1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ) 11 LLOYD MOSLEY, ) Case No.: CV 20-04731-CJC (JCx) ) 12 ) ) Plaintiff, 13 ) ) v. 14 ) ORDER SUA SPONTE REMANDING ) CASE TO LOS ANGELES COUNTY 15 RALPH’S GROCERY COMPANY, et ) SUPERIOR COURT ) 16 al., ) ) 17 ) Defendants. ) 18 ) ) 19

20 I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 21

22 On May 14, 2020, Plaintiff Lloyd Mosley brought this action against Ralph’s 23 Grocery Company in Los Angeles County Superior Court. (Dkt. 1-1 [Complaint, 24 hereinafter “Compl.”].) Plaintiff, a quadriplegic who uses a wheelchair for mobility, 25 alleges that he visited Defendant’s grocery store on April 22, 2020. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 6.) There, 26 he used the store’s restroom, but was allegedly unable to wash his hands because the soap 27 dispenser was mounted too high off the ground. (Id. ¶ 8.) Based on this alleged 1 architectural barrier, Plaintiff asserts two state law causes of action against Defendant 2 under (1) California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”),

(b), and 3 (2) California Disabled Persons Act (“CDPA”),

(a)(1). (See 4 generally id.) On May 27, 2020, Defendant removed the action to this Court, invoking 5 federal question jurisdiction. (Dkt. 1 [Notice of Removal, hereinafter “NOR”].) 6 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 9 A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to a federal district court 10 if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over it.

. 11 Principles of federalism and judicial economy require courts to “scrupulously confine 12 their [removal] jurisdiction to the precise limits which [Congress] has defined.” See 13 Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,

(1941). Indeed, “[n]othing is to 14 be more jealously guarded by a court than its jurisdiction.” See United States v. Ceja- 15 Prado,

(9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). The defendant 16 removing the action to federal court bears the burden of establishing that the district court 17 has subject matter jurisdiction over the action, and the removal statute is strictly 18 construed against removal jurisdiction. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,

(9th 19 Cir. 1992). 20 21 Federal courts have a duty to examine their subject matter jurisdiction whether or 22 not the parties raise the issue. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed, 23 Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] district court’s duty to establish subject 24 matter jurisdiction is not contingent upon the parties’ arguments.”). “The court may— 25 indeed must—remand an action sua sponte if it determines that it lacks subject matter 26 jurisdiction.” GFD, LLC v. Carter,

, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2012). 27 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 3 In its Notice of Removal, Defendant contends that there is federal question 4 jurisdiction over this action because Plaintiff asserted a claim under the ADA. The Court 5 disagrees. Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, “federal jurisdiction exists only when 6 a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” 7 Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams,

(1987). “[A] case will not be removable 8 if the complaint does not affirmatively allege a federal claim.” Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. 9 Anderson,

, 6 (2003). “The plaintiff is the master of his or her complaint and 10 may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Easton v. Crossland 11 Mortg. Corp.,

, 982 (9th Cir. 1997). 12 13 The Complaint asserts two state-law claims under the Unruh Act and the CDPA. 14 (See Compl.) Defendant contends that federal question jurisdiction nonetheless exists 15 because “it appears from the Complaint that this is a civil rights action alleging violations 16 of the Americans with Disabilities Act.” (NOR ¶ 4.) This assertion is inaccurate. 17 Though the Complaint references the ADA, it does so only because the Unruh Act and 18 the CDPA both incorporate the ADA, such that an ADA violation may serve as a “hook” 19 for violations of those state laws. See

(f) (“A violation of the right of 20 any individual under the federal [ADA] shall also constitute a violation of this section.”); 21

(c) (similar). But the fact that Plaintiff references the ADA in support 22 of his Unruh Act and CDPA claims does not convert Plaintiff’s state law claims into ones 23 arising under the ADA. See Wander v. Kaus,

(9th Cir. 2002) 24 (“Federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim is not created just because a 25 violation of federal law is an element of the state law claim.”); Carpenter v. Raintree 26 Realty, LLC,

, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2012) (“The mere fact that the 27 Unruh Act incorporates violations of the ADA does not give this Court federal question 1 ||

, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2020) (“The fact that plaintiff relies in part 2 |}on ADA violations as the basis for her state claim is insufficient to confer federal 3 || question jurisdiction.”). Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this action. 4 5 CONCLUSION 6 7 ‘Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of 8 ||removal in the first instance.” Gaus,

. Because Plaintiff has not asserted 9 ||any claim that arises under federal law, the Court sua sponte REMANDS this action to 10 ||Los Angeles County Superior Court. 1 12 DATED: — June 11, 2020 “eo □□ ge 13 ye ye 14 CORMAC J. CARNEY 15 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28