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6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 R.L., Case No. 2:19-cv-04833-SHK 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. OPINION AND ORDER 14 ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiff R.L.1 (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of the final decision of the 19 Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner,” 20 “Agency,” or “Defendant”) denying his application for disability insurance 21 benefits (“DIB”), under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”). This 22 Court has jurisdiction under

(g), and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 23 § 636(c), the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United 24 States Magistrate Judge. For the reasons stated below, the Commissioner’s 25 decision is REVERSED and this action is REMANDED for further proceedings 26 consistent with this Order. 27 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on June 23, 2016, alleging disability 3 beginning on November 3, 2015. Transcript (“Tr.”) 198-204.2 Following a denial 4 of benefits, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge 5 (“ALJ”) and, on March 27, 2018, ALJ Cynthia Floyd determined that Plaintiff was 6 not disabled. Tr. 29-46. Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ’s decision with the 7 Appeals Council, however, review was denied on April 4, 2019. Tr. 1-7. This 8 appeal followed. 9 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 10 The reviewing court shall affirm the Commissioner’s decision if the decision 11 is based on correct legal standards and the legal findings are supported by 12 substantial evidence in the record.

(g); Batson v. Comm’r Soc. 13 Sec. Admin.,

(9th Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence is “more 14 than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 15 accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales,

, 16 401 (1971) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing the 17 Commissioner’s alleged errors, this Court must weigh “both the evidence that 18 supports and detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusions.” Martinez v. 19 Heckler,

(9th Cir. 1986). 20 “‘When evidence reasonably supports either confirming or reversing the 21 ALJ’s decision, [the Court] may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ.’” 22 Ghanim v. Colvin,

(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Batson,

1196); see also Thomas v. Barnhart,

(9th Cir. 2002) (“If the 24 ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, [the 25 Court] may not engage in second-guessing.”) (citation omitted). A reviewing 26

27 2 A certified copy of the Administrative Record was filed on October 28, 2019. Electronic Case 1 court, however, “cannot affirm the decision of an agency on a ground that the 2 agency did not invoke in making its decision.” Stout v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 3

(9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Finally, a court may not 4 reverse an ALJ’s decision if the error is harmless. Burch v. Barnhart,

, 5 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “[T]he burden of showing that an error is 6 harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” 7 Shinseki v. Sanders,

(2009). 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 A. Establishing Disability Under The Act 10 To establish whether a claimant is disabled under the Act, it must be shown 11 that: 12 (a) the claimant suffers from a medically determinable physical or 13 mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has 14 lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 15 twelve months; and 16 (b) the impairment renders the claimant incapable of performing the 17 work that the claimant previously performed and incapable of 18 performing any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the 19 national economy. 20 Tackett v. Apfel,

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. 21 § 423(d)(2)(A)). “If a claimant meets both requirements, he or she is ‘disabled.’” 22 Id. 23 The ALJ employs a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine 24 whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. Bowen v. Yuckert, 25

(1987);

(a). Each step is potentially 26 dispositive and “if a claimant is found to be ‘disabled’ or ‘not-disabled’ at any step 27 in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps.” Tackett,

one through four, and the Commissioner carries the burden of proof at step five. 2 Tackett,

