1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

3 4 5 Shake Satamian, 6 Plaintiff, 2:20-cv-5776-VAP-PDx 7 v. Order DENYING Plaintiff’s 8 Costco Wholesale Corp., Motion to Remand (Dkt. 8) 9 Defendant 10 11 12 Before the Court is Plaintiff Shake Satamian’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to 13 Remand, filed July 24, 2020. (“Motion,” Dkt. 8). Costco Wholesale 14 Corporation opposed the Motion on August 10, 2020. (Dkt. 12). To date, 15 Plaintiff has not filed a Reply. 16 17 After considering all papers filed in support of, and in opposition to, the 18 Motion, the Court deems this matter appropriate for resolution without a 19 hearing pursuant to Local Rule 7-15. The Court DENIES the Motion. 20 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 On April 23, 2020, Plaintiff commenced an action in Los Angeles 23 Superior Court against Defendant Costco Wholesale Corporation 24 (“Defendant”) for personal injury suffered at the Costco Wholesale store 25 located at 6100 Sepulveda Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 91411 (the “Subject 26 Premises”). Plaintiff states that, while “visit[ing] premises owned, 1 1 possessed, leased, or otherwise controlled by defendants, . . . she slipped 2 and fell in water and condiments[.]” (Dkt. 1-1 at 5). She states, further, that 3 “[t]here was no warned [sic] of the presence of this hazard for those visiting 4 said premises” and that “[t]he aforesaid negligence of defendants, and each 5 of them, proximately caused the damage to the plaintiff stated herein.” (Id.). 6 In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleged general negligence, premises liability and 7 listed as damages wage loss, loss of use of property, hospital and medical 8 expenses, general damage, property damage, loss of earning capacity, and 9 emotional distress. (Dkt. 1-1 at 5). Defendant answered the complaint in 10 state court, (Dkt. 1-2), then removed the action on June 29, 2020. (Dkt. 1). 11 12 Defendant is a citizen of Washington, (Dkt. 12 at 1), and Plaintiff is a 13 California citizen, (Dkt. 8-1 at 2). Plaintiff concedes that diversity of 14 citizenship exists between the parties, and the amount in controversy 15 exceeds $75,000. (Dkt. 8-1 at 3). Thus, Plaintiff does not contest the 16 existence of diversity jurisdiction. Rather, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s 17 removal of the action was improper because it was not timely. (Dkt. 8-1 at 18 1-2). Defendant, in turn, argues that removal is proper because the “Notice 19 of Removal was [filed] [sic] within 30 days of learning through discovery that 20 the action [was] removable.” (Dkt. 12 at 2). 21 22 II. LEGAL STANDARD 23 Removal jurisdiction is governed by statute. See

et 24 seq.; Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co.,

(9th Cir. 1979) 25 (“The removal jurisdiction of the federal courts is derived entirely from the 26 statutory authorization of Congress” (citations omitted)). Defendants may 2 1 remove a case to a federal court when a case originally filed in state court 2 presents a federal question or is between citizens of different states. See 3

(a)-(b), 1446, 1453. Only those state court actions that 4 originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed. 28 U.S.C. 5 § 1441(a); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams,

(1987). 6 7 The time limit for removal is set forth in

(b), which 8 provides two thirty-day windows during which a case may be removed to a 9 federal district court within: (1) thirty days “after the receipt by the defendant, 10 through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the 11 claim for relief which such action or proceeding is based thirty days after a 12 defendant receives the initial pleading”; or (2) thirty days after the defendant 13 receives an “amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper from which it 14 may first be ascertained that the case is . . . or has become removable.” 28

(b)(3); Harris v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co.,

, 694 16 (9th Cir. 2005). 17 18 The removal statute is construed strictly against removal. Ethridge v. 19 Harbor House Rest.,

, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988). The strong 20 presumption against removal ensures that “the defendant always has the 21 burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1992) (citing Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assocs., 23

, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990)). Federal jurisdiction “must be 24 rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” 25 Id. 26 3 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Plaintiff argues that remand is warranted here because Defendant’s 3 removal was untimely. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the thirty-day clock 4 started on March 17, 2020, when Plaintiff’s attorney sent a demand letter to 5 Defendant’s representative. (Dkt. 8-1 at 2). Plaintiff’s position is clearly 6 barred by Ninth Circuit precedent. The Ninth Circuit has held that “other 7 paper,” for the purposes of the removal statute, “does not include any 8 document received prior to receipt of the initial pleading.” Carvalho v. 9 Equifax Info. Servs., LLC,

(9th Cir. 2010). Thus, although 10 “a demand letter sent during the course of the state court action can 11 constitute “other paper” within the meaning of section 1446(b) if it reflects a 12 reasonable estimate of the plaintiff's claim,” where, as here, a “demand 13 letter [is] sent to [a defendant] several months before [a plaintiff] even file[s] 14 her complaint,” that pre-litigation demands cannot serve as basis for putting 15 a party on notice as to the amount in controversy.

. Thus, the 30- 16 day removal window cannot have started when Plaintiff sent the demand 17 letter. 18 19 Defendant, in turn, argues that it did not learn of the basis for federal 20 jurisdiction until June 15, 2020, when Plaintiff’s counsel returned discovery 21 responses. (Dkt. 12-1 at 3-4). In its Complaint, Plaintiff did not include 22 citizenship information or the amount in controversy. (Dkt. 1-1). Thus, the 23 first time Defendant learned of the basis for diversity jurisdiction since the 24 inception of this case was when Plaintiff returned discovery responses. 25 (Dkt. 1-5). These responses were executed on June 10, 2020, (Dkt. 1-5 at 26 25), and served on June 15, 2020, (Dkt. 12-1 at 8). Defendant removed the 4 1 | action on June 29, 2020, well within the 30-day window. The Court 2 | therefore concludes that removal was timely. 3 4 IV. CONCLUSION 5 The Court accordingly DENIES the Motion to Remand. 6 ’ | ITIS SO ORDERED. 8 Dated: 8/19/20 A ~. A, ? he □ q 10 OO , Virginia A. Phillips 5 11 United States District Judge 12 43 14 415 46 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26