JT Legal Group, APC v. Kashani Law, P.C.
JT Legal Group, APC v. Kashani Law, P.C.
Trial Court Opinion
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44 55 66 77 United States District Court 88 Central District of California 99 1100 1111 JT LEGAL GROUP, APC, Case No. 2:19-cv-10361-ODW (PLAx)
1122 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR 1133 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMANDING ACTION [49][52] 1144 KASHANI LAW, P.C., et al.,
1155 Defendants.
1166 1177 I. INTRODUCTION 1188 Plaintiff JT Legal Group, APC, initiated this action against its “competitor” 1199 Payton Kashani; his law firm Kashani Law, P.C.; and JT Legal’s former employees 2200 Fernando Vega and Susan Ibeth Zamora Tinti (collectively, “Defendants”). (First 2211 Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 23.) JT Legal claims that Vega and Tinti left the law 2222 firm and, before their departure, they stole client lists, files, and other materials for 2233 Kashani’s benefit. Before the Court are Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment 2244 on all claims. (Kashani & Tinti MSJ (“TMSJ”), ECF No. 49; Kashani Law & Vega 2255 MSJ (“VMSJ”), ECF No. 52.) For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS in 2266 part Defendants’ Motions and REMANDS this action to state court.1 2277
2288 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motions, the Court deemed the matters appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 II. BACKGROUND2 2 Vega worked at JT Legal from January 21, 2019, to September 11, 2019. 3 (VSUF 3.) Prior to his employment at JT Legal, Vega possessed Jessica Ferrer’s 4 contact information. (VSUF 4.) In May 2019, Vega learned that Ferrer and her 5 friend, Samantha Dias, were in a car accident. (VSUF 5.) Both Ferrer and Dias 6 retained JT Legal as their legal representative after speaking with Vega. (VSUF 6.) 7 Vega managed Ferrer’s and Dias’s cases until he left JT Legal to go work for Kashani 8 Law. (VSUF 7, 14.) After Vega left JT Legal, Ferrer and Dias dropped JT Legal as 9 their counsel and retained Kashani Law. (See TSUF 1; VSUF 1.) JT Legal claims 10 that Ferrer and Dias went to Kashani Law because Defendants misappropriated its 11 lists of clients and their files. (TSUF 2; VSUF 2.) 12 On December 3, 2019, JT Legal initiated this action in the Superior Court of 13 California, County of Los Angeles; Defendants removed to this Court. (Notice of 14 Removal (“NOR”), ECF No. 1.) JT Legal asserts claims against Vega, Tinti (another 15 former employee), Kashani, and Kashani Law for: (1) misappropriation of trade 16 secrets; (2) unfair competition; (3) intentional interference with prospective economic 17 advantage; (4) intentional interference with contractual relations; (5) trespass against 18 chattels; and (6) violation of the Stored Communications Act. (See FAC.) 19 Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims; JT Legal does not oppose 20 Kashani and Tinti’s MSJ. (See Notice of Pl.’s Failure to Oppose, ECF No. 50.) 21 JT Legal does oppose Kashani Law and Vega’s MSJ, which is fully briefed. (See 22 Opp’n, ECF No. 53; Reply, ECF No. 59.) 23 24 2 JT Legal did not oppose Kashani and Tinti’s MSJ and failed to file a Statement of Genuine 25 Disputes in response to Vega and Kashani Law’s MSJ as required by Local Rule 56-2. As a result, the Court may deem all of Defendants’ undisputed facts uncontroverted if they are supported by 26 admissible evidence. See Werner v. Evolve Media, LLC, No. 2:18-cv-7188-VAP (SKx),
2020 WL 3213808, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2020); C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-3. Defendants filed a Statement of 27 Uncontroverted Facts and support their facts with admissible evidence. (See Kashani & Tinti SUF 28 (“TSUF”), ECF No. 49-1; Vega & Kashani Law SUF (“VSUF”), ECF No. 52-1.) Therefore, the Court takes Defendants’ facts as uncontroverted. 1 III. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 3 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 4 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Courts must view the facts and draw reasonable 5 inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 6
550 U.S. 372, 378(2007). A disputed fact is “material” where the resolution of that 7 fact might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and the dispute is 8 “genuine” where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 9 the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248(1986). 10 Conclusory or speculative testimony in affidavits is insufficient to raise genuine issues 11 of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. GTE Corp.,
594 F.2d 12 730, 738(9th Cir. 1979). Moreover, though the Court may not weigh conflicting 13 evidence or make credibility determinations, there must be more than a mere scintilla 14 of contradictory evidence to survive summary judgment. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 15
198 F.3d 1130, 1134(9th Cir. 2000). 16 Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party cannot simply 17 rest on the pleadings or argue that any disagreement or “metaphysical doubt” about a 18 material issue of fact precludes summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 19
477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 20
475 U.S. 574, 586(1986); Cal. Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan 21 Ceramics, Inc.,
