1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 JOHN ALEXANDER V., ) Case No. EDCV 19-1473-SB (JPR) 11 ) Plaintiff, ) 12 ) ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND v. ) RECOMMENDATIONS OF U.S. 13 ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner ) 14 of Social Security, ) ) 15 Defendant. ) ) 16 17 Pursuant to

, the Court has reviewed the 18 Complaint, Joint Stipulation, Administrative Record, and all 19 other records on file as well as the Report and Recommendation of 20 U.S. Magistrate Judge. On May 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed 21 Objections to the R. & R., in which he mostly simply repeats 22 arguments from the Joint Stipulation. A few of his contentions 23 warrant discussion, however. 24 Plaintiff reiterates that the ALJ allegedly erred in 25 assessing his subjective symptoms. As the Magistrate Judge 26 found, however, the ALJ correctly discounted his subjective 27 symptom statements as inconsistent with the objective medical 28 evidence. (R. & R. at 12-13.) He does not challenge that 1 finding. 2 And the ALJ properly discounted the statements for the 3 additional reason that they were inconsistent with evidence 4 demonstrating that Plaintiff’s symptoms were relatively 5 controlled with his treatment and medication, as the Magistrate 6 Judge noted. (R. & R. at 13-14.) Plaintiff argues that there 7 was “no language specifically regarding ‘effective treatment’” in 8 the ALJ’s decision except in reference to “migraine headaches 9 being controlled by emergency medications.” (Objs. at 3.) But 10 the ALJ also noted that his pain from his hypermobility syndrome 11 and mild degenerative disc disease was “manag[ed]” “primarily 12 with non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs and physical therapy” 13 (AR 28) and cited to treatment notes (id.) indicating the 14 treatment was effective (see AR 435 (Plaintiff reporting no pain 15 and 80 percent improvement in low-back pain since last visit), 16 436 (noting that back pain was “made better” by medications)). 17 The Magistrate Judge also noted that Plaintiff worked part 18 time for about two years and stopped working “not because he 19 could no longer perform the work but because he moved away from 20 the area.” (R. & R. at 15 (citing AR 182).) Plaintiff argues 21 that this was “not an accurate depiction” of his testimony and 22 was not cited in the ALJ’s decision. (Objs. at 3.) Plaintiff 23 correctly notes that he testified that he could not resume work 24 after leaving Merced because of an “exacerbation of symptoms.” 25 (Id. (citing AR 182).) But he testified that he stopped working 26 because he moved, not because of any of his impairments. (AR 27 182.) The Magistrate Judge accurately depicted the record. In 28 any event, her discussion of Plaintiff’s part-time work was in 1 the context of her assessment of the ALJ’s reliance on his daily 2 activities to discount his testimony. (R. & R. at 15.) But she 3 rejected that reasoning and instead recommended affirming based 4 on the ALJ’s findings that his complaints were inconsistent with 5 his effective treatment and with the objective evidence. (R. & 6 R. at 16.) She did not err. 7 Plaintiff also repeats his arguments that the ALJ erred in 8 evaluating the medical-opinion evidence. First, he claims that 9 the ALJ “only provided one reason to discredit” Dr. Fraley’s 10 opinions — that his letter was drafted by Plaintiff. (Objs. at 11 3.) To start, as the Magistrate Judge explained (R. & R. at 25), 12 most of the opinions expressed in Dr. Fraley’s letter were not 13 his opinions at all; they were Plaintiff’s own opinions of his 14 limitations. And the ALJ did not discount them solely because 15 Plaintiff wrote the letter. The Magistrate Judge correctly noted 16 that the ALJ also found the opined limitations “rather extreme” 17 and “not supported by the medical evidence of record or by Dr. 18 Fraley’s own treatment” of Plaintiff. (Id. (citing AR 30).) 19 Plaintiff states that Dr. Fraley’s records indicate that 20 Plaintiff reported “very disturbed sleep patterns,” “abdominal 21 discomfort,” migraines that “were not at a goal level,” fatigue, 22 “generalized anxiety disorder,” and “increased range of joint 23 movement.” (Objs. at 4 (citing AR 557-58, 562-63).) But as 24 previously discussed, the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff’s 25 subjective symptom statements. Moreover, half of the records on 26 which Plaintiff relies are not from Dr. Fraley at all. (See AR 27 557-58 (records of Dr. Talha Memon noting that other than 28 “symptoms of hypersomnolence,” diagnosis of which was “not 1 conclusive,” all exam results were normal).) Finally, the 2 limitations in Dr. Fraley’s letter are for the most part 3 unrelated to the sleep and other symptoms on which Plaintiff 4 relies. 5 Plaintiff also complains, again, that remand is warranted 6 because the ALJ did not specifically address all the factors in 7

