
Plaintiffs’ first challenge to the disputed leases focuses on BLM’s obligations under
1) BLM Was Required To Conduct A NEPA Analysis for the Non-NSO Leases
As a preliminary matter, BLM argues that at least for two of the parcels, the need for preparing any NEPA analysis at all had not ripened. The federal regulations explicitly require that review under the NEPA process be timely.
A BLM-issued lease for oil and gas gives the lessee the right to drill and produce, subject to the terms of the agreement. Any plan for drilling must be submitted through the Application for Permit to Drill (“APD”) process. Regulation of the APD process is outlined in 43 CFR § 3101.1-2, which defines what reasonable measures BLM can require. These include relocating the proposed drilling up to 200 meters, delaying surface disturbance or drilling up to 60 days, or requiring special reclamation measures. But generally, “the BLM cannot deny a lessee the right to drill once a lease is issued unless the action is in direct conflict with another existing law.”
In Conner v. Burford, the Ninth Circuit addressed exactly the type of BLM leases at issue here — leases with No Surface Occupancy provisions (“NSO leases”) and all other leases, termed “non-NSO leases.” The court found that the NSO leases absolutely prohibited any surface disturbing activities and were more akin to a right of refusal than an actual lease for drilling. The NSO leases therefore did not constitute an “irretrievable commitment of resources.”
The two other parcels do not contain NSO provisions. The BLM points out that these leases do contain other provisions, including Stipulation No. 1, that allow BLM to deny all surface disturbing activities if threatened and endangered species (“T & E species”) are found on the lands during inventories, unless a lawful alternative is submitted.
2) BLM Unreasonably • Concluded That The Leases Would Have No “Significant Environmental Impact”
As the time for NEPA analysis was triggered by the proposal for the sale of the two non-NSO leases, BLM had to analyze whether the proposal might have significant environmental impact. BLM contends that its EA arid FONSI established convincing reasons that there would be no such impact.
“Some proposed federal actions categorically require the preparation of an EIS. If the proposed action does not categorically require the preparation of an EIS, the agency must prepare an EA to determine, whether the action will have a significant effect on the environment.”
In evaluating the significance of the impact of the proposed action, the agency must consider both the context of the action as well as the intensity.
Intensity is determined by scrutinizing ten factors, as described in 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27:
(1) Impacts that may be both beneficial and adverse. A significant effect may exist even if the Federal agency believes that on balance the effect will be beneficial.
(2) The degree to which the proposed action affects public health or safety.
(3) Unique characteristics of the geographic area such as proximity to historic or cultural resources, park lands, prime farmlands, wetlands, wild and scenic rivers, or ecologically critical areas.
(4) The degree to which the effects on the quality of the human environment are likely to be highly controversial.
(5) The degree to which the possible effects on the human environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks.
(6) The degree to which the action may establish a precedent for future actions with significant effects or represents a decision in principle about a future consideration.
*1155 (7) Whether the action is related to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts. Significance exists if it is reasonable to anticipate a cumulatively significant impact on the environment. Significance cannot be avoided by terming an action temporary or by breaking it down into small component parts.
(8) The degree to which the action may adversely affect districts, sites, highways, structures, or objects listed in or eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places or may cause loss or destruction of significant scientific, cultural, or historical resources.
(9) The degree to which the action may adversely affect an endangered or threatened species or its habitat that has been determined to be critical under the Endangered Species Act of 1973.
(10) Whether the action threatens a violation of Federal, State, or local law or requirements imposed for the protection of the environment.
The presence of any one of these factors may be sufficient to require an EIS.
NEPA requires that BLM evaluate all reasonably foreseeable environmental effects of its actions.
Here, BLM based its analysis of the lease sale on the projection that only one well would be drilled across the four parcels to be leased.
While BLM argues that this conclusion borne out of past data was reasonable, logically this projection fails to take into account all “reasonably foreseeable” possibilities as required by NEPA. BLM plainly limits its analysis to one scenario — a lessee drills an exploratory well, no oil is found, and the lessee halts all further exploration. While this may have been reasonable in the past, the record before the agency teaches that it was not reasonable by the time the non-NSO leases were issued. Even BLM itself has acknowledged that fracking activity in the United States has increased dramatically in recent years.
Even so, the precedent of this Circuit makes clear that BLM was unreasonable in categorically refusing to consider an effect that bears “reasonably close causal relationship” to the action at issue.
