1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 SOUTHERN DIVISION 11 ) 12 OMID NASERI, individually and on ) Case No.: SACV 21-01084-CJC (KESx) ) 13 behalf of others similarly situated, ) ) 14 ) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S Plaintiff, ) MOTION TO REMAND [Dkt. 15] AND 15 ) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION v. ) TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST 16 ) AMENDED COMPLAINT [Dkt. 8] ) WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 17 GREENFIELD WORLD TRADE, INC. ) d/b/a THE LEGACY COMPANIES, ) 18 ) ) 19 Defendant. ) ) 20 ) 21 22 I. INTRODUCTION 23 24 In this case, Plaintiff Omid Naseri alleges that Defendant Greenfield World Trade, 25 Inc. violated the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly”), the Consumer 26 Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), and California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) by 27 deceiving customers into thinking they had to register a purchased product in order for 1 hereinafter “FAC”].) Before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Dkt. 15 2 [hereinafter “MTR”] and Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 8). For the following 3 reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to remand is DENIED and Defendant’s motion to dismiss is 4 GRANTED.1 5 6 II. BACKGROUND 7 8 Plaintiff bought a blender Defendant manufactures. (FAC ¶¶ 17, 22.) One of the 9 reasons Plaintiff bought Defendant’s blender is because it had an “express 2-year 10 warranty.” (Id. ¶ 20.) When Plaintiff read the user manual, however, he got the 11 impression that the express warranty only applied if Plaintiff registered the product. (Id. 12 ¶¶ 23–25.) To register, a person is required to enter his name, email, phone number, 13 address, model number, purchase location, and purchase date. (Id. ¶ 27.) In fact, 14 registration was not required for the warranty to be valid. (See id. ¶¶ 28–29.) Neither the 15 online registration form nor the user manual made this clear. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that 16 Defendant uses the personal information it collects from registration “for its own business 17 and marketing purposes and for its own economic benefit,” and intends for the 18 registration process to “have a chilling effect on warranty claims, preventing customers 19 who have not registered, or who choose not to register their warranties from making 20 warranty claims, thereby saving Defendant money in warranty repair and administration 21 costs.” (Id. ¶¶ 30–31.) 22 23 // 24 // 25 // 26

27 1 Having read and considered the papers presented by the parties, the Court finds these matters 1 III. MOTION TO REMAND 2 3 Defendant removed this case to federal court, asserting that the Court has CAFA 4 jurisdiction. Plaintiff moves to remand, but does not argue that this Court lacks CAFA 5 jurisdiction. Rather, Plaintiff argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 6 claims for equitable relief under the UCL and CLRA because “Defendant has failed to 7 demonstrate or even allege that Plaintiff’s legal remedy sought is inadequate.” (MTR at 8 3.) 9 10 Plaintiff relies on Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp.,

(9th Cir. 2020). 11 But Sonner did not hold that failure to allege an inadequate legal remedy deprives a court 12 of subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, Sonner held that failure to allege an inadequate 13 legal remedy precludes a plaintiff from recovering at all.

(“[W]e hold 14 that a federal court must apply traditional equitable principles before awarding restitution 15 under the UCL and CLRA.”);

(“Under these principles, Sonner must establish 16 that she lacks an adequate remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for past 17 harm under the UCL and CLRA.”). Sonner’s conclusion—that the district court did not 18 err in dismissing Sonner’s claims for equitable restitution under the UCL and CLRA 19 because Sonner failed to establish that she lacked an adequate remedy at law—shows that 20 federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over equitable claims under the UCL and CLRA. 21 See

Plaintiff’s motion to remand these claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 22 under Sonner is therefore DENIED. 23 24 IV. MOTION TO DISMISS 25 26 Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to sue under the Song-Beverly Act, 27 the CLRA, and the UCL because Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege he was injured by 1 Under all three statutes, only someone who has been damaged by the failure to 2 comply with the statute may bring suit. Under the Song-Beverly Act, only a buyer of 3 consumer goods “who is damaged by a failure to comply with any obligation under this 4 chapter or under an implied or express warranty or service contract may bring an action 5 for the recovery of damages and other legal and equitable relief.” Cal. Civ. Code 6 § 1794(a) (emphasis added). Under the CLRA, “[a]ny consumer who suffers any damage 7 as a result of the use or employment by any person of a method, act, or practice declared 8 to be unlawful by Section 1770 may bring an action against that person.” Cal. Civ. Code 9 § 1780 (emphasis added). And under the UCL, a plaintiff has standing to bring an action 10 only if he has “suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the 11 unfair competition.”

. To meet this standing 12 requirement, Plaintiffs must: “(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property 13 sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that the 14 economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or false 15 advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.” Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 16

(2013), disapproved of on other grounds by Yvanova v. New 17 Century Mortg. Corp.,

(2016). 18 19 Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege he has been damaged under any of these 20 statutes. Plaintiff alleges that he has been damaged because he would not have bought 21 the blender, or would have paid less for it, “[h]ad the Product’s exterior packing disclosed 22 that the warranty was contingent on registration by Plaintiff providing [ ] personal 23 information.” (FAC ¶ 33.) But according to Plaintiff, the warranty was not contingent 24 on registration—he just briefly thought it was. (See

¶¶ 28–29.) Plaintiff also alleges 25 that “[c]lass members who did provide their personal information have been damaged by 26 being forced to relinquish their personal information based on Defendant’s statutorily 27 mandated omissions.” (FAC ¶ 67.) But even if this were a cognizable injury, Plaintiff 1 || does not allege that he himself registered his product and provided personal information 2 ||to Defendant. 3 4 “Leave to amend should be granted unless the district court ‘determines that the 5 pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Knappenberger v. 6 || City of Phoenix,

(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lopez v. Smith,

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). The Court has doubts that Plaintiff could cure the 8 || defects the Court identified by alleging additional facts. It appears that the warranty on 9 || Plaintiff's blender was not contingent on registration, so the Court does not understand 10 || how Plaintiff could have been damaged. Moreover, it appears that Plaintiff did not 11 register his product, so the Court does not understand how he could have been damaged 12 || by providing personal information either. Nevertheless, the Court will give Plaintiff 13 || another opportunity to state a viable claim. But in any amended pleading, Plaintiff needs 14 make his theory of how he was damaged very clear. 15 16 |} V. CONCLUSION 17 18 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to remand is DENIED and 19 || Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is GRANTED. 20 || Plaintiff's clams are DISMISSED WITH FOURTEEN DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND. 21 2 DATED: August 10, 2021 Ko je 23 Of / 24 CORMAC J. CARNEY 25 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 26 27 28