. 3 The five steps are: 4 Step 1. Is the claimant presently working in a substantially gainful 5 activity [(“SGA”)]? If so, then the claimant is “not disabled” within 6 the meaning of the [] Act and is not entitled to [DIB]. If the claimant is 7 not working in a [SGA], then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at 8 step one and the evaluation proceeds to step two. See 20 C.F.R. 9 § 404.1520(b). 10 Step 2. Is the claimant’s impairment severe? If not, then the 11 claimant is “not disabled” and is not entitled to [DIB]. If the claimant’s 12 impairment is severe, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at 13 step two and the evaluation proceeds to step three. See 20 C.F.R. 14 § 404.1520(c). 15 Step 3. Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of 16 specific impairments described in the regulations? If so, the claimant is 17 “disabled” and therefore entitled to [DIB]. If the claimant’s 18 impairment neither meets nor equals one of the impairments listed in 19 the regulations, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step 20 three and the evaluation proceeds to step four. See 20 C.F.R. 21 § 404.1520(d). 22 Step 4. Is the claimant able to do any work that he or she has 23 done in the past? If so, then the claimant is “not disabled” and is not 24 entitled to [DIB]. If the claimant cannot do any work he or she did in 25 the past, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step four and 26 the evaluation proceeds to the fifth and final step. See 20 C.F.R. 27 § 404.1520(e). 1 Step 5. Is the claimant able to do any other work? If not, then 2 the claimant is “disabled” and therefore entitled to [DIB]. See 20

(f)(1). If the claimant is able to do other work, then 4 the Commissioner must establish that there are a significant number of 5 jobs in the national economy that claimant can do. There are two ways 6 for the Commissioner to meet the burden of showing that there is other 7 work in “significant numbers” in the national economy that claimant 8 can do: (1) by the testimony of a vocational expert [(“VE”)], or (2) by 9 reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, 10 subpt. P, app. 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant 11 is “not disabled” and therefore not entitled to [DIB]. See

404.1520(f), 404.1562. If the Commissioner cannot meet this burden, 13 then the claimant is “disabled” and therefore entitled to [DIB]. See

14

. 15 B. Summary Of ALJ’s Findings 16 The ALJ determined that “[Plaintiff] meets the insured status requirements 17 of the . . . Act through December 31, 2020.” Tr. 31. The ALJ then found at step 18 one, that “[Plaintiff] has not engaged in [SGA] since November 3, 2015, the alleged 19 onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).”

At step two, the ALJ found that 20 “[Plaintiff] has the following severe impairments: sacroiliac joint disorder, diabetes 21 mellitus with diabetic polyneuropathy of the lower extremities associated with 22 diabetes mellitus type 2, obesity[,] and mild lumbar spine degenerative disc disease 23 (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).” Tr. 32. At step three, the ALJ found that “[Plaintiff] 24 does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 25 medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, 26 Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404. 1526).” Tr. 37. 27 In preparation for step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual 1 perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except he is able 2 to lift and/or carry up to 20 lbs. occasionally and up to 10 lbs. frequently, 3 sit about 6 hours in an 8-hour day and stand or walk about 6 hours in an 4 8-hour workday and needs to be allowed to alternate between sitting and 5 standing every 30 minutes. After standing for 30 minutes, he should be 6 allowed to sit for a minute before standing again. [Plaintiff] can 7 occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl and needs to avoid 8 concentrated exposure to workplace hazards such as working at 9 unprotected heights, fast moving unprotected machinery and 10 traversing uneven or slippery terrain. 11 Tr. 38. 12 The ALJ next noted that “[a]ccording to the [VE], [Plaintiff] has [PRW] as 13 an electrical inspector” as defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles 14 (“DOT”) at DOT code 625.381-0263 and as an expeditor/aviation supply clerk at 15 DOT code 222.387-058. Tr. 45. The ALJ added that Plaintiff “was born on 16 January 4, 1955[,] and was 60 years old, which is defined as an individual closely 17 approaching retirement age, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 18 404. 1563).”

The ALJ then noted that Plaintiff “has at least a high school 19 education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 404. 1564).”

