1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 BRANDON CHAVEZ and CYNTHIA Case No.: 18-cv-2811 W (JLB) CHAVEZ, 14 ORDER GRANTING IN PART Plaintiffs, 15 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR v. ATTORNEY’S FEES AND 16 REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS AND JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH 17 EXPENSES [DOC. 15] AMERICA, LLC, 18 Defendant. 19 20 21 Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs Brandon Chavez and Cynthia Chavez’s 22 motion for attorney’s fees and reimbursement of costs and expenses. Defendant Jaguar 23 Land Rover North America, LLC opposes. 24 The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. 25 See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d.1). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART the 26 motion [Doc. 15] and AWARDS Plaintiffs $20,378.00 in attorneys’ fees and $498.88 in 27 expenses and costs. 28 1 I. INTRODUCTION 2 This lawsuit arises out of Plaintiffs’ purchase of a 2014 Land Rover Range Rover 3 on or about August 16, 2016. (Compl. ¶ 4.1) Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North 4 America LLC (“JLRNA”) issued an express warranty to Plaintiffs covering the vehicle. 5 (Id. ¶ 7.) Shortly after purchasing the vehicle, Plaintiffs experienced a number of defects 6 and “nonconformity(s) to warranty….” (Id. ¶ 8; Sannipoli Decl. [Doc. 15-1] ¶ 8.) 7 Plaintiffs took the vehicle to JLRNA for repairs approximately four times, but Plaintiffs 8 continued to experience problems with the vehicle. (Compl. ¶¶ 9, 10; Sannipoli Decl. ¶¶ 9 8, 9.) Plaintiffs then contacted JLRNA and requested that it repurchase or replace the 10 vehicle. (Sannipoli Decl. ¶¶ 9, 10, Ex. D.) JLRNA denied the request on October 9, 11 2018. (Id.) 12 On November 7, 2018, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against JLRNA in the San Diego 13 Superior Court. (See Compl.) The Complaint alleges a cause of action under the 14 California Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act,

et seq (the 15 “Song-Beverly Act”). (Id. 1.) On December 14, 2018, JLRNA removed the case to this 16 Court. (See Notice of Removal.) 17 Shortly after the case was removed, Plaintiffs sent JLRNA a settlement demand 18 seeking a repurchase of the vehicle and payment of $6,879.38 in attorney's fees. 19 (Sannipoli Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. E.) JLRNA did not respond to the offer. (Id. ¶ 13.) On 20 February 5, 2019, Plaintiffs sent another settlement offer for repurchase of the vehicle 21 and $8,850.88 in attorney’s fees and costs. (Id. ¶ 16, Ex. F.) JLRNA again did not 22 respond. (Id. ¶ 16.) 23 On approximately May 2, 2019, Plaintiffs’ counsel discovered that a case 24 management conference had not been scheduled because JLRNA inadvertently failed to 25 attach a copy of its state-court Answer to the Notice of Removal. (Sannipoli Decl. ¶ 19.) 26 27 28 1 Plaintiffs’ counsel notified JLRNA, and sent another settlement demand for repurchase of 2 the vehicle and $9,509.38 in attorney’s fees and costs. (Id. ¶¶ 20–23, Ex. G, Ex. H.) On 3 May 16, JLRNA offered to repurchase the vehicle and pay $5,000 in attorney’s fees and 4 costs. (Id. ¶ 25, Ex. I.) After attempts to resolve the amount of attorney’s fees failed, the 5 parties agreed to settle the case for repurchase of the vehicle and to resolve the dispute 6 over attorney’s fees by filing a motion. (Id ¶¶ 30–32.) 7 8 II. ANALYSIS 9 Under the Song-Beverly Act, a buyer who prevails in an action is entitled to an 10 award of attorney’s fees and costs “based on actual time expended, determined by the 11 court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the 12 commencement and prosecution of such action.”

(d). In Murillo v. 13 Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc.,

(1998), the California Supreme Court 14 explained why the Legislature allowed consumers to recover attorney’s fees: 15 Such fees generally comprise the lion's share of the litigation costs, and the prospect of having to pay attorney fees even if one wins a lawsuit can 16 serve as a powerful disincentive to the unfortunate purchaser 17 of a malfunctioning automobile. By permitting prevailing buyers to recover their attorney fees in addition to costs and expenses, our Legislature has 18 provided injured consumers strong encouragement to seek legal redress in a 19 situation in which a lawsuit might not otherwise have been economically feasible. 20

21

. 22 The lodestar method is the prevailing method for calculating an attorney’s fees 23 award. Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc.,

, 24 818-819 (2006); see also Ketchum v. Moses,

(2001) (endorsing -------------------- 25 the lodestar method as the prevailing method for statutory fee awards). The evaluation of 26 the lodestar requires the Court "to make an initial determination of the actual time 27 expended; and then to ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the 28 amount of the actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time 1 expended are reasonable." Robertson,

(quoting Nightingale v. 2 Hyundai Motor America,

(1994)). In determining the 3 reasonableness of the lodestar, courts can consider the complexity of the case, procedural 4 demands, the skill exhibited, and the results achieved.

