1 FILED | ormcualitincrcamr | 3 OCT 1 | 2019 4 ree IRERICT OF CALIFORNIA DEPUTY 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11] DAVIDK.,! Case No. 8:18-cv-01287-MAA Plaintiff, 13 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND V. ORDER REVERSING DECISION OF 14 THE COMMISSIONER AND REMANDING FOR FURTHER

Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

18 On July 25, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking review of the 19 || Commissioner’s final decision denying his applications for Disability Insurance 20 || Benefits and Supplemental Security Income pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the 21 || Social Security Act. This matter is fully briefed and ready for decision. For the 22 || reasons discussed below, the Commissioner’s final decision is reversed, and this 23 || matter is remanded for further administrative proceedings. 24 | ——_ ' Plaintiff's name is Partially redacted in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil 25 || Procedure ete )ien ) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court os and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United tates. 27 | 2? The Commissioner of Social Security is substituted as the Defendant pursuant to 38 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).

1 ADMINISTRATIVE BACKGROUND 2 On January 12, 2015, Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance 3 || Benefits, and on January 30, 2015, he filed an application for Supplemental 4 || Security Income. (Administrative Record [AR] 15, 92, 93.) In both applications, 5 || Plaintiff alleged disability beginning on January 1, 2007, due to major depression, 6 || sleep apnea, and chronic pain. (AR 52, 72.) 7 After his applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration, 8 || Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 9 || (““ALJ’). (AR 15, 150-51.) At a hearing held on May 24, 2017, at which Plaintiff 10 || appeared with counsel, the assigned ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff and a 11 || vocational expert. (AR 30-51.) 12 In a decision issued on August 4, 2017, the ALJ denied Plaintiffs claim after 13 || making the following findings pursuant to the Commissioner’s five-step evaluation. 14 || (AR 15-24.) Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his 15 || alleged onset date of January 1, 2007. (AR 17.) He had severe impairments 16 || consisting of “major depressive disorder; generalized anxiety disorder; sleep apnea; 17 || history of piriformis release with residual neuroma and low back pain.” (/d.) He 18 || did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically 19 || equaled the requirements of one of the impairments from the Commissioner’s 20 || Listing of Impairments. (AR 18.) He had a residual functional capacity to perform 21 |) “medium unskilled work.” (AR 20.) Based on this residual functional capacity, 22 || Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work as a ride operator. (AR 23.) 23 || However, Plaintiff could perform other work in the national economy. (AR 23.) In 24 |) so concluding, the ALJ did not adopt the vocational expert’s testimony, but instead 25 || relied on Rules 203.14, 203.21, and 203.28 of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. 26 || (AR 24.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined 27 || by the Social Security Act. (/d.) 28 || ///

1 On June 9, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review. 2 || (AR 1-6.) Thus, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the 3 |} Commissioner. 4 5 DISPUTED ISSUES 6 The parties raise three disputed issues: 7 l. “Whether the ALJ conducted a proper residual functional capacity 8 || assessment.” 9 Ze “Whether the ALJ properly considered the treating physician’s 10 || opinion.” i, Si “Whether the ALJ properly considered the State agency medical 12 || consultants’ opinions.” 13 || (ECF No. 23, Parties’ Joint Stipulation [“Joint Stip.”] at 2-3.) 14 STANDARD OF REVIEW 16 Under

(g), the Court reviews the Commissioner’s final 17 || decision to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by 18 || substantial evidence and whether the proper legal standards were applied. See 19 || Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin.,

(9th Cir. 20 || 2014). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a 21 || preponderance. See Richardson v. Perales,

(1971); Lingenfelter 22 || v. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is “such 23 || relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 24 || conclusion.” Richardson,

. The Court must review the record as a 25 || whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from 26 || the Commissioner’s conclusion. Lingenfelter,

. Where evidence is 27 || susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s 28

1 || interpretation must be upheld. See Orn v. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 2 | 2007). 3 4 DISCUSSION 5 For the reasons discussed below, reversal and remand for further 6 || administrative proceedings are warranted for Issue Two, based on the ALJ’s 7 || assessment of the treating physician’s opinion. Having found that remand is 8 || warranted, the Court declines to address Plaintiff's remaining arguments. See Hiler 9 || v. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 2012) (“Because we remand the case to the 10 || ALJ for the reasons stated, we decline to reach [plaintiff's] alternative ground for 11 |} remand.”); see also Augustine ex rel. Ramirez v. Astrue,