BLM also asserts that because the EA was tiered to the regional manage
BLM finally argues that at this stage, the exact scope and extent of drilling that will involve fracking is unknown, so NEPA analysis, if any, should be conducted when there is a site-specific proposal. But “the basic thrust” of NEPA is to require that agencies consider the range of possible environmental effects before resources are committed and the effects are fully known.
On this record, it was unreasonable for BLM not to at least consider reasonable projections of drilling in the area that include fracking operations, or else limit its sale to leases with NSO provisions that would permit it to prohibit all surface disturbances until more specific information becomes available.
This unreasonable lack of consideration of how fracking could impact development of the disputed parcels went on to unreasonably distort BLM’s assessment of at least three of the “intensity” factors in its FONSI. First, BLM erroneously held that the leases were not highly controversial. A proposal is highly controversial when “substantial questions are raised as to whether a project ... may cause significant degradation” of a resource.
There was clearly a controversy here regarding the nature of the drilling to occur on the leases and the potential impacts drilling would impose on the nearby communities. Monterey County objected strenuously to the lease sale, citing its water agency’s opinion that fracking would put municipal water supplies at risk. Many environmental groups and concerned citizens residing in nearby communities also protested the lease sale on the basis of fracking’s potential threats to public health and safety. Although mere opposition to the project does not in itself create a controversy, “the volume of comments from and the serious concerns raised by federal and state agencies specifically charged with protecting the environment [may] support a finding that an EIS” is necessary.
In response, BLM asserts the now-familiar argument that there is no controversy because any degradation of the local environment from fracking should be discussed, if ever, when there is a site-specific proposal. But the Ninth Circuit has specifically disapproved of this as a reason for holding off on preparing an EIS, holding that “[t]he government’s inability to fully ascertain the precise extent of the effects of [the activity] is not, however, a justification for failing to estimate what those effects might be before irrevocably committing to the activity.”
Second, BLM erroneously analyzed the potential effect of the leases on public health and safety. Although Plaintiffs argue a variety risks to public health and safety from fracking on the leased lands, including air quality, oil spills, water contamination, and water shortages, the court finds the risk of water pollution to be the most compelling and the most supported by the record. Certain parcels included in the lease sale are located in close proximity to San Antonio Reservoir, an important water resource for the Salinas Valley. The lease areas are also a part of the Salinas River watershed, which “play[s] an important role in recharging fresh aquifers.”
The potential risk for contamination from fracking, while unknown, is not so remote or speculative to be completely ignored. Although BLM notes in its EA that “[t]o date, there is no direct evidence that communities where hydraulic fracturing has been allowed have had any issues with contamination of drinking water,” this treatment is insufficient in light of the EA’s own observations of the potential
Third, BLM erroneously discounted the uncertainty from fracking that may be resolved by further data collection. “Preparation [of an EIS] is mandated where uncertainty may be resolved by further collection of data, or where collection of such data may prevent speculation on potential effects.”
Ultimately, BLM argues that the effects of fracking on the parcels at issue are largely unknown. The court agrees. But this is precisely why proper investigation was so crucial in this case. BLM’s dismissal of any development scenario involving fracking as “outside of its jurisdiction”
3) Remedy
“[C]ourts have discretion to formulate equitable relief to remedy a NEPA violation”
B. Mineral Leasing Act
As a separate matter, Plaintiffs also argue that the lease sale was flawed because BLM violated the substantive provisions of the MLA. The MLA provides the following:
All leases of lands containing oil or gas, made or issued under the provisions of this chapter, shall be subject to the condition that the lessee will, in conducting his explorations and mining operations, use all reasonable precautions to prevent waste of oil or gas developed in the land, or the entrance of water through wells drilled by him to the oil sands or oil-bearing strata, to the destruction or injury of the oil deposits.152
BLM has satisfied this requirement by providing in its leases terms that require the lessee to conduct operations and employ “reasonable precautions” to prevent waste:
Sec. 4. Diligence, rate of development, unitization, and drainage — Lessee must exercise reasonable diligence in developing and producing, and must prevent unnecessary damage to, loss of, or waste of leased resources.
Sec. 6. Conduct of operations — Lessee must conduct operations in a manner that minimizes adverse impacts, to the land, air, and water, to cultural biological visual, and other resources, and to other land uses or users. Lessee must take reasonable measures deemed necessary by lessor to accomplish the intent of this section. To the extent consistent with lease rights granted, such measures may include, but are not limited to, modification to siting or design of facilities, timing of operations, and specification of interim and final reclamation measures ”153
These lease terms included in all four of the leases at issue are substantially similar to the MLA language and act to require the lessee to use reasonable measures in her activities to prevent waste of resources.