818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987). Nor will uncorroborated 22 allegations and “self-serving testimony” create a genuine issue of material fact. 23 Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc.,
281 F.3d 1054, 1061(9th Cir. 2002). The Court 24 should grant summary judgment against a party who fails to demonstrate facts 25 sufficient to establish an element essential to his case when that party will ultimately 26 bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322. 27 Pursuant to the Local Rules, parties moving for summary judgment must file a 28 proposed “Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law” that sets out 1 “the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine dispute.” 2 C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-1. A party opposing the motion must file a “Statement of Genuine 3 Disputes” setting forth all material facts as to which it contends there exists a genuine 4 dispute. C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-2. “[T]he Court may assume that material facts as claimed 5 and adequately supported by the moving party are admitted to exist without 6 controversy except to the extent that such material facts are (a) included in the 7 ‘Statement of Genuine Disputes’ and (b) controverted by declaration or other written 8 evidence filed in opposition to the motion.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-3. 9 IV. DISCUSSION 10 As the determination of JT Legal’s sole federal law claim (violation of the 11 Stored Communications Act) is dispositive, the Court first addresses this claim. 12 A. Violation of the Stored Communications Act 13 Defendants contend that JT Legal has no evidence to support its claim that 14 Defendants violated the Stored Communications Act,
18 U.S.C. § 2701. (TMSJ 6; 15 VMSJ 10–11.) Defendants are correct—JT Legal has affirmatively abandoned this 16 claim. (See Opp’n 3.) JT Legal did not file an opposition to Tinti and Kashani’s MSJ. 17 And in its opposition to Vega and Kashani Law’s MSJ, JT Legal asserts that the FAC 18 “should have never included” the federal claim. (See
id.(explaining that the federal 19 claim was asserted in error due to miscommunication between JT Legal and its 20 counsel).) To be clear, JT Legal states unequivocally in its opposition that it “believes 21 this [C]ourt should grant Defendants’ [Motions] to the extent there are federal 22 claims.” (Id.) 23 In light of JT Legal’s non-opposition and its affirmative request for entry of 24 summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on this claim, the Court GRANTS 25 Defendants’ Motions to the extent they seek judgment on the claim for violation of the 26 Stored Communications Act. 27 28 1 B. Remand 2 JT Legal claims that it never intended to state a federal claim and wanted to 3 dismiss the claim earlier in the proceeding; however, Defendants would not stipulate 4 to a voluntary dismissal. (See id.) JT Legal requests that the Court remand the 5 remaining state law claims to state court. Defendants oppose the request. (Reply 6 7–9.) 7 A district court “‘may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction’ if it ‘has 8 dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’” Sanford v. 9 MemberWorks, Inc.,
625 F.3d 550, 561(9th Cir. 2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. 10 § 1367(c)(3)). “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated 11 before trial, the balance of factors [judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and 12 comity] . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining 13 state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,
484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); 14 Wade v. Reg’l Credit Ass’n,
87 F.3d 1098, 1101(9th Cir. 1996) (“Where a district 15 court dismisses a federal claim, leaving only state claims for resolution, it should 16 decline jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them without prejudice.”). 17 JT Legal initiated this action in state court, and the sole basis for Defendants’ 18 removal was federal question jurisdiction based on the Stored Communications Act. 19 (See NOR 2.) The Court has dismissed that claim; thus, federal question jurisdiction 20 no longer exists. Further, diversity jurisdiction is not available, as JT Legal and 21 Defendants are citizens of California. (See FAC ¶¶ 5–16.) 22 After carefully considering the Carnegie-Mellon factors, the Court declines to 23 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. The 24 Carnegie-Mellon factors, particularly comity and the economic use of federal court 25 resources, favor litigation of this state-law matter in state court rather than federal 26 court. 27 Accordingly, the Court REMANDS this action to the Superior Court of 28 California, County of Los Angeles. 1 Vv. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part Defendants’ Motions 3 || for Summary Judgment with respect to JT Legal’s claim for violation of the Stored Communication Act. (ECF Nos. 49, 52.) The Court DENIES as moot the remainder 5 || of Defendants’ Motions. The Court REMANDS this action to the Superior Court of 6 || California, County of Los Angeles, Stanley Mosk Courthouse, 111 N. Hill Street, Los 7|| Angeles, California 90012, Case Number 19STCV43351. The Court will issue 8 | judgment. 9 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 12 June 30, 2021 ~~ . 13 es Bf 14 Celie
15 OTIS D. GHT, II UNITED STATESDISTRICT JUDGE
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Reference
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