5 Here, Plaintiffs seek $20,378.00 in attorneys’ fees, $6,113.40 as a fee 6 enhancement, and $498.88 in expenses and costs. (P&A [Doc. 15-2] 4:2–4; Sannipoli 7 Decl. ¶¶ 3–7, Exs. A–C.) The attorneys’ fee amount is based on 52.2 hours billed at 8 attorney rates between $665 and $355 per hour, paralegal and law clerk rates of $195 per 9 hour, and non-paralegal legal assistant rates of $145 per hour. (Sannipoli Decl. ¶¶ 46.) 10 JLRNA contends the number of hours Plaintiffs’ attorneys billed is excessive 11 because the case was not complicated, there was no written discovery, no orders issued 12 by the Court and minimal communication between the parties. (Opp’n [Doc. 17] 11:18– 13 26.) JLRNA also complains that Plaintiffs’ attorneys used block billing and charged for 14 tasks that should have been non-billable. (Id. 12:2–13:6.) JLRNA also contends 15 Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ rates are inflated. (Id. 14:16–17:6.) According to JLRNA, 16 reasonable attorneys’ fees in this case given the posture of the case when it settled should 17 not exceed $5,000 with no fee enhancement. (Id. 17:21.) 18 In support of their attorneys’ fee request, Plaintiffs submitted their billing records. 19 (See Sannipoli Decl. Ex. A.) Of the 52.2 hours billed, nearly half of that time was spent 20 on tasks related to opening the case and filing the complaint (8.1 hours), and preparing 21 the motion for attorney’s fees and reply (17.20 hours). (Id. Ex. A at pp. 1, 7.) The 22 remaining 26.9 hours were spent on such tasks as communicating with the client, the 23 court and opposing counsel, drafting discovery in anticipation of the magistrate judge’s 24 issuance of the scheduling order, preparing for the Rule 26 conference, and researching 25 various Federal Rules of Civil procedure. (Id. at pp. 1–7.) 26 JLNRA’s first complaint is that the amount of time Plaintiffs’ attorneys billed is 27 excessive given the posture of the case when it settled. Although the case settled before 28 the Rule 26 conference, the billing records reflect work related to the preparation of the 1 discovery and the Rule 26 conference. Presumably, JLRNA believes such work was 2 unnecessary. But the case was removed from state court on December 14, 2018. 3 Generally, the Rule 26 conference occurs approximately 45 days after the answer is filed. 4 Because JLRNA failed to attach a copy of its state-court answer to the Notice of 5 Removal, the Rule 26 conference was not scheduled until May 31, 2019. Nevertheless, 6 Plaintiffs’ attorneys cannot be faulted for assuming the Rule 26 meeting would be 7 scheduled within approximately 45 days of the removal and preparing accordingly. This 8 is particularly true given that by ignoring two of Plaintiffs’ settlement offers that were 9 made shortly after the case was removed, JLRNA appeared more willing to litigate the 10 case than settle. 11 Nor is the Court persuaded by JLRNA’s claims that the fees consist of improper 12 block billing or non-billable tasks. Block billing is particularly problematic when many 13 of the entries consist of large blocks of time. Here, however, only three block-billed 14 entries exceed 2 hours, which were identified above: 8.1 hours for tasks related to 15 opening the case; 7.2 hours for preparing the motion for attorney’s fees; and an estimated 16 10 hours for evaluating JLRNA’s opposition, preparing the reply and work related to 17 finalizing the settlement agreement. (Sannipoli Decl. Ex. A at pp. 1, 7.) Although these 18 three entries are large, based on the tasks described in the billing statements the Court 19 cannot conclude that the amount of time is not “reasonable.” Aside from the three larger 20 entries, there are eight other entries between 1 hour and 1.8 hours, and the remaining 21 entries are for less than an hour. Again, none of these entries fall outside the bounds of 22 reasonable given the tasks described. With respect to the alleged billing for non-billable 23 tasks, JLRNA has not provided any authority indicating that tasks such as inter-office 24 meetings and the preparation of documents for filing should not be billed. For these 25 reasons, the Court finds the amount of time Plaintiffs’ attorneys billed to the case is 26 reasonable. 27 Next, JLRNA contends Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ billable rates are excessive, and 28 JLRNA offer its own attorney and paralegal billing rates as proof. (Opp’n 16:7–17:7.) 1 || Plaintiffs, however, have demonstrated that given their expertise, their billing rates 2 ||compare favorably with other attorneys of like skill in Southern California that represent 3 || plaintiffs. (See P&A 12:15—13:11.) Additionally, as Plaintiffs point out, their higher 4 billable rates when compared to JURNA’s attorneys, reflect the fact that the case was 5 taken on a contingency-fee basis and thus the rates reflect the risk Plaintiffs’ attorneys 6 || will not recover if unsuccessful in the case. 7 Finally, Plaintiffs’ attorneys also request a multiplier of .3 based on the delay in 8 || payment, and their demonstrated expertise in this case. (P&A 18:6—-21.) JLRNA opposes 9 ||on the grounds that the issues in the case were not complex and given the posture of the 10 ||case. The Court agrees with JLURNA. 11 As discussed above, approval of Plaintiffs’ higher billing rates already reflects, in 12 || part, their expertise and the risks associated with taking this case on a contingency-fee 13 || basis, which includes the risk that the attorneys may never be compensated or will have 14 || to wait until the end of the case to be compensated. Additionally, given the posture of the 15 || case when the parties settled, there is no indication the issues in this case were complex. 16 || Accordingly, a multiplier is not warranted in this case. 17 18 ||TII. CONCLUSION & ORDER 19 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion [Doc. 15] 20 AWARDS Plaintiffs $20,378.00 in attorneys’ fees and $498.88 in expenses and 21 || costs. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 Dated: January 23, 2020 \

25 Hn. 1 omas J. Whelan 6 United States District Judge 27 28