1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ) 11 ) Case No.: CV 20-04063-CJC(GJSx) RADE RADAKOVICH, ) 12 ) ) 13 ) Plaintiff, ) 14 ) v. ) 15 ) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH ) MOTION TO REMAND [Dkt. 9] 16 ) AMERICA, LLC and DOES 1-50, ) 17 ) ) 18 Defendants. ) ) 19 ) ) 20 ) 21 22 I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 23 24 In October 2019, Plaintiff Rade Radakovich filed this suit against Defendants 25 Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (“Jaguar”), Carwell, LLC (doing business as 26 Jaguar Land Rover South Bay, hereinafter “Jaguar South Bay”), and unnamed Does in 27 San Luis Obispo County Superior Court. (Dkt. 1-1 [Complaint, hereinafter “Compl.”].) 1 (Id. ¶ 5.) In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle suffers from various defects 2 related to the seats, air conditioning, and entertainment system and that Jaguar and Jaguar 3 South Bay failed to make necessary repairs. (Id. ¶¶ 9–10.) Plaintiff asserts a single cause 4 of action for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly 5 Act”). (See id.) He seeks actual damages of at least $20,000 and approximately 6 $250,000 in civil penalties. (Id. at 5.) 7 8 On April 1, 2020, while the action was pending in San Luis Obispo County 9 Superior Court, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Jaguar South Bay. (Dkt. 1-4 [Request for 10 Dismissal].) On May 1, 2020, Jaguar removed to this Court, invoking diversity 11 jurisdiction. (Dkt. 1 [Notice of Removal, “hereinafter NOR”].) Now before the Court is 12 Plaintiff’s motion to remand. (Dkt. 9; Dkt. 9-1 [Points and Authorities, hereinafter 13 “Mot.”].) For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.1 14 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 17 A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to a federal district court 18 if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over it.

. 19 Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction over cases between completely diverse parties 20 that involve an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.

. Principles 21 of federalism and judicial economy require courts to “scrupulously confine their 22 [removal] jurisdiction to the precise limits which [Congress] has defined.” See Shamrock 23 Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,

(1941). Indeed, “[n]othing is to be more 24 jealously guarded by a court than its jurisdiction.” See United States v. Ceja-Prado, 333

, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). The party removing the 26 27 1 Having read and considered the papers presented by the parties, the Court finds this matter appropriate 1 action to federal court bears the burden of establishing that the district court has subject 2 matter jurisdiction over the action, and the removal statute is strictly construed against 3 removal jurisdiction. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1992). 4 5 III. DISCUSSION 6 7 Plaintiff argues that Jaguar has not properly established complete diversity of 8 citizenship, as required by

(a).2 In the Notice of Removal, Jaguar 9 asserts that it is a single-member limited liability company incorporated in Delaware with 10 its principal place of business in New Jersey. (NOR ¶ 14.) Jaguar’s sole member is 11 Jaguar Land Rover Limited, a British company. (Id.) Plaintiff does not challenge these 12 allegations and apparently concedes that Jaguar is a citizen of Delaware, New Jersey, and 13 Britain. 14 15 Instead, Plaintiff argues that Jaguar has not carried its burden of establishing that 16 he is a California citizen, as alleged in the Notice of Removal. Puzzlingly, Plaintiff does 17 not claim to be a citizen of some state other, nor does he offer any evidence regarding his 18 citizenship. Instead, his motion rests entirely on the argument that Jaguar cannot provide 19 sufficient evidence of his California citizenship. Although Jaguar submitted several 20 items of evidence in support of its opposition, (Dkt. 12 [hereinafter “Opp.”]), Plaintiff 21 declined to file a reply brief. The Court is unimpressed by Plaintiff’s gambit and finds 22 that Jaguar has carried its burden of establishing complete diversity. 23 24 “A defendant seeking to remove a case to a federal court must file in the federal 25 forum a notice of removal ‘containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for 26 27 2 Although his motion makes passing reference to the amount in controversy requirements, Plaintiff does 1 removal.’” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens,

, 87 (2014) 2 (quoting

(a)). These allegations are accepted if made in good faith.

3 However, if the allegations in the notice of removal are challenged “in any appropriate 4 manner, [the removing party] must support them by competent proof.” Gaus,

567 (quoting McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,

(1936)); 6 see also Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 89 (“Evidence establishing the amount is required by 7 § 1446(c)(2)(B) only when the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the defendant’s 8 allegation.”). 9 10 Jaguar has carried this burden. For diversity purposes, a person is a “citizen” of 11 the state in which he or she is domiciled. Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd.,

(9th Cir. 1983). “A person’s domicile is her permanent home, where she 13 resides with the intention to remain or to which she intends to return.” Kanter v. Warner- 14 Lambert Co.,

(9th Cir. 2001). In support of its allegation that Plaintiff 15 is domiciled in California, Jaguar presents: 16 17 1. Plaintiff’s lease agreement, which lists an address in San Luis Obispo County, 18 (Dkt. 1-6 at 1); 19 2. Jaguar South Bay repair records, which list the same address and show that 20 Plaintiff had the vehicle repaired in Torrance, California several times, (Dkt. 1-7); 21 3. A Statement of Information for Plaintiff’s business, Greystone Relocation 22 Concierge LLC, from the California Secretary of State, which similarly lists his 23 address in California, (Dkt. 12-6). 24 25 Plaintiff argues that this evidence only addresses his residence, not his domicile or 26 “intention to remain” in California. See Warner-Lambert Co.,

. The 27 Court disagrees. Taken together, this evidence suggests more than residency—it shows 1 ||a person’s residence as prima facie evidence of the person’s domicile.” Mondragon v. 2 || Capital One Auto Fin.,

(9th Cir. 2013) (citing Anderson v. Watts, 138 3 ||U.S. 694, 706 (1891)). Plaintiff has not offered any domicile-related evidence of his 4 does not claim to be a citizen of some other state, and has not responded to Jaguar’s 5 ||opposition brief. Accordingly, based on the undisputed evidence in the record, the Court 6 that Jaguar has carried its burden of establishing complete diversity. 7 8 || IV. CONCLUSION 9 10 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to remand is DENIED.

12 DATED: — July 13, 2020 fo JL. cz 14 CORMAC J. CARNE 15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28