1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 ARTHUR C. HAMILTON, Case No. 19-cv-03722-BLF

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 9 v. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND PERMISSION TO REOPEN CASE 10 JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N. A., et al., [RE: ECF 18] 11 Defendants.

12 Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff, Arthur Hamilton’s Motion for Relief from Judgment and 13 Permission to Reopen Case. Motion, ECF 18. The Court construes Plaintiff’s motion as being filed 14 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) and hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s motion. 15 I. BACKGROUND 16 Plaintiff filed the instant action on June 26, 2019, accusing Defendants JP Morgan

Bank, N.A., Old Republic Default Management Services, and Shirley Franklin of fraudulently 18 evicting Plaintiff from his home and taking possession of the property, all while making it look like 19 “a simple trustee’s sale.” Compl. at 4, ECF 1. The complaint asserted four causes of action: (1) 20 “Fraudulent Use of the Process”; (2) “Fraudulent Transfer, Fraudulent Conversion, and Violation 21 of Antifraud Rule: 10b-5”; (3) “Fraudulent Alienation, Fraudulent Inducement”; and (4) “Intentional 22 Infliction of Emotional Distress.” See

at 7–8. 23 On July 15, 2019, the Court, pursuant to

(e), dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint 24 with prejudice because Plaintiff’s claims were barred by res judicata. ECF 16. Plaintiff had 25 previously filed a separate action in this district involving the same parties, the same alleged facts, 26 and the same causes of action—the only apparent difference being the signature date. Compare 27 generally Compl. at ECF 1 with ECF 1 in Hamilton v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al., Case 1 No. 5:18-cv-05164-BLF (“Hamilton I”). Plaintiff’s earlier-filed complaint was dismissed with 2 prejudice on January 14, 2019. ECF 20 in Hamilton I. 3 At the time the Court dismissed this case on July 15, 2019, none of the Defendants were 4 served. One of the defendants, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N. A., was served over three weeks later, 5 on August 9, 2019. See ECF 17. On September 19, 2019, Plaintiff filed the present motion to be 6 relieved from judgment and for permission to reopen the case. Motion, ECF 18. The Court does 7 not anticipate a response from any of the Defendants to Plaintiff’s motion because two of the 8 defendants were never served and JP Morgan Chase Bank, N. A. was only served after the case was 9 dismissed with prejudice and therefore, was not required to answer. 10 II. DISCUSSION 11 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a court may relieve a party from a final 12 judgment for six reasons upon a showing of “(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 13 discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged judgment; or (6) 14 ‘extraordinary circumstance’ which would justify relief.” Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry,

, 15 1442 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Mere dissatisfaction with the Court’s order, or 16 belief that the Court is wrong in its decision, are not grounds for relief under Rule 60(b). Beckway 17 v. DeShong, No. C07-5072 TEH,

, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2012) (citing 18 Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo,

(9th Cir. 1981)). 19 First, Plaintiff claims that “this case was prematurely closed due to [his] lack of 20 understanding of proper rules and procedures.” Motion at 1. The Court construes this argument as 21 one for mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) and holds that Plaintiff is not 22 entitled to relief under this theory. Plaintiff’s complaint in this case was not dismissed due to a 23 mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect on the part of Plaintiff—it was dismissed because it should 24 have never been filed. “The doctrine of res judicata provides that ‘a final judgment on the merits 25 bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.’” In re Schimmels, 26

, 881 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Montana v. United States,

, 153–54 (1979)). 27 Because Plaintiff had filed an identical complaint earlier, Plaintiff’s claims in this case were barred 1 not have saved them from dismissal. 2 Second, Plaintiff claims that a magistrate judge “extended his own grasp on this case with 3 setting an inaccurate frame of reference” and complains that those “references were not vacated 4 || upon reassignment.” Motion at 1. The Court notes that this case was never assigned to a magistrate 5 || judge. The Court assumes that Plaintiffs reference to a magistrate judge relates to his earlier-filed 6 (and also dismissed) case and thus is entirely irrelevant to this action. See ECF 7 in Hamilton L In 7 any event, Hamilton I was dismissed because Plaintiff repeatedly refused to comply with the 8 || undersigned judge’s orders. ECF 20 in Hamilton I at 2. 9 Finally, Plaintiff makes conclusory assertions such as “this was never a frivolous case” and 10 || “delays and postponement have been defendant(s)’ only defense against irreconcilable facts.” 11 Motion at 1. Such statements do not present any newly-discovered facts or evidence that would 12 save Plaintiff's claims under Rule 60(b). 13 In sum, none of the Rule 60(b) reasons are present here. Plaintiff has not pointed to any 14 || extraordinary circumstances to justify relief. Plaintiff's complaint was never a valid one because 3 15 his claims were always barred by res judicata. 16 Ill. CONCLUSION 3 17 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment and Permission to 18 Reopen Case is DENIED. 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 22 Dated: September 24, 2019 kom hh han nyt én) 23 BETH LABSON FREEMAN 24 United States District Judge 25 26 27 28