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11 MEGAN SAVINOVICH and WALTER Case № 2:19-CV-07587-ODW SAVINOVICH III, (MAAx) 12 Plaintiffs, 13 ORDER GRANTING IN PART v. 14 MOTION TO AMEND [11] AND SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC. et al., GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND 15 [12] Defendants. 16 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiffs Megan Savinovich and Walter Savinovich III (“Plaintiffs”) initiated 19 this lemon law action against Defendant Subaru of America (“Defendant”) in the 20 Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, on July 30, 2019. (Notice of 21 Removal (“Removal”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 1; Decl. of Danielle N. Duarte (“Duarte Decl.”), 22 Ex. A (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1-2.) Plaintiffs brought a total of six causes of action, five 23 under the California Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly”) and one 24 under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”). (Compl. ¶¶ 7–45.) On 25 August 30, 2019, Defendant removed the action to this Court on the basis of federal 26 question subject matter jurisdiction. (Removal ¶¶ 3, 7–9.) 27 Plaintiffs move to amend the complaint to (1) dismiss the MMWA claim and 28 (2) join Subaru of Santa Cruz as a defendant. (Mot. Amend, ECF No. 11.) Plaintiffs 1 also move to remand the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, subsequent to 2 the Motion to Amend. (Mot. Remand, ECF No. 12.) Both motions have been fully 3 briefed. (See ECF Nos. 13–16.)1 4 II. DISCUSSION 5 Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction only as authorized by the 6 Constitution and Congress. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Kokkonen v. 7 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

(1994). Federal courts have original 8 jurisdiction where an action arises under federal law or where each plaintiff’s 9 citizenship is diverse from each defendant’s citizenship and the amount in controversy 10 exceeds $75,000.

, 1332(a). Federal courts have supplemental 11 jurisdiction over other claims that are “so related to claims in the action within” the 12 court’s original jurisdiction “that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28

(a). “The district court[] may decline to exercise supplemental 14 jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over 15 which it has original jurisdiction.”

§ 1367(c)(3); see also Acri v. Varian Assoc., 16 Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1997). 17 Courts “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. 18 Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Courts may decline to grant leave to amend only where the opposing 19 party puts forward “strong evidence” of undue prejudice, or bad faith or dilatory 20 motive on the part of the moving party. Foman v. Davis,

(1962); 21 Sonoma Cty. Ass’n of Retired Employees v. Sonoma Cty.,

(9th Cir. 22 2013). “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining Foman factors, 23 there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” 24 Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2003). 25 To begin, Plaintiffs seek leave to amend to dismiss their MMWA claim. 26 Defendant has not demonstrated, let alone put forward “strong evidence,” that it will 27

28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motions, the Court deemed the matters appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 || suffer undue prejudice if the MMWA claim is dismissed, or that Plaintiffs are acting in bad faith or have a dilatory motive for seeking to dismiss the MMWA claim. See 3 || Sonoma Cty.,

. Indeed, Defendant does not object to dismissal of the MMWA claim, although it prefers dismissal be with prejudice. (Opp’n to Mot. 5 || Amend 2, ECF No. 14.) As leave to amend should be “freely given” and this matter is 6 | still in the early pleading stages, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend to 7 || the extent it seeks to dismiss the MMWA cause of action. (See Mot. Amend 12-13.) 8 | Accordingly, the Court dismisses the MMWA without prejudice. 9 The MMWA claim provided the sole basis for the Court’s original jurisdiction. 10 | (See Removal 3, 7-9.) As it has been dismissed, the Court declines to exercise 11 || supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining claims and remand is appropriate. 12 || See 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, the Court does not reach Plaintiffs’ other 13 || arguments, i.e. for joinder of Subaru of Santa Cruz as a necessary party. (See Mot. 14 | Amend 4-12.) 15] IT. CONCLUSION 16 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs’ 17 || Motion to Amend (ECF No. 11) and dismisses the MMWA claim, and GRANTS 18 | Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (ECF No. 12). The Court thus REMANDS this action 19 || to the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles, Stanley Mosk 20 || Courthouse, 111 N. Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, Case No. 19STCV26490. 21 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 24 January 13, 2020 Ne 25 SEP ed lint 7 OTIS D. W mien II 08 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE