1 DENIED JS-6 BY ORDER OF THE COURT 2

3 Defendants again fail to submit a proper proposed judgment. This 4 filing, too, resembles a proposed order on a motion for summary judgment, except that, this time, Defendants copied language from 5 the Court’s order on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judg- ment. Defendants are expected to understand how to prepare a pro- 6 posed judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. 7 Additionally, the Court VACATES the February 28, 2020 Final Pre- trial Conference. 8 Date: 02/19/2020 Judge Josephine L. Staton 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 (Southern Division - Santa Ana) 11

12 13

14

15 CASE NO.: 8:17-cv-02245-JLS-PLA 16 James Zarian Plaintiff THE HONORABLE JOSEPHINE L. 17 vs. STATON 18 Steven Legere; Kim Legere; [PROPOSED] JUDGMENT ON 19 Raul Valle; MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG- 20 MENT 21 Hearing Date: 1/24/2020 22 Time 10:30 AM 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 [PROPOSED] JUDGMENT ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG- 2 MENT 3 4 On December 27, 2017, plaintiff James Zarian (hereinafter also "Plaintiff"), 5 filed the instant action against Defendants, in relation to Raul's Auto Service, lo- 6 cated at 217 Avocado Street, Costa Mesa, CA 92627, asserting claims for injunc- 7 8 tive relief under the Americans With Disabilities Act. 9 Raul's Auto Service is located in a commercial property, in Costa Mesa. The 10 property has a narrow driveway, a motorcycle repair shop, followed by Raul's Auto 11 12 Service. At the end of the driveway there is an outdoor service yard, packed with 13 vehicles being repaired by Raul's Auto Service. The service yard also contains an 14 15 automobile lift. The plaintiff alleges he visited the site (no specific date is noted in 16 the Complaint), and was deterred from patronizing, because of the absence of an 17 accessible parking space. 18 19 Defendants maintain that an accessible parking space at the property is not 20 readily achievable because: (a) the Americans with Disabilities Act Architectural 21 22 Guidelines, and the California Building Code, do not mandate one; (b) the city of 23 Costa Mesa will not allow one, and (c) the dimensional constraints of the property 24 do not allow one. 25 26 The parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, one filed by Plain- 27 tiff James Zarian (Pl.’s MSJ, Doc. 38-1) and the other filed by Defendants Steven 28 Legere, Kim Legere, and Raul Valle (Defs.’ MSJ, Doc. 39-1). The parties opposed 1 each other’s Motions (Opp’n to Pl.’s MSJ, Doc. 48; Opp’n to Defs.’ MSJ, Doc. 45) 2 and filed Replies (Reply ISO Pl.’s MSJ, Doc. 49; Reply ISO Defs.’ MSJ, Doc. 50). 3 4 The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Un- 5 ruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”) claim and dismissed that claim without preju- 6 dice. (See Order Declining Suppl. Jurisdiction, Doc. 42.) The Court rules on Plain- 7 8 tiff’s Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim. 9 For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion and 10

GRANTS Defendants’ Motion. 11 12 I. DISCUSSION: STANDING 13 To have Article III standing, a plaintiff must “have (1) suffered an injury in 14 15 fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) 16 that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Rob- 17 ins,

(2016) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,

, 18 19 560–61 (1992); then citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 20

, 180–81 (2000)). 21 22 In order to establish an injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that she suffered 23 “‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ 24 and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Spokeo,

26 1548 (quoting Lujan,

). 27 “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing 28 these elements” and “each element must be supported in the same way as any other 1 matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and 2 degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan, 504 3 4 U.S. at 561. “At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting 5 from the defendant’s conduct may suffice[.]” Id. “In response to a summary judg- 6 ment motion, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on such mere allegations, 7 8 but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts, which for purposes 9 of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true.” Id. (internal quotation 10 marks omitted). 11 12 Here, Plaintiff failed to set forth evidence sufficient to support standing be- 13 cause he filed only an unsigned declaration regarding the crucial facts that would 14 15 support standing. (See Doc. 38-5 at 3.) An unsigned declaration is of no effect; it is 16 certainly not evidence. Consequently, Plaintiff has not discharged his burden of es- 17 tablishing that he has suffered an injury in fact and/or that he is faced with an im- 18 19 minent threat of injury. See Lujan,

. Thus, on this record, Plaintiff 20 does not have standing. 21 22 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, and 23 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 24

25 26 DENIEDDated: ___________ 27 BY ORDER OF THE COURT ____________________________________ 28 Hon. JOSEPHINE L. STATON United States District Court