Garcia v. McDowell

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA ESEQUIEL “PAUL” GARCIA, 11 Case No. 16-05301 BLF (PR) Petitioner, 12 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO v. COMPEL COMPUTER ACCESS; 13 DENYING MOTION FOR NEIL MCDOWELL, Warden, E TV ERID ME IN NT AI TA IR NY G H PE EA NR DI IN NG G; MOTION AS MOOT 15 Respondent.

16 (Docket Nos. 44, 53, 66) 18 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his state conviction. Finding the second amended petition stated cognizable claims, Dkt. No. 35, the Court ordered Respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted. Dkt. No. 37. Respondent filed a response on June 19, 2020, along with exhibits. Dkt. Nos. 56-59. Copies of all the papers were served on Petitioner on the same day. Dkt. No. 56 at 4.

24 Before Respondent filed an answer, Petitioner filed a motion to compel the CDCR to provide him computer access to review digital discovery that were on CDs and DVDs.

26 Dkt. No. 44.1 Respondent filed opposition, Dkt. No. 50, and Petitioner filed reply, Dkt.

1 No. 54. Petitioner also filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing on his motion. Dkt. No. 53. The Court finds the submitted papers are sufficient to decide the matter and a hearing is not necessary. Accordingly, the motion for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED. For the reasons discussed below, the motion to compel is DENIED.

6 DISCUSSION A. Motion to Compel 8 Plaintiff wants the Court to order the CDCR to provide him with the following: (1) a copy of all digital discovery consisting of 377 CDs/DVDs containing 18,139 pages of discovery, (2) proper authorization to retain all digital discovery in his possession; (3) permission to have access to a computer with all appropriate software to access the content of the CDs and DVDS; (4) permission to print all necessary documents off the same; and (5) authorization for a schedule of at least ten hours per week to review his digital discovery. Dkt. No. 44 at 14-15.

15 In opposition, Respondent first asserts that because the motion challenges the conditions of Petitioner’s confinement, not his custody, § 2254 does not authorize the relief Petitioner seeks. Dkt. No. 50 at 4. Respondent argues that even if Petitioner were able to state a claim for denial of access to the court, he must show actual injury. Id., citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). Respondent asserts Petitioner has failed to do so since his trial attorney Robertson, trial attorney Sousa, civil attorney Barber, and Petitioner’s parents had access to the digital discovery for years, and yet Petitioner fails to describe the specific materials he needs to review or explain how any of the materials will assist him in seeking habeas relief. Id. at 5. Respondent also asserts that it is not clear whether Petitioner has exhausted administrative remedies with respect to this claim and therefore would not be entitled to the relief requested. Id. Secondly, Respondent asserts that even if the motion could be construed as a accompanying exhibits would be stricken. Dkt. No. 46.

1 motion for discovery in the habeas context, relief is unavailable in the absence of good cause. Dkt. No. 50 at 5. Respondent asserts that Petitioner fails to show good cause because his attorneys and parents had access to the digital discovery for years and yet he fails to specify what materials he expects to locate in the discovery or explain how those materials will assist him in obtaining relief. Id. at 6. Respondent also asserts that the request for access is too broad, and that Petitioner makes no effort to tailor his request to materials that are relevant to challenging his conviction. Id. Respondent also points out that Petitioner clearly has access to materials related to his conviction, referring to the vast exhibits filed in support of his petition. Id. In the absence of good cause or any effort by Petitioner to specify the materials to which he requests access, Respondent asserts that the motion to compel is not warranted. Id. 12 In reply, Petitioner concedes that his request is broad but asserts that it is necessary because he never personally reviewed all the digital material, and he does not know whether there is any information on the CDs and DVDs that could lead to new habeas claims, provide additional support for pending claims, or guide further investigation that will lead to new claims. Dkt. No. 53 at 3-4. He admits that with the help of his parents, he was able to discover certain claims but nonetheless he is entitled to have personal access to his legal documents. Id. at 4-5. Petitioner also asserts that he pursued and exhausted all administrative remedies. Id. at 7-8. Lastly, Petitioner asserts that he has shown good cause based on the argument that denying him access will deprive him of the ability to meet his burden in the habeas context and his “one bite of the apple.” Id. at 12-13.

