Strickland v. Ujiri

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA ALAN STRICKLAND AND KELLY STRICKLAND, Case No. 20-cv-981-YGR Plaintiffs, ORDER DIRECTING SUPPLEMENTAL 8 BRIEFING ON MOTION TO DISMISS v. COUNTERCLAIMS; VACATING HEARING M SPA OS RA TI S U &JI ERI N; T T EO RR TO AN INT MO E R NA TP ; T NO AR TS I; O M NAA LP LE LEAF DKT. NO. 45 BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, 12 Defendants.

Pending before the Court is the motion of plaintiff Alan Strickland to dismiss the counterclaims of defendants Masai Ujiri and Toronto Raptors/Maple Leaf Sports & Entertainment. (Dkt. No. 45.) In evaluating the pending motion, the Court requires further briefing on a narrow scope of issues regarding the California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”).

It is not plain from the face of the pleadings here who employed Strickland at the time of the incident. The exhaustion requirements of the CTCA apply to a “a cause of action against a public employee or former public employee for injury resulting from an act or omission in the scope of his employment as a public employee . . . .” Cal. Gov’t Code § 950.2 (emphasis supplied).

“In contrast, when a public employee’s alleged acts fall outside the scope of his employment, ‘a prerequisite claim pursuant to the [CTCA] is not required.’” Wilson-Combs v. California Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 555 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1118 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Rabkin v. Dean, 856 24 F.Supp. 543, 552 (N.D.Cal. 1994)). Thus, Strickland’s argument that the CTCA’s requirements apply by definition assumes that Strickland was acting within the course and scope of his employment by the County when he was injured.

It further appears Strickland’s claims for injury are covered by the Workers’ Compensation laws and may also be controlled by the “firefighter’s rule” which would bar claims as arising from || the normal occupational risks of engagement as a peace officer. See Vasquez v. N. Cty. Transit || Dist., 292 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing firefighter’s rule and exceptions); Hodges v. || Yarian, 53 Cal.App.4th 973, 981-982 (1997) (a member of the public, having already been taxed to || provide the officer with workers’ compensation benefits, is “entitled to the benefit of the cost- || spreading aspect of the public compensation system and should not have to pay again for injuries || that are compensable in that system.”). To the extent there is a viable theory allowing Strickland, || individually, to sue Ujiri in spite of those barriers to suit, equity would appear to require Ujiri to || plead counterclaims on the same set of facts without the requirement of a CTCA filing with the || County.

10 Given that the parties did not address these narrow issues, additional briefing is warranted.

11 || Accordingly, simultaneous briefs not exceeding five (5) pages may be filed on the above issues by ||no later than November 23, 2020. Simultaneous responses not exceeding five (5) pages may be E 13 || filed by no later than December 3, 2020.

14 The hearing on this matter is VACATED. If necessary, after briefing, the Court will reset the || hearing.

§ 16 IT Is SO ORDERED.

17 || Date: November 12, 2020 Lapone Haptelftecs— YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGE s 18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE