ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

While responding to a report of a suspected drug dealer with a shotgun outside an apartment complex, officers of the Anaheim Police Department encountered an individual later identified as Bernie Cervantes Villegas at the complex holding a long-barrel gun. After Mr. Villegas refused repeated commands to drop his weapon and then lifted the gun off the ground, Officer Nick Bennallack fired five rounds at Mr. Villegas, striking and killing him. Mr. Villegas’s family1 filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and related state law claims. Defendants, the City of Anaheim and the Anaheim Police Department (together, “APD”), former APD Police Chief John Welter, and APD Officer Nick Bennallack (collectively, “Defendants”), filed the instant motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 18 [“Defs.’ MSJ”].) The Court finds that, in light of the information known to the officers and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the rapidly developing incident at the apartment complex, the use of deadly force against Mr. Villegas was objectively reasonable. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.2

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as then-conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In a § 1983 action against a law enforcement officer, the officer “will be denied qualified immunity ... only if (1) the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting injury, show that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the incident such that a reasonable officer would have understood her conduct to be unlawful in that situation.” Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)).

Because this case involves claims of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the constitutional analysis is governed by the “objective reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. *9061, 7, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). Determining whether a particular use of force is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment “requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The use of deadly force is reasonable “if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.” Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 914 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 3, 105 S.Ct. 1694.); see also Long v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 511 F.3d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 2007). Determining whether an officer’s use of force was reasonable requires consideration of all the circumstances known to the officer, including “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Moreover, the reasonableness of the force used “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865). The court must allow for the fact that “police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving' — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865.

Where reasonableness turns on disputed issues of material fact it is “a question of fact best resolved by a jury.” Torres, 648 F.3d at 1123 (quoting Wilkins v. City of Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2003)). However, where the facts are undisputed and the court has drawn all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party, the objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct “is a pure question of law.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).3

Considering the totality of the circumstances and taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the undisputed evidence shows that Officer Bennallack’s use of deadly force against Mr. Villegas was objectively reasonable. Office Bennallack and Officer Brett Heitmann responded to a 911 call on the evening of January 7, 2012, in which the caller reported a male subject with a shotgun standing in the visitor parking area of her apartment complex, located at 3633 W. Ball Rd., Anaheim, California. (Dkt. No. 19, Defs.’ Statement of Uncontroverted Facts [“Defs.’ SUF”] 1.)4 The caller stated that she was familiar with the subject and believed he was a drug dealer. (Id.) Officer Bennallack and Officer Heitmann responded to the location and joined two other APD officers, Kevin Voorhis and Matthew Ellis, on a street near the apartment complex. (Defs.’ SUF 3-4.) Because the call reported a subject with a shotgun, Officers Heitmann and Voorhis equipped themselves with their assigned tactical assault rifles. (Defs.’ SUF 4; Dkt. No. 20-2 [“Heitmann Decl.”] ¶ 9; Dkt. No. *90720-3 [“Voorhis Decl.”] ¶¶ 2-4.) The apartment complex was arranged in a single row of units, oriented north to south, with carports making up the rear ground floor of the building. (Defs.’ SUF 5-7; Dkt. No. 21, Exh. 1.) A narrow lane of concrete ran behind the buildings allowing access to the carports and a visitor parking area north of the building. (Id.)

The four officers proceeded on foot in a diamond formation, moving north up the concrete lane and searching and clearing each carport. (Defs.’ SUF 6.) When the officers reached the north end of the apartment building they paused at its exterior corner. (Defs.’ SUF 7-8.) Around the corner, beyond the officers’ line of sight, was the visitor parking area where the subject with the shotgun was last seen. (Defs.’ SUF 1, 7.) Officers Bennallack and Heitmann were the first to maneuver around the corner. (Defs.’ SUF 8-9.) Upon rounding the corner they observed an individual, later identified as Tristan Rosal, standing near a car. (Defs.’ SUF 9.) The officers shouted repeated commands: “Put your hands up” and “Show me your hands.” (Id.) Mr. Rosal complied and fully raised his hands. (Id.) As the officers continued to side-step north from the corner into the visitor parking area, they observed Mr. Villegas standing next to a cinder block wall on the side of a low stairway, facing east toward the officers. (Defs.’ SUF 11.) The officers saw Mr. Villegas holding5 a long-barrel firearm and commanded him to “Drop the gun,” “Drop the gun.” (Defs.’ SUF 11, 14; Bennallack Decl. ¶ 16.) Officer Bennallack believed that the gun Mr. Villegas was holding was a shotgun. (Defs.’ SUF 11; Bennallack Decl. ¶ 13.) The officers continued to side-step northbound, and Mr. Villegas still did not comply with their repeated commands to drop the gun. (Defs.’ SUF 14.) Instead, Mr. Villegas lifted the gun off the ground. (Id.) Officer Heitmann had his rifle at his shoulder with the safety off and was “milliseconds” away from firing, but his line of fire was interrupted by the metal stair railing. (Heitmann Decl. ¶ 20.) Officer Bennallack, who was slightly north of Officer Heitmann, fired five rounds from his handgun, striking Mr. Villegas and causing him to fall to the ground. (Defs.’ SUF 16; Bennallack Decl. ¶ 18.) The officers approached and Officer Bennallack kicked the gun away from Mr. Villegas’s reach. (Defs.’ SUF 17.) The officers then administered chest compressions until paramedics arrived. (Id.) It was subsequently determined that the long-barrel firearm Mr. Villegas was holding was a BB gun. (See Dkt. No. 21, Exh. 2.)

Although this incident resulted in the tragic loss of a life, given the circumstances confronting the officers it was objectively reasonable for Officer Bennallack to use deadly force.6 The officers were *908responding to a call of a suspected drug dealer armed with a shotgun outside of a residential apartment complex. Although the weapon Mr. Villegas was holding turned out to be a BB gun, an officer could reasonably — even easily — believe the gun in question was an authentic firearm. {See Dkt. No. 21, Exh. 2.) The gun is made out of dark metal and has a wooden stock. {See id.) It does not have a bright orange tip or any similar feature that would indicate it was not an authentic, fullpower firearm. {See id.) Confronted with the circumstances facing Officer Bennallack on January 7, 2012, an objectively reasonable officer would reasonably believe that Mr. Villegas posed an “immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others”- — -the “most important factor” in the Graham excessive force analysis. Glenn v. Wash. Cnty., 673 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Officer Bennallack was confronted with a suspected drug dealer who failed to comply with repeated commands to put his gun down and instead lifted the gun off the ground.7 Officer Bennallack had to make a split-second decision whether Mr. Ville-gas was attempting to shoot him and the other police officers. Officer Bennallack made the decision that Mr. Villegas posed such a threat, so he shot Mr. Villegas to protect himself and his fellow officers. This Court will not judge the reasonableness of Officer Bennallack’s actions with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.

Officer Bennallack did what he reasonably believed he had to do at the time. The Fourth Amendment requires nothing more.8