22 1. Conditions of Confinement 23 “Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 19830” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (per curiam). “Challenges to the validity of any confinement or particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus; requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983 action.” Id. (citation omitted). “[I]f a state prisoner’s claim does not lie at ‘the core of habeas corpus,’ it may not be brought in habeas corpus but must be brought, ‘if at all,’ under § 1983.” Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).

5 First of all, Petitioner’s motion to compel is more akin to a request for injunctive relief in that he would have the Court order the prison to provide him with unlimited access to equipment and material, the lack of which would allegedly result in irreparable harm. The Court agrees with Respondent that such a request for relief does not lie “at the core of habeas corpus” but rather involves conditions of confinement. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 931. Furthermore, Petitioner admits in reply that he is not requesting discovery that was not provided but “simply wants what he is entitled to in order to be able to meet his burden of proof in a habeas context.” Dkt. No. 54 at 12. As such, the proper means of obtaining the relief he seeks is to sue the prison for the alleged failure to provide the proper equipment and resources, the lack of which he claims is violating his right of access to the courts. In fact, Petitioner cites to the very caselaw which would support such a claim if it were filed in a separate civil rights action under § 1983. Dkt. No. 54 at 10. Here, an injunctive order against the prison for circumstances of Petitioner’s confinement does not lie at the core of habeas and therefore must be, if at all, brought under § 1983. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 931. Accordingly, the motion must be denied on this basis.

20 2. Discovery 21 The only alternative is to construe the motion as one seeking to compel discovery against Respondent, notwithstanding Petitioner’s objections to such a characterization.

23 A habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal court, is not entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary course. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997).

25 However, Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, provides that a “judge may, for good cause, authorize a party to conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and may limit the extent of discovery.” Before deciding whether a petitioner is entitled to discovery under Rule 6(a) the court must first identify the essential elements of the underlying claim. See Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904 (difficulties of proof aside, petitioner’s allegation of judicial bias, if proved, would violate due process clause). The court must then determine whether the petitioner has shown “good cause” for appropriate discovery to prove his claim. See id. Good cause for discovery under Rule 6(a) is shown “‘where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is... entitled to relief....’” Id. at 908-09 (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 9 U.S. 286, 299 (1969)); Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 2005).

10 Petitioner admits that the scope of his motion is intentionally broad in order to give him license to search for new habeas claims, find additional support for pending claims, or guide further investigation that will lead to new claims. See supra at 3. However, good cause under Rule 6(a) requires Petitioner set forth “specific allegations” with respect to an underlying claim, i.e., a claim that has already been raised and presented. See Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-09. Petitioner has not satisfied this requirement since there is no allegation that he is seeking access to the digital files to find specific facts to prove a claim that he has already presented to the Court. In fact, there is no assertion that the hundreds of papers he has already filed in support of his claims in the second amended petition is not adequate to support his claims. Dkt. No. 35. Rather, Petitioner essentially wants free reign to conduct a fishing expedition to discover more claims, which clearly does not constitute good cause under Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-09. Furthermore, even if Petitioner were to discover new claims, state judicial remedies would have to be exhausted before this Court could consider them, assuming that Petitioner was granted a stay to do so. Lastly, since filing the instant motion, Petitioner was served on June 19, 2020, with a copy of Respondent’s answer which included thirty-one exhibits containing all relevant portions of the underlying state criminal proceedings. See supra at 1; Dkt. Nos. 56, 57, 58, 59.

Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded that Respondent need be compelled to provide any || further discovery to Petitioner at this juncture. Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion to compel is DENIED for failure to show good cause.

3 || B. Motion for Second Extension of Time to File Traverse 4 On September 22, 2020, the Court granted Petitioner a second extension of time to || file a traverse, which is currently due no later than November 3, 2020. Dkt. No. 65.

6 || Accordingly, a duplicative motion filed a few days later on September 24, 2020, is || DENIED as moot. Dkt. No. 66.

9 CONCLUSION 10 For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s motion to compel is DENIED for lack of i good cause. Petitioner may seek the relief he seeks by filing a separate § 1983 action D against the prison. Dkt. No. 44. Petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing is E B DENIED as unnecessary. Dkt. No. 53. Petitioner’s motion for a second extension of time DENIED as duplicative. Dkt. No. 66.

This order terminates Docket Nos. 44, 53, and 66.

2 15 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _October 13, 2020 BETH LABSON FREEMAN 18 United States District Judge 2 Order Denying M. to Compel; Other Motions PRO-SE\BLF\HC.16\05301Garcia_deny.compel&mots Lo