Daniel Harper v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

United States District Court for the Central District of California

Daniel Harper v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

Trial Court Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 DANIEL HARPER, ) NO. CV 20-8495-JGB (KS) 11 Plaintiff, )

12 v. )

) 13 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF ) ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 14 CORRECTIONS AND ) REHABILITATION, ) 15 Defendants. ) 16 _________________________________ )

17 18 On September 15, 2020, Plaintiff, who is confined at the California Medical Facility in 19 Vacaville, California and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint under

42 U.S.C. § 20

1983. (Dkt. No. 1.) In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that female prison employees working 21 at prisons throughout California are sexually harassed by inmates and not adequately protected 22 from harassment by their employer, the California Department of Corrections and 23 Rehabilitation. (Complaint 1-6.) Plaintiff states that he is “not entitled to any relief[,] all [he] 24 want[s] to do is stand up for the female staff in all of California’s prisons.” (Complaint at 7.) 25 Also on September 15, 2020, the Court notified Plaintiff that he had failed to pay the filing fee 26 and had not filed a request to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkt. No. 2.) 27 28 1 On October 6, 2020, after three weeks had passed and Plaintiff had not responded to 2 the Court’s notification, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause, no later than October 27, 3 2020, why the action should not be dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee or obtain 4 authorization to proceed without prepayment of the fee. (Dkt. No. 4.) The Court also notified 5 Plaintiff that the Complaint violates the general rule prohibiting pro se plaintiffs from pursuing 6 claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity, see Simon v. Hartford Life & Accident 7 Ins. Co.,

546 F.3d 661, 664

(9th Cir. 2008), and does not support a reasonable inference that 8 Plaintiff has standing to bring the claims asserted. (Dkt. No. 4); see also Lujan v. Defenders 9 of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555, 560-61

(1992). The Court warned Plaintiff that, for these reasons, 10 the Complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 11 granted. (Dkt. No. 4); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (Congress requires district courts to 12 dismiss civil rights complaints brought by prisoners if the court determines that the complaint, 13 or any portion thereof, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted). 14 15 On October 21, 2020, Plaintiff responded to the Court’s October 6, 2020 Order to Show 16 Cause. (Dkt. No. 5.) In the Response, Plaintiff states: “I have sent stuff to the house 17 representative or elected officials in Sacramento to see if there is anything they can do to help 18 and I have not heard from any of them at all so I got to try at the court level. So please do not 19 dismiss this case I do not want it to be a 1983 at all. All I want is get a civil rights measure 20 put into action for these female staff at these prisons. Please.” (Id.) Plaintiff attached to the 21 Response a request to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkt. No. 5 at CM/ECF Page ID 99-103.) 22 23 “[T]hose who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy the 24 threshold requirement imposed by Article III of the Constitution by alleging an actual case or 25 controversy”—namely, a plaintiff must demonstrate a “personal stake in the outcome.” City 26 of Los Angeles v. Lyons,

461 U.S. 95, 101

(1983) (quoting Flast v. Cohen,

392 U.S. 93

, 94- 27 101 (1968) and Baker v. Carr,

369 U.S. 186, 204

(1962)). This question of “standing” is an 28 essential part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III and not subject to waiver. 1 Lujan,

504 U.S. at 560

; see United States v. Hays, 515 U.S 737, 742 (1995). The burden lies 2 on the plaintiff to establish standing, see DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,

547 U.S. 332

, 352 3 (2006), and, to do so, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an “invasion of a legally protected 4 interest” (2) that is “concrete and particularized,” (3) “actual and imminent,” (4) “fairly 5 traceable to the challenged action,” and (5) “redressable by a favorable ruling.” Arizona State 6 Leg. v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, ___ U.S. ____,

135 S. Ct. 2652, 2663

(2015). 7 Consequently, “[a] litigant ‘raising only a generally available grievance about government— 8 . . . and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public 9 at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.’” Hollingsworth v. Perry,

570 U.S. 10 693, 706

(2013); see Lujan,

504 U.S. at 576

(“Vindicating the public interest (including the 11 public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of 12 Congress and the Chief Executive.” (emphasis in original)). 13 14 Plaintiff indicates that he does not wish to bring a Section 1983 lawsuit against the 15 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”); rather, he is advocating 16 for “a civil rights measure” to protect female prison staff from sexual harassment, and he filed 17 a complaint with the Court only because he has not received a response from the State 18 legislature. (Dkt. No. 5.) However, under Article III, the Court has no jurisdiction to consider 19 whether a “civil rights measure” or other policy change is warranted. As stated above, the 20 Court’s jurisdiction extends only to “cases or controversies,” and, without more, a plaintiff’s 21 complaints about his exposure to undesirable or even unlawful conduct does not establish that 22 a present case or controversy exists. See Lujan,

504 U.S. at 564

. For these reasons, the Court 23 finds it lacks jurisdiction, and, despite Plaintiff’s good intentions, the action must be 24 dismissed. 25 26 The Court also notes that the Complaint violates the general rule prohibiting pro se 27 plaintiffs from pursuing claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity. See Simon, 28

546 F.3d at 664

. “[A] pro se litigant may not bring a class action on behalf of others,” Williams 1 || v. Kobayashi, CIV. NO. 1:18-cv-00336 DKW-RLP,

2018 WL 5258614

, at *8 (D. Hawai’i 2 || Oct. 22, 2018) (citing Simon,

546 F.3d at 664-65

; Robertson v. Republic of Nicaragua,

719 F. 3

|| App’x 705 (9th Cir. 2018)), because “pro se plaintiffs cannot represent and protect the interests 4 || of the class fairly and adequately.” See Nellis v. Cushfield Maint. W. Corp., Case No. 18-CV- 5 || 03946-LHK,

2019 WL 2744835

, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2019) (collecting cases dismissing 6 || class action claims brought by pro se litigant). “The privilege to represent oneself pro se... 7 || is personal to the litigant and does not extend to other parties or entities. Consequently, in an 8 || action brought by a pro se litigant, the real party in interest must be the person who ‘by 9 || substantive law has the right to be enforced.’” Simon,

546 F.3d at 664

. Here, Plaintiff purports 10 || to represent the interests of female prison staff, but the law precludes him from doing so as a 11 || pro se litigant. 12 13 In light of the foregoing, and without reaching the merits of Plaintiff's application to 14 || proceed in forma pauperis, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this action is 15 || DISMISSED without prejudice. 16 □ 17 || DATED: November 4, 2020 ~ Pe □□ 18 JESUS G. BERNAL UNJAED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 19 || Presented by: 0 “PSaun_L:Kasensn KAREN L. STEVENSON 21 || UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Reference

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