Plaintiffs nevertheless assert that BLM violated the MLA “by failing to ensure via lease terms that lessees take all reasonable precautions to prevent emissions of natural gas.”
Although these technologies may certainly prevent waste and may be economically viable, as Plaintiffs suggest, the MLA cannot be read to impose a mandate for BLM to require lessees to employ certain technologies. The plain language of the MLA requires that “all leases” shall be “subject to the condition” outlined in the lease language. Put another way, the
In fact, the Supreme Court has specifically disapproved of courts directing affirmative agency action when no specific mandate exists, or the law grants the agency significant discretion in choosing the means to carry out the statute. In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, the Supreme Court ruled that a claim challenging an agency action under Section 706(1) of the APA may proceed only “where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.”
IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and BLM’s motion is DENIED as to the NEPA claims. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED and BLM’s motion is GRANTED as to the MLA claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
. See AR 09230.
. See id. at 02532.
. See id. at 09230.
. See id., at 09045.
. See id. at 09033.
. See id. at 09038.
. See id. at 09229.
. See id. at 090229, 09033.
. See id. at 01038.
. See id. at 09044-45.
. See id. at 09208.
. See id. at 09045.
. See id. at 09044.
. See id. at 09302, 09306, 09314.
. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq.
. See Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Int., 377 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2004).
. See Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. See also Gardner v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 638 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 43 C.F.R. § 1610.2). See also AR 00003.
. See id.
. See id.
. See AR 00001-00668.
. "Split estate” refers to the land in which the surface rights are owned by private owners, while the subsurface mineral rights are owned by the United States and administered by the BLM. See id. at 00176, 00987.
. See id. at 00028, 00032-33, 00850.
. See id. at 00468-75.
. See id.
. See id. at 00001-668.
. See id. at 00086-90, 00096-104, 00112-121, 00122-142, 00437, 00447, 00453-54, 00464.
. See id. at 00670-73.
. See id. at 00699-703, 00714-16, 00725-26, 00760-68.
. See id.
. See id. at 00824, 00990.
. See id. at 00844-952.
. See id. at 01080.
. See id. at 01080-81.
. See id. at 00953-1089.
. See id. at 00992-94.
. See id. at 00999-1006.
. See id. at 01013-15.
. See id. at 01015-29.
. See id. at 00986.
. See id. at 00987.
. See id.
. See id. at 00989.
. See id. at 01044.
. See id.
. See id. at 00469.
. See id. at 01044.
. There are 30 active oil fields and gas fields totally or partially within the HFO geographic management area.
. See id. at 01044.
. See id. at 00469.
. See id. at 01044.
. See id. at 01036.
. See id. at 01037.
. See id.
. See id. at 01040.
. Id.
. See id.
. See id. at 01039-40.
. See id. at 00959-63.
. See id.; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27.
. See AR 00953-58, 07865.
. See id. at 00955.
. See id. at 01013.
. See id. at 08094.
. See id. at 00980.
. See id. at 01018, 01023, 07958.
. See id. at 00934, 07996.
. See id. at 01020.
. See id. at 05961-06207, 06221-07494, 08021-23.
. Id. at 08021.
. Id.
. Id.
. See id. at 07898.
. See id. at 08062.
. See id. at 08089.
. See id. at 05542.
. See id. at 03591-03600.
. See id. at 09368-9404.
. See id.
. See id. at 09394, 09404.
. See id. at 09368-75, 09380-84.
. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
. Sierra Forest Legacy v. U.S. Forest Serv., 652 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1074 (N.D.Cal. 2009).
. Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 etseq.
. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97, 103 S.Ct. 2246, 76 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983).
. See id.
. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181 etseq.
. 30 U.S.C. § 21(a).
. 30 U.S.C. § 225.
. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
. Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 402 F.3d 846, 859 (9th Cir. 2005).
. Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 222 F.3d 1105, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000) (abrogated on other grounds by
. See Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768, 785 (9th Cir. 2006).
. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2.
. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5.
. Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1446 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(v) which requires an EIS to include a statement of "any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.").
. Id. at 1446.
. AR 00977.
. Conner, 848 F.2d at 1447-48.
. See id.
. Id. at 1448-49.
. Pit River Tribe, 469 F.3d at 782-83.
. AR 09383.
. Kern v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., 284 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002).
. Conner, 848 F.2d at 1446 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13).
. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4; Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project, 161 F.3dat 1211.
. Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project, 161 F.3d at 1212 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1215 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted).