20 The ALJ then found, at step four, that “[Plaintiff] is capable of performing 21 [PRW] as an electrical inspector [as generally performed]. This work does not 22 require the performance of work-related activities precluded by [Plaintiff’s] [RFC] 23 (20 CFR 404. 1563).” Tr. 44. 24 3 The VE noted, and the ALJ found, that Plaintiff’s PRW as an electrical inspector was defined in 25 the DOT at DOT code 625.381-026. See Tr. 45, 71. DOT code 625.381-026 appears to be a typo 26 and probably was meant to refer to DOT code 825.381-026, which code correlates with the occupational title “Electrical Inspector (aircraft mfg.; air trans.),” which appears to match 27 Plaintiff’s PRW. See https://occupationalinfo.org/82/825381026.html (last accessed May 8, 1 The ALJ added that “[]although [Plaintiff] is capable of performing [PRW], 2 there are other jobs existing in the national economy that he is also able to 3 perform[,]” including the occupations of “electronics assembler[,]” as it is 4 described at DOT code 726.684-018, and “electrical assembler in the aircraft 5 industry” as described at DOT code 729.384-026. Tr. 45-46. In so finding, the 6 ALJ determined that Plaintiff “has acquired work skills from [PRW] (20 CFR 7 404. 1568).” Tr. 45. 8 Specifically, the ALJ noted that the VE “testified that [Plaintiff’s] [PRW] as 9 an electrical inspector . . . required the following skills: attention to detail, 10 knowledge of electronic and electric assemblies and sub-assemblies, appropriate 11 knowledge of appropriate procedure and product specifications within that 12 industry and the use of small hand tools.”

13 The ALJ found that: 14 Based on the testimony of the [VE], . . . [Plaintiff] has acquired work 15 skills from [PRW] that are transferable to other occupations with jobs 16 existing in significant numbers in the national economy. The [VE] 17 testified [Plaintiff’s] previous work is so similar to the jobs recited above 18 that [Plaintiff] would need to make very little, if any, vocational 19 adjustments in terms of tools, work processes, work settings, or the 20 industry. 21 Tr. 46. 22 The ALJ found that “although [Plaintiff’s] additional limitations do not 23 allow [him] to perform the full range of light work, considering [Plaintiff’s] age, 24 education and transferable work skills, a finding of ‘not disabled’ is appropriate 25 under the framework of Medical-Vocational Rule 202.07 section 202.00(f) of the 26 Medical-Vocational Guidelines, and 20 CFR 404.1568(d).” Tr. 46. The ALJ 27 concluded that “[Plaintiff] has not been under a disability, as defined in the . . . Act, 1 from November 3, 2015, through [March 27, 2018], the date of th[e] decision (20 2 CFR 404.1520(f)).”

3 C. Issue Presented And Parties’ Arguments 4 In this appeal, Plaintiff raises one issue, “[w]hether the ALJ’s determination 5 at [s]teps 4 and 5 are supported by substantial evidence.” ECF No. 23, Joint Stip. 6 at 4. 7 D. ALJ’s Step Four Finding Fails 8 Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ’s determination at Step 4 is not supported by 9 substantial evidence” because the VE opined that a hypothetical person with 10 Plaintiff’s RFC could not perform his PRW.

. Specifically, Plaintiff notes 11 that the ALJ found that Plaintiff “must ‘be allowed to alternate between sitting and 12 standing every 30 minutes. After standing for 30 minutes, he should be allowed to 13 sit for a minute before standing again.’”

(quoting Tr. 38). Plaintiff adds that in 14 the fifth hypothetical question posed to the VE, the ALJ asked, in pertinent part, 15 “‘this person must be allowed the option of alternating between sitting and 16 standing every 30 minutes. So if the person has been standing for 30 minutes, they 17 should be allowed to sit briefly for a minute before standing again. Any past 18 work?’” to which the VE responded, “‘no, your honor.’”

(quoting Tr. 74) 19 (capitalization normalized). Plaintiff argues that because the VE opined someone 20 with Plaintiff’s limitations could not perform Plaintiff’s PRW, he “established that 21 he is unable to perform his past work” at step four, and thus the ALJ’s contrary 22 finding is not supported by substantial evidence.

