1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9

10 P.W., Case No. 19-cv-01132-NC 11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING 12 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR v. ATTORNEY’S FEES 13 ANDREW SAUL, Re: Dkt. No. 25 14 Defendant. 15 16 17 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to Equal Access 18 to Justice Act (“EAJA”),

(d)(1)(A). Plaintiff seeks a total of $10,673 in 19 attorney’s fees. See Dkt. No. 28 at 10. Defendant Commissioner of Social Security 20 contends that EAJA fees are not warranted because its defense of this action was 21 substantially justified and the requested fees are excessive. The Court discusses each 22 argument in turn. First, the EAJA provides that: 23 Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a 24 prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in 25 addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that 26 party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including 27 proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the 1 United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court 2 finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that 3 special circumstances make an award unjust. 4 28 U.S. C § 2412(d)(1)(A). A party seeking fees under the EAJA need only allege that the 5 government’s position was not substantially justified. See Scarborough v. Principi, 541

, 414 (2004). “The burden of establishing ‘that the position of the United States 7 was substantially justified’ . . . must be shouldered by the Government.”

8 Here, Defendant argues in passing that it was substantially justified in defending 9 this lawsuit. See Dkt. No. 26 at 1. Defendant, however, offers no analysis for its position. 10 Thus, Defendant failed to meet its burden and fees are warranted. 11 Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel’s claimed fees are excessive. 12 Defendant does not point to any specific billing entry or category of work that it contends 13 was excessive. Instead, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s expenditure of 50.4 hours on this 14 case is unreasonable when, in its estimation, similar cases require only 15 to 30 hours of 15 work. See Dkt. No. 26 at 2–3. Accordingly, Defendant requests that the Court reduce 16 Plaintiff’s counsel’s billed hours to 30 hours.

. The Court ordered Plaintiff’s 17 counsel to provide her billing records for review. See Dkt. No. 27. 18 The Ninth Circuit has held that it is “an abuse of discretion to apply a de facto 19 policy limiting social security claimants to twenty to forty hours of attorney time in 20 ‘routine’ cases.” Costa v. Comm’r of SSA,

(9th Cir. 2012). Instead, 21 courts must scrutinize “case-specific factors including, among others, the complexity of 22 the legal issues, the procedural history, the size of the record, and when counsel was 23 retained.”

24 Reviewing Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing records, the Court finds that counsel’s 25 expended hours were reasonable. The billing records do not show any redundant or 26 unnecessary hours. Although the total hours expended was relatively high and the lawsuit 27 did not involve particularly complex legal issues, this case involved an extensive 1 || extensive record naturally requires Plaintiff’s counsel to expend a significant amount of 2 || time on this case. 3 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for attorney’s fees in the 4 || amount of $10,673. 5 IT ISSO ORDERED. 6 7 Dated: June 26, 2020 he _ NATHANAEL M. COUSINS 8 United States Magistrate Judge 9 10 11 12 € 13

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