. Cf. Ocean Advocates, 402 F.3d at 859 (arbitrary and capricious standard involves evaluation of whether agency “articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made”).
. Id.
. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27.
. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1185.
. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27.
. See id.
. See Ocean Advocates, 402 F.3d at 865; Barnes v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 655 F.3d 1124, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011); Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 731 (9th Cir. 2001) (disapproved on other grounds).
. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 772, 103 S.Ct. 1556, 75 L.Ed.2d 534 (1983).
. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8.
. See Metropolitan Edison Co., 460 U.S. at 774, 103 S.Ct. 1556.
. AR 01044 ("we would expect no more than one well total on all of these parcels.”).
. Id. at 01046.
. See id. at 01038.
. See id. at 01080-81.
. Ocean Advocates, 402 F.3d at 867-68; see also Metropolitan Edison Co., 460 U.S. at 773, 103 S.Ct. 1556 (holding that to determine whether NEPA requires an agency to consider a particular effect, courts must "look at the relationship between that effect and the change in the physical environment caused by the major federal action at issue.”). Cf. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 449 F.3d 1016, 1035 (9th Cir. 2006). BLM suggests that San Luis Obispo was limited to its particular circumstances, in which the court held that that it was unreasonable for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to categorically refuse to consider terrorist attacks in reviewing an application for proposed interim spent fuel storage installation. But nothing in the case law since San Luis Obispo suggests such a limited application of its standard. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1179. Even economic effects may be relevant "when they are ‘interrelated' with ‘natural or physical environmental effects.’ ’’ Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, Case No. 06-01075 CRB, 2007 WL 518624, at *7 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 13, 2007) (citations omitted).
. See AR 09045.
. See id. at 00908.
. Cf. Greater Yellowstone Coal., Inc. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard for purposes of the Administrative Procedures Act and the Environmental Protection Act, the court found that it was not rational for the agency to rely on past data from before the "epidemic of mountain pine beetles” to predict future trends of the grizzly population).
. Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project, 161 F.3d at 1213-14.
. Kern, 284 F.3d at 1073 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20).
. Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346, 1356 (9th Cir. 1994).
. See AR 00001-00668.
. Salmon River Concerned Citizens, 32 F.3d at 1356.
. City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
. Id. See also N. Plains Res. Council v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 1067, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011).
. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 117 F.3d 1520, 1536 (9th Cir. 1997).
. Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project, 161 F.3d at 1212.
. Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n, 241 F.3d at 736.
. California v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 260 F.Supp.2d 969, 973 (N.D.Cal. 2003).
. AR 00961.
. Conner, 848 F.2d at 1450. See also N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Kempthorne, 457 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that regarding a BLM sale of non-NSO leases, preparation of an EIS was "undeniably required” and should assess the general impact of drilling on the environment even while rejecting plaintiffs’ arguments that the EIS should have contained more site-specific analysis).
. AR 01013.
. See id. at 00126-130, 01013, 01034.
. See id. at 09044.
. Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted).
. See AR 00962.
. Plaintiffs also argue that the proposed action may adversely affect an endangered or threatened species or its habitat. While it is true that the area in question serves as a habitat for several identified endangered species, such as the California condor, blunt-nosed leopard lizard, South Central Coast steelhead, and the San Joaquin kit fox, the RMP/FEIS and the EA both addressed mitigation of oil drilling activity to aid preservation of these species. The record is unclear as to whether potential fracking operations would pose unique threats to impact endangered or threatened species not considered by the RMP/FEIS. Nevertheless, BLM implemented stipulations that would adequately protect these species even with these unknowns. Stipulation No. 1 reserves to BLM all rights to regulate, require relocation, and even deny projects based on the presence of T & E species. Unlike the other concerns raised by Plaintiffs, the preservation of T & E species was properly addressed by the lease terms.
. See ARO 1080-81.
. Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 615 F.3d 1069, 1084 (9th Cir. 2010).
. See zd. at 1081.
. See id.
. See id. at 1080-81 (noting that relief for a NEPA violation is subject to traditional equitable principles).
. 30 U.S.C. § 225 (emphasis added).
. AR 09370, 09378, 09387, 09397 (emphasis added).
. Docket No. 28 at 44.
. See id. at 38.
. 542 U.S. 55, 64, 124 S.Ct. 2373, 159 L.Ed.2d 137 (2004) (emphasis original).
. See id.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY and Sierra Club v. The BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT and Ken Salazar, Secretary of the Department of Interior
- Cited By
- 3 cases
- Status
- Published