23 Defendant “concedes that the [VE] testified . . . that [Plaintiff] could not 24 perform his [PRW] with the [ALJ’s] assessed [RFC].”

at 12 (citing Tr. 74). 25 Here, Defendant concedes, and the record supports a conclusion, that 26 Plaintiff could not perform his PRW. See Tr. 74 (VE opining that someone with 27 Plaintiff’s RFC could not perform Plaintiff’s PRW). As such, the Court finds that 1 E. ALJ’s Step Five Finding Fails 2 1. Plaintiff’s Arguments 3 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step five by citing transferable skills 4 Plaintiff obtained at his PRW, such as “attention to detail[,]” that “are not really 5 skills” and are instead “worker traits.” ECF No. 23, Joint Stip. at 5-6. Plaintiff 6 argues that “[t]he problem is that [he] worked on large airplanes inspecting and 7 obtaining parts for them, not assembling the plane and parts thereof. Yet, the jobs 8 that the [VE] identified involve the assembly of small electrical parts” and “[t]his 9 is a conflict that the ALJ has not resolved warranting remand.”

. 10 Plaintiff adds that, for example, “a[] familiarity with inspecting circuitry 11 does not translate to the ability to assemble circuitry as a primary function of the 12 job.”

. Moreover, Plaintiff argues that the VE testified that very little 13 vocational adjustment was needed because Plaintiff’s PRW as an inspector 14 involved soldering, and the assembler occupations the VE found Plaintiff could 15 perform also involved soldering.

. Plaintiff argues, however, that “[t]he 16 [VE’s] testimony that soldering is what binds these occupations making it little to 17 no vocational transition is without evidentiary substance” because his PRW 18 required inspection of soldering, whereas the proposed assembler occupations that 19 the VE and ALJ opined Plaintiff could perform at step five require “using 20 soldering” to assemble parts.

(citing DOT 726.684-018 and DOT 729.384- 21 026). Plaintiff, therefore, argues that “[w]hile the occupations arguably share the 22 same industry, they are radically different in the services performed.”

23 Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ’s error is prejudicial because transferability 24 [of job skills] is material to [his] claim for disability” because he “[wa]s an 25 individual closely approaching retirement age at the time of the onset” and 26 “[a]bsent transferable skills, [he] would be entitled to a finding of disability as of his 27 55th birthday.”

at 12 (citing 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, Rule 202.06). 1 2. Defendant’s Response 2 Defendant responds that “there is no dispute over the fact that Plaintiff was 3 60 years old on the alleged onset date and has at least a high school education.”

4 at 13 (citing Tr. 45). Defendant asserts that “[t]he sole issue in contention is 5 whether the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff acquired transferable skills from his 6 [PRW].”

To that end, Defendant argues that “the ALJ’s step five finding that 7 Plaintiff acquired work skills from his [PRW] that are transferable to other 8 occupations with jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy is 9 supported by substantial evidence.”

(citations omitted). 10 Defendant asserts that “[a]t the administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified 11 that he worked at Raytheon from 2000 to 2015 as an expediter and an inspector” 12 and that “[a]s an expediter, Plaintiff testified that he picked up and delivered 13 calibration equipment for repair” and “[a]s an inspector, Plaintiff testified that he 14 inspected ‘PC boards, calibration equipment . . . [and] wire within the board.’”

15 at 14 (citing Tr. 58). Defendant adds that Plaintiff also testified that he took “five 16 to seven tests per year to be certified for soldering and blueprint reading.”

17 (citing Tr. 58). 18 3. Plaintiff’s Testimony Regarding His PRW And 19 Transferable Skills 20 Plaintiff testified that he worked as an “Inspector” until 2011, when he “got 21 downgraded because of budget cuts” to the position of “Expediter.” Tr. 58. 22 Plaintiff testified that as an inspector, he “was [an] inspector [of] PC boards, 23 calibration equipment . . . inspecting wire, wire within the boards. [He] had to take 24 tests, maybe five, seven tests per year . . . like [his] certification for solder [and] 25 [c]ertification for blueprint reading.”

