Legardy v. Redon

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 EUREKA DIVISION RONALD LEGARDY, Case No. 20-cv-05716-RMI 9 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 10 v. TO AMEND 11 M.B. ATCHLEY, et al., 12 Defendants.

14 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and he has consented to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge.

17 DISCUSSION 18 Standard of Review 19 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 21 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1)-(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).

2 Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has recently explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

13 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

17 Legal Claims 18 Plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to protect him from sexual assaults by his cellmate.

19 The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In particular, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. Id. at 833; Cortez v. Skol, 776 F. 3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). The failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks by other inmates or from dangerous conditions at the prison violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health 1 Allegations in a pro se complaint sufficient to raise an inference that the named prison officials knew that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm, and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it, state a failure-to-protect claim. See Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1041-42 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847).

5 “In a § 1983 or a Bivens action – where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants – the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (finding under Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, and Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that complainant-detainee in a Bivens action failed to plead sufficient facts “plausibly showing” that top federal officials “purposely adopted a policy of classifying post-September 11th detainees as ‘of high interest’ because of their race, religion, or national origin” over more likely and non-discriminatory explanations).

13 A supervisor may be liable under section 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2012). Even if a supervisory official is not directly involved in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct, “[a] supervisor can be liable in this individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The claim that a supervisory official “knew of unconstitutional conditions and ‘culpable actions of his subordinates’ but failed to act amounts to ‘acquiescence in the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates’ and is ‘sufficient to state a claim of supervisory liability.’” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208) (finding that conclusory allegations that supervisor promulgated unconstitutional procedures which authorized unconstitutional conduct of subordinates do not suffice to state a claim of supervisory liability).

27 Plaintiff states that his cellmate sexually assaulted him and later attempted to sexually Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. § 15601 (“PREA”). Plaintiff lists several defendants on the title page of his complaint but has failed to describe the actions of any specific defendant.

3 Plaintiff seeks to bring an action pursuant to the PREA. However, the PREA does not create a private right of action, even for allegations of prison rape. See Krieg v. Steele, 599 Fed. 5 Appx. 231 (5th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases); Porter v. Jennings, 2012 WL 1434986, at *1 (E.D. 6 Cal. 2012) (noting same). To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to a bring an Eighth Amendment claim, the complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. In an amended complaint, Plaintiff must identify the actions of specific defendants and describe how their actions violated his constitutional rights.

9 He must describe how defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his safety by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it.

11 CONCLUSION 12 1. The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in accordance with the standards set forth above. The amended complaint must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this order is filed and must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint, Plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the designated time will result in the dismissal of this case.

20 2. It is the Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice of Change of Address,” and must comply with the court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

25 // // // 1 IT IS SO ORDERED.

2 || Dated: September 16, 2020 RQ@BERT M. ILLMAN 5 United States Magistrate Judge a 12

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