1 FILED CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT 2 3 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA —_CW □□□□□ 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA - SOUTHERN DIVISION 10 11 || JACK GERSHFIELD, on behalf of Case No.: SACV 21-00058-CJC (ADSx) himself and all other similarly situated individuals, 13 14 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND [Dkt. 23] 15 V. '° | TEAMVIEWER US, INC., and DOES 17 || 1-100, 18 Defendant. 19 20 21 22 23 || I. INTRODUCTION 24 25 Plaintiff Jack Gershfield brings this putative class action against Defendant 26 || Teamviewer US, Inc. and unnamed Does, alleging violations of California’s Unfair 27 || Competition Law (“UCL”) and California’s Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”). (Dkt. 20 28 [First Amended Complaint, hereinafter “FAC’’]; Dkt. 1-1 at 5 [Complaint, hereinafter

1 “Compl.”].) Plaintiff initially filed his claims in state court but Defendant removed the 2 case, asserting jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). (Dkt. 1 3 [Notice of Removal].) 4 5 On September 19, 2019, Plaintiff purchased a year-long subscription to 6 Defendant’s remote-access software. (FAC ¶ 13.) To complete the purchase, Plaintiff 7 was required to provide his name as well as his credit card number, expiration date, and 8 verification code. (Id.) A year later, in September 2020, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 9 renewed his subscription without his authorization by disclosing his private credit card 10 information to Defendant’s credit card processor. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff alleges that the 11 unauthorized exfiltration and disclosure of his personal information to a third party 12 violated the CCPA. (Id. ¶¶ 19–20); see

. He also alleges that 13 Defendant violated the UCL by, among other things, unlawfully charging him for 14 services that he did not authorize, need, or want. (Id. ¶¶ 25–37.) 15 16 Plaintiff brings his claims on behalf of all similarly situated individuals. Plaintiff’s 17 original Complaint defined his UCL subclass as all of Defendant’s California customers 18 “on and after December 1, 2016[,] who were charged for [Defendant’s] software 19 subscription [and] did not want, need or use said software.” (Compl. ¶ 40.) It also 20 defined his CCPA subclass to include all of Defendant’s California customers “on and 21 after January 1, 2020[,] whose accounts, credit or debit cards were charged without 22 [their] affirmative, explicit and unequivocal authorization.” (Id. ¶ 40.) However, after 23 the Court denied Plaintiff’s previous motion to remand—concluding that the 24 preponderance of the evidence showed that the amount in controversy met CAFA’s $5 25 million requirement—Plaintiff narrowed the definition of both subclasses. The class 26 definitions now include only customers who were charged for Defendant’s software and 27 “communicated that they did not want, need, or use said software by requesting a refund 1 2 Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to remand based on his First Amended 3 Complaint. (Dkt. 11 [hereinafter “Mot.”].) For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion 4 is DENIED.1 5 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 8 A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to a federal district court 9 when the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. 10 § 1441. “CAFA provides the federal district courts with ‘original jurisdiction’ to hear a 11 ‘class action’ if the class has more than 100 members, the parties are minimally diverse, 12 and the ‘matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000.’” Standard Fire 13 Ins. Co. v. Knowles,

(2013). “Congress designed the terms of CAFA 14 specifically to permit a defendant to remove certain class or mass actions into federal 15 court . . . [and] intended CAFA to be interpreted expansively.” Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., 16 Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2015). “[N]o antiremoval presumption attends cases 17 invoking CAFA, which Congress enacted to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions 18 in federal court.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens,

, 89 19 (2014). 20 21 // 22 // 23 // 24 III. DISCUSSION 25 26

27 1 Having read and considered the papers presented by the parties, the Court finds this matter appropriate 1 Plaintiff seeks to remand this case based on the narrowed class definition contained 2 in his First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff argues that because class members now 3 include only Defendant’s customers who “disputed the charge and/or requested a refund,” 4 Defendant cannot show that the amount in controversy exceeds CAFA’s $5 million 5 requirement. Plaintiff’s argument is flawed, however, because the Court cannot consider 6 his amended class definition when determining jurisdiction over a removed action. 7 8 “[T]he circuits have unanimously and repeatedly held that whether remand is 9 proper [in CAFA cases] must be ascertained on the basis of the pleadings at the time of 10 removal.” Broadway Grill, Inc. v. Visa Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2017). Courts 11 ordinarily do not permit “post-removal amendment of the complaint to affect the 12 existence of federal jurisdiction,” especially when the amendment would alter “the make 13 up of the class.”

. 14 15 Plaintiff contends that the Court may consider his amended class definition based 16 on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Benko v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp.,

, 17 1117 (9th Cir. 2015). The Court disagrees. In Benko, the Ninth Circuit considered 18 whether the local controversy exception required remand of a case removed under 19 CAFA.

. The court held “that plaintiffs should be permitted to amend a 20 complaint after removal to clarify issues pertaining to federal jurisdiction under CAFA.” 21

It reasoned that because complaints filed in state court “may not address CAFA- 22 specific issues, such as the local controversy exception,” plaintiffs may need to amend 23 their complaint to “provide a federal court with the information required to determine 24 whether a suit is within the court’s jurisdiction under CAFA.”

Unlike the amendment 25 in Benko, which clarified a CAFA-specific issue that would not ordinarily be addressed in 26 a state court complaint, the amendment here changed the class definition—an issue 27 central to the case whether it is filed in state or federal court. As the Ninth Circuit stated 1 || class definition, add or remove defendants, or add or remove claims in such a way that 2 || would alter the essential jurisdictional analysis.” Broadway Grill,

; 3 || Richards v. Now, LLC,

, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2019) (“Broadway 4 || Grill rejected the notion that a plaintiff could [] alter the definition of the class itself as a 5 permissible clarification of federal jurisdiction under CAFA.”). Allowing such 6 |}amendment would permit “what CAFA was intended to prevent: an amendment changing 7 nature of the class to divest the federal court of jurisdiction.” Broadway Grill, 856 8 || F.3d at 1279. Accordingly, the Court may not consider Plaintiff's amended class 9 definition in determining whether remand is appropriate. 10 11 || IV. CONCLUSION 12 13 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to remand is DENIED. 14 is || DATED: April 20, 2021 Ko Lo — $F

19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28