, 12 | 1153 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“[The] Court need not address the other claims plaintiff 13 |} raises, none of which would provide plaintiff with any further relief than granted, 14 || and all of which can be addressed on remand.”). 15 16 || A. ‘Treating Physician’s Opinion (Issue Two). 17 1. Legal Standard. 18 Disputed Issue Two involves the ALJ’s assessment of the opinion of Dr. 19 || Ciprian, Plaintiffs treating psychiatrist. (Joint Stip. at 10-15.) 20 A treating physician’s opinion is entitled to special weight because he or she 21 || is “most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture” of a claimant’s medical 22 || impairments and bring a perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be 23 || obtained from objective medical findings alone. See

(c)(2), 24 || 416.927(c)(2); McAllister v. Sullivan,

(9th Cir. 1989). “The 25 || treating physician’s opinion is not, however, necessarily conclusive as to either a 26 || physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 27 || F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). The weight given a treating physician’s opinion 28 ///

1 || depends on whether it is supported by sufficient medical data and is consistent with 2 || other evidence in the record. See

(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). 3 If the treating physician’s opinion is uncontroverted by another doctor’s 4 || opinion, it may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. See Lester v. 5 || Chater,

(9th Cir. 1996). Ifa treating physician’s opinion is 6 || controverted, it may be rejected only if the ALJ makes findings setting forth 7 || specific and legitimate reasons that are based on the substantial evidence of record. 8 || See

“The ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough 9 |} summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation 10 || thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751 (quoting Cotton v. 11 || Bowen,

(9th Cir. 1986)). 12 Here, Dr. Ciprian’s opinion was inconsistent with the opinions of two state 13 || agency review physicians (AR 61, 109) and an examining physician (AR 914). 14 || Thus, the ALJ was required to state specific and legitimate reasons based on 15 || substantial evidence in the record before rejecting Dr. Ciprian’s opinion. 16 17 2: Background. 18 Dr. Ciprian was Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist from January 2015 to 19 || February 2016. (AR 886, 1038). In June 2015, Dr. Ciprian issued a five-page 20 || narrative opinion about Plaintiff's major depressive disorder. (AR 902-06.) In that 21 || opinion, Dr. Ciprian explained Plaintiffs level of functioning in four areas. (AR 22 || 904-05.) 23 First, in the area of “present daily activities,” Dr. Ciprian stated that Plaintiff 24 || can take the bus, drive to appointments, and prepare some meals, but when he is 25 || depressed, he would not have the energy to care for himself and would stay in bed 26 || for most of the time. (AR 904.) Second, in the area of “social functioning,” Dr. 27 || Ciprian stated that Plaintiff isolates himself and minimizes social contact with 28 || others, that his last job was at Disneyland several years ago, and that he has no

1 |) primary support and cannot obtain any employment. (AR 905.) Third, in the area 2 || of “concentration and task completion,” Dr. Ciprian wrote that Plaintiff is able to 3 || follow instructions and complete his tasks, but due to a depressed mood, anxiety, 4 || low motivation, and hopelessness, Plaintiff would not be able to keep up with his 5 || regular routine. (/d.) Fourth, in the area of “adaptation to work or work-like 6 || situations,” Dr. Ciprian wrote that Plaintiff keeps things to himself and does not 7 || speak up but chooses to be silent at all times, and furthermore that he manages his 8 || stress poorly, often leading to suicidal ideation. (/d.) 9 The ALJ addressed Dr. Ciprian’s assessment of the second area, social 10 || functioning. (AR 22.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff's “observed interactions with 11 || others and the lack of observed problems in these interactions shows he is only 12 || slightly limited in this area on a sustained basis. As such, there is no included 13 || social interaction restrictions in [Plaintiffs] residual functional capacity.” (Ud.) As 14 || support, the ALJ referred to evidence that Plaintiff had a close friend who 15 || completed a third-party function report on his behalf, that the friend sees and 16 || interacts with Plaintiff frequently, that Plaintiff was able to interact with the 17 || numerous medical professionals he encountered, and that he had no history of 18 || disciplinary action during an earlier incarceration for a probation violation. (/d. 19 || [citing AR 19].) Thus, the ALJ afforded “less weight” to Dr. Ciprian’s opinion. 20 || (AR 22. 21 | /// 22 || /// 23 /// 24 > The ALJ used this same reason exclusively to discount the opinions of an 25 ae psychiatrist and two state agency physicians. (AR 22.) __ Although the Commissioner interprets the ALJ’s decision preaaly to posit 26 || additional reasons to discount the treating peyeniamns s pas (Joint Stip. at 13- 14), the Court’s review is limited to the sole reason the ALJ actualy asserted, based 27 | on Plaintiff's level of social functioning. See Connett v. Barnhart,