Plaintiff testified that his duties as an 26 expediter “were to pick up and deliver calibration equipment for repair.”

27 / / / 1 4. VE’s Testimony Regarding Plaintiff’s Transferable Skills 2 The VE testified that Plaintiff “would have transfer[able] skills [from his 3 PRW] that would allow electronics assembly work or electrical assembly work.” 4 Tr. 74. Specifically, the VE found that Plaintiff’s transferable “skill set would 5 include attention to detail, knowledge of electronic and electrical assemblies and 6 sub-assemblies, appropriate knowledge of appropriate procedure and product 7 specifications within that industry. The use of hand tools, small hand tools” that 8 “would transfer with little, if any vocational adjustment[.]” Tr. 76 (emphasis 9 added). The VE added that Plaintiff “had knowledge of soldering, that would be 10 one issue in terms of skills.”

11 5. Relevant DOT Job Descriptions 12 The DOT describes the job duties of Plaintiff’s PRW as an electrical 13 inspector at DOT code 825.381-026 as: 14 Inspects and tests electrical parts, assemblies, and accessories prior to 15 installation in aircraft for conformance to specifications and quality 16 standards, using precision measuring instruments and test equipment: 17 Examines parts and assemblies, such as wire harnesses, control panels, 18 coaxial cables, and electrical jig boards, for completeness of assembly, 19 quality, and conformance to blueprints, production illustrations, 20 engineering drawings, and specifications. Inspects wiring of assemblies 21 for accuracy of stripping, soldering, and crimping, and for defects, such 22 as frayed wires, loose connections, and cracks. Verifies wire and cable 23 length, dimensions, and clearance of parts, using precision instruments. 24 Tests continuity and performance of parts, assemblies, and accessories, 25 using test equipment. Records acceptance or rejection of parts on 26 inspection report, and indicates reason for rejection. 27 See https://occupationalinfo.org/82/825381026.html (last accessed May 8, 2020) 1 The DOT describes the job duties of electronics assembler at DOT code 2 726.684-018, which the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform the duties of at step five, 3 as: 4 Performs any combination of following tasks to assemble electronic 5 components, subassemblies, products, or systems: Reads work orders, 6 follows production drawings and sample assemblies, or receives verbal 7 instructions regarding duties to be performed. Positions and aligns 8 parts in specified relationship to each other in jig, fixture, or other 9 holding device. Crimps, stakes, screws, bolts, rivets, welds, solders, 10 cements, press fits, or performs similar operations to join or secure 11 parts in place, using hand[]tools, power tools, machines, and 12 equipment. Mounts assembled components, such as transformers, 13 resistors, transistors, capacitors, integrated circuits, and sockets, on 14 chassis panel. Connects component lead wires to printed circuit or 15 routes and connects wires between individual component leads and 16 other components, connectors, terminals, and contact points, using 17 soldering, welding, thermocompression, or related bonding procedures 18 and equipment. Installs finished assemblies or subassemblies in cases 19 and cabinets. Assembles and attaches hardware, such as caps, clamps, 20 knobs, and switches, to assemblies. Performs intermediate assembly 21 tasks, such as potting, encapsulating, sanding, cleaning, epoxy bonding, 22 curing, stamping, etching, impregnating, and color coding parts and 23 assemblies. Tends machines that press, shape, or wind component 24 parts. Adjusts or trims materials from components to achieve specified 25 electrical or dimensional characteristics. Performs on-line go-not-go 26 testing and inspection, using magnifying devices, measuring 27 instruments, and electronic test equipment, to ensure parts and 1 assemblies meet production specifications and standards. May perform 2 assembly operations under microscope or other magnifying device. 3 See https://occupationalinfo.org/72/726684018.html (last accessed May 8, 2020) 4 (emphasis added). 5 Finally, the DOT describes the job duties of electrical assembler in the 6 aircraft industry at DOT code 729.384-026, which the ALJ found Plaintiff could 7 perform the duties of at step five, as: 8 assembler, wire group; bench assembler, electrical [r]outes, wires, 9 assembles, and installs electrical and electronic components in aircraft 10 and missile units, such as main junction and terminal boxes, main 11 control switch panels, and instrument and radio panels, according to 12 specifications, using jig boards, hand[]tools, and equipment: Reads 13 work orders, blueprints, and specifications to determine established 14 assembly methods. Cuts wire to specified lengths, using wire cutters. 15 Cuts plastic sleeves and slips sleeves over wire ends to insulate 16 connections. Crimps terminal eyelets and lugs to wire ends, using hand 17 or machine crimping device. Routes, combs, twists, wraps, ties, and 18 attaches wire to terminal points, according to jig board layout, using 19 soldering gun and hand[]tools. Connects wiring to accessories, such as 20 relays, circuit breakers, plugs, condensers, switches, and solenoids, and 21 installs accessory assemblies in electrical or electronic units, using 22 soldering gun and hand[]tools. Conducts functional and continuity 23 tests of electrical assemblies, components, wire harness, and plugs, 24 using ohmmeter, test lights, and other electrical testing instruments. 25 Pots or encapsulates electrical and electronic details. . . . May attach 26 eyelets, terminals, and mounting studs to etched circuit boards. 27 See https://occupationalinfo.org/72/729384026.html (last accessed May 8, 2020) 1 F. Standard To Review ALJ’s Step Five Finding 2 The regulations addressing a person with Plaintiff’s characteristics provide, 3 in pertinent part, that: 4 If you are of advanced age (age 55 or older), and you have a severe 5 impairment(s) that limits you to sedentary or light work, we will find 6 that you cannot make an adjustment to other work unless you have skills 7 that you can transfer to other skilled or semiskilled work . . . that you 8 can do despite your impairments(s). We will decide if you have 9 transferable skills as follows. . . . If you are closely approaching 10 retirement age (age 60 or older) and you have a severe impairment(s) 11 that limits you to no more than light work, we will find that you have 12 skills that are transferable to skilled or semiskilled light work only if the 13 light work is so similar to your previous work that you would need to 14 make very little, if any, vocational adjustment in terms of tools, work 15 processes, work settings, or the industry. 16

