1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ALAN TIKAL, ) NO. ED CV 19-1787-DMG(E) ) 12 Petitioner, ) ) 13 v. ) ORDER OF DISMISSAL ) 14 WARDEN FCI-1 VICTORVILLE ) et al, ) 15 ) Respondents. ) 16 ______________________________) 17 18 BACKGROUND 19 20 On September 16, 2019, Petitioner, a federal prisoner 21 incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution Medium I (“FCI- 22 1”) prison at Victorville, California, filed a putative habeas corpus 23 petition pursuant to

. Petitioner alleges that 24 he is suffering from overcrowded conditions at his place of 25 confinement. Petitioner, who apparently shares a cell, contends that 26 the alleged overcrowding is violating the Eighth Amendment and Bureau 27 of Prisons Program Statement 1060.11. Program Statement 1060.11 28 allegedly establishes a maximum capacity of inmates per housing unit 1 and requires that 50% of cells be single occupancy. Petitioner seeks 2 injunctive relief restoring “lawful occupancy levels” and preventing 3 “illegal crowding in excess of rated capacity.” 4 5 DISCUSSION 6 7 Habeas corpus “is the exclusive remedy . . . for the prisoner who 8 seeks ‘immediate or speedier release’ from confinement.” Skinner v. 9 Switzer,

(2011) (citation omitted). A challenge to 10 the fact or duration of confinement which, if successful, would result 11 in immediate or speedier release falls within the “core” of habeas 12 corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez,

(1973); Nettles v. 13 Grounds,

(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 14

(2017). A civil rights action is the exclusive vehicle 15 for an inmate’s claim that does not fall within the “core” of habeas 16 corpus, such as a challenge to the conditions of confinement. Nettles 17 v. Grounds,

. Accordingly, Petitioner may not use 18 the present habeas corpus Petition to bring claims regarding allegedly 19 unlawful conditions of confinement. Petitioner may attempt to assert 20 such claims through the vehicle of a civil rights action pursuant to 21 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 22

(1971) (“Bivens”).1 23 /// 24 /// 25 26 27 1 The Court expresses no opinion regarding whether a Bivens remedy is available to Petitioner on the claims alleged in 28 the Petition. See Ziglar v. Abbasi,

(2017) 1 This Court declines to exercise its discretion to convert the 2 present Petition into a Bivens complaint. “If the complaint is 3 amenable to conversion on its face, meaning that it names the correct 4 defendants and seeks the correct relief, the court may recharacterize 5 the petition so long as it warns the pro se litigant of the 6 consequences of the conversion and provides an opportunity for the 7 litigant to withdraw or amend his or her complaint.” Nettles v. 8 Grounds,

(citations and internal quotations omitted). 9 Here, the Petition is not “amenable to conversion on its face.” 10 First, the Petition does not appear to name the “correct defendants.” 11 Although Plaintiff names the Warden at FCI-1 and a Unit Manager at 12 FCI-1, the memorandum attached to the Petition allegedly requiring 13 double-celling for all inmates bears the name and signature of the 14 “Complex Warden,” i.e., the Warden at the Victorville Federal 15 Correctional Complex at which FCI-1 is only one of three facilities. 16 See Daley v. U.S.,

, at *1 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 17 2011) (identifying the three facilities, including FCI-1). 18 Furthermore, “a habeas corpus action and a prisoner civil rights suit 19 differ in a variety of respects - such as . . . filing fees, the means 20 of collecting them, and restrictions on future filings - that may make 21 recharacterization impossible or, if possible, disadvantageous to the 22 prisoner compared to a dismissal without prejudice of his petition for 23 habeas corpus.” Nettles v. Grounds,

(citations and 24 internal quotations omitted); see also

at 932 n.8 (describing 25 differences between procedural requirements applicable to habeas 26 corpus actions and to civil rights actions). Accordingly, conversion 27 of the present Petition into a Bivens complaint would be 28 inappropriate. See Glaus v. Anderson,

, 388 (7th Cir. 1] 2005) (court relied on myriad differences between habeas actions and 2| civil rights actions in affirming district court’s refusal to 3] recharacterize a habeas petition as a civil rights complaint) ; 4] Jorgenson v. Spearman,

, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 22, 2016) 5] (declining to convert a flawed habeas petition into a civil rights 6] complaint “in light of the considerable procedural and substantive differences between habeas corpus and civil rights matters”); see also 8] Thody v. United States,

, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 9] 2017), adopted,

(C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2017) (declining 10] to convert into a Bivens complaint a section 2241 petition seeking 11] injunctive relief mandating single celling); Turner v. Ortiz,

, at *2 (D.N.J. May 11, 2017) (dismissing section 2241 petition 13] challenging conditions of confinement which included alleged 14] overcrowding and alleged violation of Program Statement 1060.11). 15 16 ORDER 17 18 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition and the action are 19|| dismissed without leave to amend but without prejudice. 20 DATED: November 8, 2019 22 Jn, OLLY M. GEE 24 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Presented this 20th day of September, 2019, by: 27 [s/o CHARLES F. EICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE