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8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California 10

11 HOVSEP HAGOPIAN, et al., Case № 2:21-cv-02248-ODW (JDEx)

12 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING

13 v. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [27] 14 TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC., et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Plaintiff Hovsep Hagopian initiated this putative class action based on his 20 allegations the 2019 Lexus LC is equipped with a defective brake system that 21 “generates an extremely loud squealing noise” when the brakes are engaged. (First 22 Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 21.) Defendants Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A, Inc., 23 (“TMS”), and Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc. 24 (“TEMA”), collectively, (“Toyota”) move to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Mot. 25 to Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF No. 27.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court 26 GRANTS Toyota’s Motion.1 27 1 After carefully considering the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the 28 matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 Hagopian leased a 2019 Lexus LC (the “Vehicle”), which is equipped with a 3 “high-friction” “high-performance” brake system. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 6.) Hagopian claims the 4 Vehicle “contain[s] one or more design and/or manufacturing defects, including but 5 not limited to defects contained in the . . . brakes that cause a loud squealing noise 6 when the brakes are applied.” (Id. ¶ 25.) 7 Based on these allegations Hagopian asserts seven claims: (1) breach of express 8 warranty; (2) breach of implied warranty; (3) breach of warranty under the 9 Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; (4) breach of warranty under the 10 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; (5) violations of California Business and Professions 11 Code section 17200; (6) violations of California Business and Professions Code 12 section 17500; and (7) nuisance. (FAC ¶¶ 66–166.) 13 III. LEGAL STANDARD 14 A court may dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to 16 support an otherwise cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 17

(9th Cir. 1988). To survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need 18 only satisfy the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—“a short and 19 plain statement of the claim.” Porter v. Jones,

(9th Cir. 2003). But 20 factual “allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 21 level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). That is, the complaint 22 must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that 23 is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (internal 24 quotation marks omitted). Testing the plausibility standard is a “context-specific task 25 that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 26 sense.”

. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court is generally limited to the 27 pleadings and must construe all “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as 28 true and . . . in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee, 250 F.3d at 679. 1 However, a court need not blindly accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted 2 deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 3

(9th Cir. 2001). 4 Where a district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should generally provide 5 leave to amend unless “it is clear . . . the complaint could not be saved by any 6 amendment.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,

, 1034 7 (9th Cir. 2008); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (“The court should freely give leave when 8 justice so requires”). 9 IV. DISCUSSION 10 Hagopian claims that the high-performance brake system in the Vehicle is 11 defective. (FAC ¶ 25.) In its Motion to Dismiss, Toyota argues that Hagopian’s entire 12 action revolves around one vague allegation—the Vehicle “contains one or more 13 design and/or manufacturing defects . . . that cause a loud squealing noise when the 14 brakes are applied.” (Mot. 4–5 (quoting FAC ¶ 25).) Toyota contends that Hagopian’s 15 FAC is deficient under Rule 8(a)(2) because Hagopian fails to include facts regarding 16 “any specific design feature, component, mechanism, or function” that renders the 17 Vehicle defective. (Id.) 18 Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain a “short and plain statement of the 19 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “The level of factual specificity 20 necessary to plead claims based on product defects presents a difficult question that 21 the Ninth Circuit has not squarely addressed, and on which district courts have not 22 reached consensus.” Clark v. Am. Honda Motor Co., No. CV 20-03147 AB (MRWx), 23

, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2021). However, “a complaint must 24 contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the 25 opposing party to defend itself effectively, and those allegations must plausibly 26 suggest an entitlement to relief.”

(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 27 “In the context of product defect claims, district courts in the Ninth Circuit have often 28 held that a complaint provides fair notice of the defect if it (1) identifies the particular 1 part or system affected by the defect, and (2) describes the problems allegedly caused 2 by the defect.”

(collecting cases). Describing only the effects of an alleged defect 3 is insufficient. See DeCoteau v. FCA US LLC, No. 2:15-cv-00020-MCE-EFB, 4

, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2015). 5 For example in Clark,

, the court found allegations that 6 “various systems and components” in a vehicle were defective satisfied Rule 8(a)(2) 7 because the plaintiffs alleged those systems and components caused “sudden, 8 unintended and uncontrollable deceleration, engine stalls, hesitation upon depressing 9 the gas pedal, abrupt shutdowns and shifts into neutral while driving.” The plaintiffs 10 in Clark also alleged “[the] issues [were] the result of a miscommunication among the 11 computers and software which controll[ed] the engine, throttle[,] and transmission.” 12

Thus, the Court held the plaintiffs “sufficiently identified the components and 13 systems involved in the alleged defect, and the resulting symptoms of the defect,” 14 which satisfied Rule 8.

15 Here, in contrast, Hagopian’s vague allegations fail to sufficiently identify the 16 components and systems involved and the resulting symptoms of the purported defect. 17 Hagopian repeatedly alleges that the Vehicle “contains one or more design and/or 18 manufacturing defects, including but not limited to . . . brakes that cause a loud 19 squealing noise when the brakes are applied.” (FAC ¶ 25.) This fails to sufficiently 20 identify the component of the brake system that is purportedly defective and merely 21 alleges the effect of the supposed defect (i.e., loud noise). Moreover, Hagopian’s 22 allegations that the brake noise is a result of a defect is not plausible. In the FAC, 23 Hagopian acknowledges that Toyota’s website contains a disclosure stating “brake 24 noise/squeal may result due to the inherent characteristic of the materials and the 25 design of the brake pads.” (Id. ¶ 4.) Thus, it is implausible that a known and 26 disclosed characteristic of the type of high-friction, high-performance brakes used in 27 Hagopian’s Vehicle rendered the brake system defective. Therefore, the Court finds 28 that Hagopian’s allegations fail to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). 1 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Toyota’s Motion and DISMISSES 2 || Hagopian’s claims with leave to amend. 3 Vv. CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Toyota’s Motion. (ECF 5 || No. 27.) If Hagopian chooses to file a second amended complaint (“SAC”), he must 6 || do so no later than twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order. If Hagopian files a SAC, Toyota must file its response no later than fourteen (14) days from the 8 | date of the SAC filing. Hagopian’s failure to file a SAC will convert this dismissal to 9 || one with prejudice. 10 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 13 August 6, 2021 14 A 4 biediad 16 OTIS D. WRIGHT, II 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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