(d)(4) (emphasis added); see also McKenna v. Colvin, No. 17 CV 13–06224 RZ,

, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2014). 18 G. ALJ’s Decision Is Not Supported By Substantial Evidence 19 Here, as Defendant correctly asserts, “[t]he sole issue in contention is 20 whether the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff acquired transferable skills from his 21 [PRW]” because Plaintiff was closely approaching retirement age and had severe 22 impairments limiting him to no more than light work at the time he applied for 23 DIB. ECF No. 23, Joint Stip. at 12;

(d)(4); Tr. 32, 38, 45, 24 198-204. The Court finds that the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff had transferrable 25 skills from his PRW is not supported by substantial evidence because the record 26 does not support a conclusion that Plaintiff acquired the skills to “use . . . hand 27 tools, small hand tools” as the VE opined and the ALJ found. Tr. 45-46, 76. 1 In concluding that Plaintiff had transferable skills, including the use of hand 2 tools, the ALJ observed that the VE “testified that [Plaintiff’s] [PRW] as an 3 electrical inspector . . . required the . . . use of small hand tools.” Tr. 45. Neither 4 the DOT description of Plaintiff’s PRW as an inspector, or Plaintiff’s testimony 5 supports this conclusion. 6 As discussed above, DOT code 825.381-026—which the Court assumes the 7 VE and ALJ were referring to when they both listed Plaintiff’s PRW as an electrical 8 inspector as DOT code 625.381-026, see Tr. 45, 71; supra at 6 n.3—indicates that 9 workers in this occupation inspect the wiring, crimping, and soldering work of 10 others, rather than actually performing the wiring, crimping, and soldering work 11 themselves. See DOT 825.381-026. Thus, the DOT description of Plaintiff’s 12 PRW does not support a conclusion that Plaintiff worked with small hand tools 13 and, thus, has the skillset to use them now with very little, if any, vocational 14 adjustment.