(9th Cir. 2003) (“We are constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts.”) 28 |! (citations omitted).

1 3. Analysis. 2 An ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion about a claimant’s mental 3 |] illness when it is inconsistent with the claimant’s level of social activity. See 4 | Ghanim v. Colvin,

(9th Cir. 2014) (citing Morgan v. Comm’r 5 || of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

(9th Cir. 1999)). Here, Dr. Ciprian’s 6 || opinion about Plaintiff's social functioning was inconsistent with the evidence the 7 || ALJ cited, particularly the third-party function report submitted by Plaintiff's 8 || friend. (AR 272-80.) According to that report, Plaintiff spends time with others, 9 || helps others by “carrying heavy things” for them, attends church regularly, visits 10 || the friend’s home regularly, and goes out “a couple of times per week.” (AR 276.) 11 || And as the ALJ further noted, the record did not suggest that Plaintiff had problems 12 || in social functioning when he interacted with numerous medical professionals or 13 || when he was incarcerated for a probation violation. Based on this evidence, the 14 || ALJ stated a specific and legitimate reason to discount Dr. Ciprian’s statement that 15 || Plaintiffs social functioning consists of isolating himself and minimizing social 16 || contact with others. (AR 905.) 17 However, despite the validity of this reason, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s 18 || assessment was incomplete because it did not address other parts of Dr. Ciprian’s 19 || opinion. (Joint Stip. at 11-12.) Specifically, the ALJ did not address Dr. Ciprian’s 20 || opinion about Plaintiff's ability to function in the other areas of mental functioning, 21 || particularly in the areas of “concentration and task completion” and “adaptation to 22 || work or work-like situations.” (/d.; see also AR 905.) In those areas, Dr. Ciprian 23 || wrote that Plaintiff “would not be able to keep up with his regular routine” and that 24 || Plaintiffs inability to manage stress will “often lead to suicidal ideation.” (AR 25 |) 905.) The Commissioner did not counter this part of Plaintiff's argument in 26 || challenging the ALJ’s assessment. (Joint Stip. at 12-15.) 27 An ALJ’s analysis of a treating physician’s opinion, even one that is 28 || contradicted by other opinions, must be “detailed and thorough.” See Magallanes,

1 || 881 F.2d at 751. It follows that an ALJ’s partial discussion of medical opinions, 2 || particularly a discussion that focuses on one symptom at the exclusion of others, is 3 || insufficient. See Erickson v. Shalala,

(9th Cir. 1993) (holding 4 || that, in a case involving a claimant with a pulmonary disease, an ALJ erred by 5 || focusing on the claimant’s breathing ability without considering the “condition as a 6 || whole” and “other symptoms” such as exhaustion or dizzy spells, because an ALJ 7 || “must consider all factors that might have a significant impact on an individual's 8 || ability to work.”) (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks 9 || omitted). 10 Here, the ALJ’s focus on Plaintiff's social functioning was not responsive to 11 | Dr. Ciprian’s findings that Plaintiff had other mental symptoms consisting of 12 || deficits in “concentration and task completion” and “adaptation to work or work- 13 || like situations.” (AR 905.) In those areas, Dr. Ciprian reported findings that were 14 || independent of social functioning, i.e., that Plaintiff's depressive symptoms 15 || prevented him from keeping up with his regular routine and that he managed his 16 || stress poorly so as to avoid suicidal ideation. Ud.) Thus, even if the ALJ properly 17 || rejected Dr. Ciprian’s statement regarding Plaintiffs social functioning, the 18 || analysis was incomplete because it was not responsive to other parts of Dr. 19 || Ciprian’s opinion stating that Plaintiff had other mental symptoms precluding the 20 || completion of a normal workweek. 21 In sum, because the discussion of Dr. Ciprian’s opinion was incomplete, it 22 || was not based on specific and legitimate reasons. See Erickson,