in assessing the various doctors’ opinions. 8 (Objs. at 3-4.) But as the Magistrate Judge noted (see R. & R. 9 at 26 (citing AR 30)), she was not required to do so. 10 The Magistrate Judge also correctly found that the ALJ did 11 not err in giving little weight to Dr. Belen’s opinion that 12 Plaintiff had moderate limitations in social functioning. (R. & 13 R. at 24-25; see AR 29.) He argues that Dr. Belen’s opinion was 14 properly based on taking his history; observing his mood to be 15 anxious, depressed, and irritable; and diagnosing him with a mood 16 disorder. (Objs. at 4.) But the opinion did not state that it 17 was based on any of those things or explain its inconsistency 18 with the otherwise mostly normal findings. (AR 522.) And the 19 ALJ did not “solely substitute[] her own non-medical judgment” 20 for Dr. Belen’s opinion, as Plaintiff argues (Objs. at 4); she 21 relied on psychologist Paula Kresser’s contrary opinion, which 22 she partially credited (R. & R. at 24 (citing AR 29)). 23 Plaintiff also reiterates his argument that remand is 24 warranted because the ALJ did not consider a 2006 letter written 25 by Dr. Spencer opining that he needed certain accommodations at 26 school or the impact of his childhood limitations in accordance 27 with SSR 11-2p. (Objs. at 5-6.) To start, the SSR 11-2p issue 28 was likely forfeited because Plaintiff — who was represented by 1 counsel before the ALJ and the Appeals Council — never raised it 2 at the administrative level, as the Magistrate Judge noted. (R. 3 & R. at 27-28 (citing AR 172-208 (hearing transcript), 337-39 4 (Request for Review of Hearing Decision)); see Shaibi v. 5 Berryhill,

(9th Cir. 2018) (as amended). 6 Plaintiff states that the issue “was argued” (Objs. at 5), but he 7 has provided no citation or other support for this assertion. He 8 seems to contend that when an ALJ errs the issue can’t be 9 forfeited (see id. at 5-6), but if forfeiture applied only when 10 there was no error, the principle would be meaningless. 11 In any event, the ALJ considered more recent medical records 12 of treatment for the same conditions and Plaintiff’s hearing 13 testimony about his symptoms and accommodation needs now and 14 while in school, as the Magistrate Judge noted. (R. & R. at 27- 15 29 (citing AR 180, 187).) She correctly found that the 16 additional evidence submitted to the Appeals Council was no more 17 probative than the evidence the ALJ had already considered and 18 that Plaintiff’s school-attendance problems and the 19 accommodations described in Dr. Spencer’s letter were not the 20 type of “serious educational difficulties” contemplated by SSR 21 11-2p. See James S.C. v. Saul, No. CV 19-5991-KS,

3491565, at *9 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2020) (noting that SSR 11-2p 23 did not apply because accommodations plaintiff received for 24 “miss[ing] a lot of school” based on “health issues” were not for 25 “serious educational difficulties”). Plaintiff argues that James 26 S.C. is distinguishable on various grounds (Objs. at 6), but the 27 differences between the two cases did not transform Plaintiff’s 28 school-attendance problems and the accommodations described in 1 |} Dr. Spencer’s letter into the type of serious educational 2\ difficulties contemplated by SSR 11-2p. There was no error. 3 Finally, the Magistrate Judge correctly found that Plaintiff 4] forfeited his claim that the ALJ’s finding that he could perform 5] certain jobs conflicted with the DOT descriptions of those jobs. 61 Citing Sims v. Apfel,

(2000), he argues that “[t]lhere is no forfeiture of the right to raise conflicts with 8 || the DOT.” (Objs. at 6.) But Sims specifically noted that 9||“[w]hether a claimant must exhaust issues before the ALJ is not 10 | before us.”

. Here, Plaintiff did not present 11] his argument concerning an alleged conflict between the RFC’s 12 | noise limitation and the DOT job descriptions to the ALJ or the 13 | Appeals Council. Therefore, Sims does not control. See Shaibi, 14]

(distinguishing Sims on that basis). In any 15 | event, as the Magistrate Judge explained, there was no apparent 16 | conflict with the DOT, and the ALJ was not required to inquire 17 | further. (R. & R. at 33.) 18 Having reviewed de novo those portions of the R. & R. to 19 which Plaintiff objects, the Court accepts the findings and 20 || recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED 21] that judgment be entered affirming the Commissioner’s decision dismissing this action with prejudice. 23 DATED: June 15, 2021 oS 24 HON. STANLEY BLUMENFELD, 25 U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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