1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 ) 10 ) Case No.: CV 19-01515-CJC(SPx) ARTURO VILLANUEVA, ) 11 ) ) 12 ) Plaintiff, ) 13 ) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S v. ) MOTION TO REMAND [Dkt. 9] 14 ) EATON CORPORATION, et al., ) 15 ) ) 16 ) Defendants. ) 17 ) ) 18 ) ) 19 ) 20 21 I. INTRODUCTION 22 23 On July 9, 2019, Plaintiff Arturo Villanueva brought this employment 24 discrimination action against Eaton Corporation (“Eaton”) and Alex Martinez in Los 25 Angeles Superior Court. (Dkt. 1-1 [Complaint, hereinafter “Compl.”].) Before the Court 26 27 1 is Plaintiff’s motion to remand. (Dkt. 9 [hereinafter “Mot.”].) For the following reasons, 2 the motion is DENIED.1 3 4 II. BACKGROUND 5 6 The allegations in the complaint arise from a series of workplace events that 7 culminated in Plaintiff’s July 14, 2017 termination from Eaton. (Compl. ¶ 14.) Prior to 8 his termination, Eaton employed Plaintiff as a “Forklift/Shipping/Receiving Clerk.” (Id. 9 ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges that he was over 40 years old during the relevant period of 10 employment. (Id.) He further alleges that he suffered a workplace injury in 2014 which 11 required him to seek both medical care and leave. (Id. ¶ 9.) At some point in January 12 2015, Alex Martinez, Plaintiff’s supervisor, sent him home because he seemed ill and 13 unable to carry out his job duties. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff took some time off and returned in 14 March 2015 with no restrictions. (Id.) He later had to take more time off, but returned to 15 work again in May 2016, this time with a 35-pound weight lift restriction. (Id.) On the 16 day that Plaintiff returned to work, Martinez allegedly sent him home after telling him 17 that his restriction could not be accommodated. (Id.) Plaintiff allegedly remained on 18 leave after this point. 19 20 On May 8, 2017—at which point Plaintiff had been on leave for about one year— 21 Eaton sent Plaintiff a letter requesting that his doctor fill out a “Return to Work Status 22 Form.” (Id. ¶ 11.) The letter also stated that Plaintiff’s employment could be terminated 23 if he was unable to return to work. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff allegedly complied with this 24 request and returned to work a week later with a 35-pound weight lift restriction. (Id. 25 ¶¶ 12–13.) Soon after his return, Plaintiff was terminated on July 14, 2017. (Id. ¶ 14.) 26

27 1 Having read and considered the papers presented by the parties, the Court finds this matter appropriate 1 Plaintiff alleges that Eaton discriminated against him due to his age and his disability. 2 (Id. ¶ 15.) 3 4 Plaintiff sued Eaton in Los Angeles Superior Court, asserting a number of claims 5 under California law and one claim under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29

, a federal statute. (See generally id.) On August 14, 2019, Eaton removed 7 the case to federal court, invoking federal question jurisdiction. (Dkt. 1 [Notice of 8 Removal, hereinafter “NOR”].) Plaintiff then filed a motion to remand the case to Los 9 Angeles Superior Court. (Dkt. 9.) 10 11 III. DISCUSSION 12 13 A civil action brought in state court may be removed by the defendant to a federal 14 district court if the action could have been brought there originally.

(a). 15 A federal court can assert subject matter jurisdiction over cases that (1) involve questions 16 arising under federal law or (2) are between diverse parties and involve an amount in 17 controversy that exceeds $75,000.

, 1332. Under the “well-pleaded 18 complaint rule,” federal question jurisdiction exists only when “a federal question is 19 presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v.

U.S. 386, 392 (1987). This means that federal courts have “jurisdiction to 21 hear, originally or by removal from a state court, only those cases in which a well- 22 pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the 23 plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of 24 federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 25

, 27–28 (1983). The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction falls on 26 the defendant, and the removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. 27 Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1992). “Federal jurisdiction must be l 2 Eaton contends that Plaintiff's motion to remand should be denied because 3 || Plaintiff asserts a FMLA claim in his complaint. The Court agrees. The existence of 4 federal question jurisdiction is determined from the face of the complaint. See 5 || Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. When the plaintiff “has chosen to plead what .. . must be 6 ||regarded as a federal claim, [] removal is at the defendant’s option.” Jd. at 399. Here, 7 || Plaintiff's complaint clearly alleges a violation of the FMLA, a federal statute. Not only 8 || does the complaint’s fifth cause of action explicitly allege a “Violation of the Family 9 || Medical Leave Act,” it goes on to allege the Plaintiff “worked at a location where at least 10 || fifty employees were employed by Plaintiff's employer within 75 miles and therefore 11 || comes under the jurisdiction and regulations of the Family Medical Leave [Act].” 12 ||(Compl. 4 52.) 13 14 Given the unambiguous assertion of a FLMA claim in the complaint, the Court is 15 || troubled by Plaintiff's assertion that “[nJowhere is [sic] Plaintiff's Complaint does 16 || Plaintiff allege a federal question, law . . . on which he is alleging a federal cause of 17 |{action.” (Dkt. 9 at 6.) The Court reminds Plaintiffs attorneys that under Federal Rule of 18 || Civil Procedure 11, the Court can impose sanctions for making frivolous legal arguments. 19 20 || IV. CONCLUSION 21 22 For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion to remand is DENIED.

7 24 DATED: — October 23, 2019 “eo ye fl ff 25 = 26 CORMAC J. CARNEY 27 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28