; see 23 || also Orn,

(holding that an ALJ failed to provide specific and 24 |) legitimate reasons by focusing on the claimant’s range of motion and neurological 25 || deficits, which was not responsive to the treating physician’s opinion that the 26 || claimant could not work because of respiratory symptoms, and stating that “an ALJ 27 || must evaluate the physician’s assessment using the grounds on which it is based”); 28 || Cargill v. Berryhill,

, 410 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that an ALJ

1 || erred by stating reasons to reject a treating physician’s opinion that went to non- 2 || exertional limitations and therefore were non-responsive to the physician’s opinion 3 |) regarding the claimant’s physical limitations in sitting and the need to elevate his 4 |) legs); Burns v. Berryhill,

, 611 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that an 5 || ALJ’s rejection of a treating physician’s opinion because of the claimant’s 6 || improvement in cognitive functioning failed to address the treating physician’s 7 || discussion of the claimant’s disabling headaches); Hostrawser v. Astrue,

|| App’x 373, 376 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that an ALJ failed to set forth specific and 9 || legitimate reasons by focusing unduly on the claimant’s leg pain while ignoring his 10 || back pain). Thus, reversal is warranted. 11 12 | B. Remand for further administrative proceedings. 13 Ninth Circuit case law “precludes a district court from remanding a case for 14 |} an award of benefits unless certain prerequisites are met.” Dominguez v. Colvin, 15 ||

(9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). “The district court must first 16 || determine that the ALJ made a legal error, such as failing to provide legally 17 || sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence.” Jd. “If the court finds such an error, it 18 || must next review the record as a whole and determine whether it is fully developed, 19 || is free from conflicts and ambiguities, and all essential factual issues have been 20 || resolved.” Jd. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ai Although the Court has found legal error in the assessment of the treating 22 || psychiatrist’s opinion, the record on the whole is not fully developed, and essential 23 || factual issues remain outstanding. Thus, although Plaintiff requests that the treating 24 || psychiatrist’s opinion be credited as true (Joint Stip. at 12), such a step is improper 25 || here. See Leon v. Berryhill,

(9th Cir. 2017) (holding that 26 || where outstanding issues remain, crediting evidence as true is improper, because 27 || “this reverses the required order of analysis”) (quoting Dominguez,

|| 409); see also Burns, 731 F. App’x at 612 (holding that where the ALJ’s analysis

1 || was not responsive to the treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ was not required to 2 || credit the opinion as true, but rather the ALJ may reconsider the treating 3 || physician’s opinion together with any other evidence). In sum, the record raises 4 || factual conflicts about Plaintiff's level of functioning that “should be resolved 5 || through further proceedings on an open record before a proper disability 6 || determination can be made by the ALJ in the first instance.” See Brown-Hunter, 7 || 806 F.3d at 496; see also Treichler,

(stating that remand for an 8 || award of benefits is inappropriate where “there is conflicting evidence, and not all 9 || essential factual issues have been resolved”) (citation omitted); Strauss v. 10 || Commissioner of the Social Sec. Admin.,

(9th Cir. 2011) 11 || (same where the existing record does not clearly demonstrate that the claimant is 12 || disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act). 13 Therefore, based on its review and consideration of the entire record, the 14 || Court has concluded on balance that a remand for further administrative 15 || proceedings pursuant to sentence four of

(g) is warranted here. It is 16 || not the Court’s intent to limit the scope of the remand. 17 18 ORDER 19 It is ordered that Judgment be entered reversing the decision of the 20 || Commissioner of Social Security and remanding this matter for further 21 || administrative proceedings. 22 23 || DATED: October [| , 2019 yt” MARIA Ay RO UNITED: TES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 27 28 10