(HC) Williams v. Lizarraga

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA LAWRENCE WILLIAMS, Case No. 1:18-cv-00748-AWI-JDP 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME 13 v. ECF No. 33 JOE LIZARRAGA, ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION 15 Respondent. FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 16 ECF No. 34 18 Petitioner Lawrence Williams, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. On July 8, 2020, petitioner moved for a 60- day extension of time to file his traverse. ECF No. 33. For good cause shown, petitioner’s motion is granted. His traverse is now due on September 8, 2020.

22 Additionally, petitioner moved for the appointment of counsel. ECF No. 34. A petitioner in a habeas proceeding does not have an absolute right to counsel. See Anderson v. Heinze, 258 24 F.2d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1958). There are three specific circumstances in which appointment of counsel is required in habeas proceedings. First, appointment of counsel is required for an indigent person seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence in post-conviction proceedings under 28 U.S.C §§ 2254 or 2255. See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2). Second, appointment of counsel WwAOw 40°U □□ ETOUONN VET RVUETIOTIL OY POI VO Ie TAY ee | may be required if an evidentiary hearing is warranted. See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases 8(c).

2 | Third, appointment of counsel may be necessary for effective discovery. See id. at 6(a). None of | these situations is present here.

4 We are further authorized to appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner in a habeas corpus || proceeding if we determine that the interests of justice require the assistance of counsel. See | Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986); 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). However, | “[i[ndigent state prisoners applying for habeas corpus relief are not entitled to appointed counsel | unless the circumstances of a particular case indicate that appointed counsel is necessary to | prevent due process violations.” Chaney, 801 F.2d at 1196. In assessing whether to appoint || counsel, we evaluate the petitioner’s likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of | the petitioner to articulate his claims without counsel, considering the complexity of the legal | issues involved. See Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983).

13 We cannot conclude at this point that counsel is necessary to prevent a due process | violation. Petitioner has been able to articulate his claims without the assistance of counsel thus | far and he has not yet demonstrated a great likelihood of success on the merits at this stage.

16 | Accordingly, we find that appointed counsel is not necessary to guard against a due process | violation and that the interests of justice do not require the appointment of counsel at this time.

18 | Order 19 Petitioner’s motion for an extension of time is granted. ECF No. 33. Petitioner’s motion | for the appointment of counsel is denied. ECF No. 34.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

23 ( Waban Dated: _ August 10, 2020 24 UNIT#D STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE | No. 206.