(d)(4). 15 Plaintiff’s testimony also does not support a conclusion that Plaintiff could 16 use hand tools with very little, if any, vocational adjustment. Plaintiff testified that 17 his PRW included inspecting and gathering parts for airplane production and, while 18 working as an inspector up to 2011, taking certification tests “for solder” and 19 “blueprint reading.” Tr. 58. It is unclear on the record before the Court whether 20 Plaintiff’s certification tests “for solder” were to certify that Plaintiff could solder 21 things himself, or if the tests merely certified that Plaintiff could inspect the 22 soldering work of others. Although Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s tests were “to 23 be certified for soldering[,]” ECF No. 23, Joint Stip. at 14, based on the DOT 24 description of Plaintiff’s PRW that workers in this field “[i]nspect[] wiring of 25 assemblies for accuracy of stripping, soldering, and crimping, and for defects[,]” it 26 seems unlikely that Plaintiff’s certification tests “for solder” tested Plaintiff’s 27 ability to perform soldering work, rather than to merely inspect the soldering work 1 Nevertheless, even assuming Plaintiff’s certification tests “for solder”—the 2 last of which Plaintiff appears to have taken in 2011 before he was downgraded to 3 an expediter and some seven years before the ALJ’s unfavorable decision in 2018— 4 certified that Plaintiff could solder things rather than merely inspect soldered 5 things, it is unclear how Plaintiff’s ability to solder things translated to Plaintiff’s 6 ability to use more “hand tools, small hand tools” beyond just a soldering gun with 7 “very little, if any, vocational adjustment.”

(d)(4); Tr. 45-46, 8 58, 76. 9 This unexplained discrepancy is critical here because the two occupations 10 the ALJ opined Plaintiff could perform at step five indicate that Plaintiff would 11 need to use a variety of tools beyond just a soldering gun to perform those 12 occupations. See DOT 729.384-026 (requiring the use of “jig boards, hand tools, 13 and equipment” to “installs electrical and electronic components in aircraft and 14 missile units, such as main junction and terminal boxes, main control switch panels, 15 and instrument and radio panels); see also DOT 726.684-018 (listing duties as 16 “[c]rimps, stakes, screws, bolts, rivets, welds, solders, cements, press fits, or 17 performs similar operations to join or secure parts in place, using hand tools, power 18 tools, machines, and equipment”; “connects wires . . . using soldering, welding, 19 thermocompression, or related bonding procedures and equipment”; “Tends 20 machines that press, shape, or wind component parts”; uses “magnifying devices, 21 measuring instruments, and electronic test equipment.”). 22 Accordingly, the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff had transferrable skills from 23 his PRW is not supported by substantial evidence. As such, the Court finds that 24 the ALJ failed to meet her burden at step five of proving that there are jobs that 25 exist in significant number in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. 26 Because the ALJ’s findings at steps four and five are not supported by 27 substantial evidence, the Court finds that remand for further proceedings is 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Because the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial 3 | evidence, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision is 4 | REVERSED and this case is REMANDED for further administrative proceedings 5 | under sentence four of

(g). See Garrison v. Colvin,

, 6 | 1009 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that under sentence four of

(g), 7 | “[t]he court shall have power to enter . . . a judgment affirming, modifying, or 8 | reversing the decision of the Commissioner... , with or without remanding the 9 | cause for a rehearing.” ) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 10 11 IT ISSO ORDERED. 12 | DATED: 05/11/2020 AW ps 14 HONORABLE SHASHI H. KEWALRAMANI 15 United States Magistrate Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28