1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ) 11 AURORA RAYA, ) Case No.: CV 20-02062-CJC (JPRx) ) 12 ) ) Plaintiff, 13 ) ) v. 14 ) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S ) MOTION TO REMAND [Dkt. 7] 15 FCA US, LLC; I10 CHRYSLER JEEP ) ) 16 DODGE RAM; and DOES 1–10, ) ) 17 ) Defendants. ) 18 ) ) 19 20 I. INTRODUCTION 21 22 In January 2020, Plaintiff Aurora Raya filed this breach of warranty action in Los 23 Angeles County Superior Court against Defendants FCA US, LLC (“FCA”) and I-10 24 Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram (“I-10 Chrysler”). (Dkt. 1-3 [Complaint, hereinafter 25 “Compl.”].) FCA removed to this Court. (Dkt. 1 [Notice of Removal, hereinafter 26 “NOR”].) Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to remand. (Dkt. 7; Dkt. 7-1 27 [hereinafter “Mot.”].) For the following reasons, that motion is GRANTED. 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 3 The complaint alleges the following facts. FCA manufactures and distributes 4 motor vehicles. (Compl. ¶ 4.) I-10 Chrysler sells motor vehicles in Riverside County, 5 California. (Id. ¶ 5.) Although not alleged in the complaint, Plaintiff now asserts that I- 6 10 Chrysler is an authorized dealership for FCA. (Compare Mot. at 3 with Compl. ¶ 5.) 7 In May 2018, Plaintiff leased a 2019 Jeep Cherokee (the “vehicle”) manufactured and 8 distributed by FCA. (Compl. ¶ 8.) In the complaint, Plaintiff does not specify whether 9 she leased the vehicle from I-10 Chrysler, but alleges that she leased it “from a person or 10 entity engaged in the business of manufacturing, distributing, or selling consumer goods 11 at retail.” (Id.) The vehicle was covered by an express written warranty for 3 years or 12 36,000 miles, as well as a 5-year powertrain warranty. (Id. ¶ 9.) 13 14 During the warranty period, the vehicle developed various defects, including 15 problems with the electrical system or “PowerNet.” (Id. ¶ 10.) FCA allegedly knew 16 about the PowerNet defect, but failed to disclose it to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 23–122.) 17 According to the complaint, FCA and I-10 Chrysler “have been unable to service or 18 repair the Vehicle to conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable 19 number of opportunities.” (Id. ¶ 124.) The complaint does not specify whether Plaintiff 20 brought the vehicle to I-10 Chrysler for repairs. (See id.) 21 22 Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts six state law causes of action for 23 (1) violation of California Civil Code § 1793.2(d); (2) violation of California Civil Code 24 § 1793.2(b); (3) violation of California Civil Code § 1793.2(a)(3); (4) breach of express 25 written warranty; (5) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; and 26 (6) fraudulent inducement. (Id. ¶¶ 123–63.) Plaintiff asserts the implied warranty claim 27 against both FCA and I-10 Chrysler. (Id. at 26.) The remaining five claims are asserted 1 For the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff is a California citizen. (Id. ¶ 2.) 2 FCA claims to be a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business in 3 Michigan. (NOR ¶ 22.) I-10 Chrysler is allegedly a California business entity with its 4 principal place of business in California. (Compl. ¶ 5.) On March 2, 2020, FCA 5 removed the action to this Court, invoking diversity jurisdiction. (NOR.) 6 7 On April 8, 2020, the Court ordered Plaintiff to submit supplemental briefing on 8 the instant motion to remand. (Dkt. 13.) Specifically, the Court instructed Plaintiff to 9 resolve several ambiguities in her complaint, namely whether Plaintiff contends that I-10 10 Chrysler leased her the allegedly defective vehicle and/or that I-10 Chrysler made repairs 11 to the allegedly defective vehicle. (Id.) In her supplemental briefing, Plaintiff answered 12 both questions in the affirmative. (Dkt. 14 [hereinafter “Supp. Br.”] at 2–3.) Plaintiff 13 intends to amend to her complaint to allege that she leased the vehicle from I-10 Chrysler 14 and brought it to I-10 Chrysler for repairs. (Id.) Plaintiff has also submitted evidence to 15 support these allegations. (See Dkt. 14-1–14-2.) The Court offered FCA the opportunity 16 to submit a supplemental reply brief, but it did not do so. (See Dkt. 13.) 17 18 III. LEGAL STANDARD 19 20 A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to a federal district court 21 if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over it.

. 22 Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction over cases between completely diverse parties 23 that involve an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.

. Principles 24 of federalism and judicial economy require courts to “scrupulously confine their 25 [removal] jurisdiction to the precise limits which [Congress] has defined.” See Shamrock 26 Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,

(1941). Indeed, “[n]othing is to be more 27 jealously guarded by a court than its jurisdiction.” See United States v. Ceja-Prado, 333 1 the action to federal court bears the burden of establishing that the district court has 2 subject matter jurisdiction over the action, and the removal statute is strictly construed 3 against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1992). 4 5 IV. ANALYSIS 6 7 In its Notice of Removal, FCA contends that Plaintiff fraudulently joined I-10 8 Chrysler “for no reason other than to defeat diversity jurisdiction and prevent removal of 9 the action to federal court.” (NOR ¶ 23.) Accordingly, FCA contends that I-10 Chrysler 10 cannot be used to destroy complete diversity. (See id.) 11 12 A court will dismiss a fraudulently-joined defendant and disregard its citizenship 13 when determining whether the parties are diverse. See Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by and 14 through Mills,

(9th Cir. 2018). However, “a defendant invoking 15 federal court diversity jurisdiction on the basis of fraudulent joinder bears a heavy burden 16 since there is a general presumption against [finding] fraudulent joinder.”

(internal 17 quotations omitted). Defendants can establish fraudulent joinder by showing that the 18 defendant who purportedly destroys complete diversity “cannot be liable on any theory.” 19 See Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co.,

(9th Cir. 1998).1 This is an 20 exacting standard because “if there is a possibility that a state court would find that the 21 complaint states a cause of action against any of the resident defendants, the federal court 22 must find that the joinder was proper and remand the case to the state court.” Hunter v. 23 Philip Morris USA,

(9th Cir. 2009). In other words, fraudulent 24 joinder imposes a more demanding standard than a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to 25 state a claim. See Grancare,

. When analyzing fraudulent joinder, courts 26 27 1 consider whether the challenged claims are “wholly insubstantial and frivolous” or 2 || possibly be cured by granting the plaintiff leave to amend.” See

. 3 4 FCA has not shown that I-10 Chrysler “cannot be liable on any theory.” See 5 || Ritchey,

. Accordingly, it has not met its burden of establishing 6 fraudulent joinder. Plaintiff brings one cause of action against I-10 Chrysler for breach o 7 |}implied warranty. “Where, as here, the breach of warranty claims against the 8 |}manufacturer and dealership arise from the same vehicle and alleged defects, California 9 || district courts have held that the dealership is “necessary for just adjudication’ of the 10 ||claims and thus was properly joined.” Torres v. Ford Motor Co.,

, at 1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2018). As explained in Plaintiffs supplemental brief, Plaintiff 12 cure the ambiguities in her complaint to state a plausible breach of implied warranty 13 |]claim against I-10 Chrysler. See Grancare,

. FCA has not responded to 14 || Plaintiff’s supplemental brief and apparently does not dispute that the proposed 15 || amendments establish a valid claim against I-10 Chrysler. Because FCA has not met its 16 || burden of showing that I-10 Chrysler was fraudulently joined, Plaintiff's motion to 17 ||remand is GRANTED. 18 19 || V. CONCLUSION 20 21 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to remand is GRANTED and this 22 || action is hereby REMANDED this action to Los Angeles County Superior Court. 23 24 DATED: April 29, 2020 Ko Lo _ ao fz □ 26 CORMAC J. CARNEY 27 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28