1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 JESUS ALBERTO TABARES, Case No. 8:21-cv-01498-JWH (GJS) 11 Petitioner 12 v. ORDER: DISMISSING DUPLICATIVE ACTION; AND 13 RAYMOND MADDEN, DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 14 Respondent. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 On August 19, 2021, Petitioner filed a

habeas petition in the 2 United States District Court for the Southern District of California, which was 3 assigned Case No. 2:21-cv-1492-JLS-KSC. The petition challenged Petitioner’s 4 conviction in Orange County Superior Court Case No. 17NF3549 and raised two 5 habeas grounds. On August 23, 2021, the Southern District transferred the petition 6 to this District, where it was assigned Case No. 8:21-cv-01393-JWH (GJS) (the 7 “Pending 1393 Action”). On August 26, 2021, the Court ordered that the petition in 8 the Pending 1393 Action be served upon Respondent and directed a response. 9 On September 1, 2021, after his prior habeas petition was transferred, 10 Petitioner filed another Section 2254 habeas petition in the Southern District, which 11 was assigned Case No. 3:21-cv-1555-BAS-RBM. Like the Pending 1393 Action 12 petition, the petition in this second action challenged Petitioner’s conviction in 13 Orange County Superior Court Case No. 17NF3549 and raised the exact same two 14 habeas grounds; in fact, the two petitions are identical except for their signature 15 dates. On September 8, 2021, the Southern District transferred the petition in the 16 second action to this District, and it initiated this action, i.e., Case 17 No. 8:21-cv-01498-JWH (GJS) (the “Second-Filed Action”). 18 Thus, as of the present date, Petitioner has two identical Section 2254 habeas 19 actions pending in this District—the Pending 1393 Petition Action and this Second- 20 Filed Action. The Pending 1393 Petition Action is proceeding, and Respondent has 21 been served with process in that case and will be responding. 22 The resources of the Court and the litigants before it are not endless and 23 should not be expended in a duplicative manner for no good reason. There is no 24 tenable reason for the Court to consider and rule on the same claims through two 25 separate actions. There also is no tenable reason for Respondent to be forced to 26 submit filings in two separate, but duplicative, cases (with an attendant cost and 27 duplication of effort). There simply is no legitimate reason for parallel, identical 28 cases to proceed based on what is a single two-pronged Section 2254 habeas attack 1 on a state court conviction, when proceeding with the first-filed case—the Pending 2 1393 Petition Action—will afford Petitioner a full and fair opportunity for the 3 consideration of his habeas claims. 4 Federal courts “retain broad powers to prevent duplicative or unnecessary 5 litigation.” Slack v. McDaniel,

(2000); see also Landis v. N. Am. 6 Co.,

(1936) (every federal court has the inherent power “to 7 control disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for 8 itself, for counsel, and for litigants”). “Plaintiffs generally have ‘no right to 9 maintain two separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in 10 the same court and against the same defendant.’” Adams v. Calif. Dep’t of Health 11 Services,

, 688 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) (affirming the 12 dismissal of a later-filed duplicative lawsuit). A plaintiff must bring one action 13 against a party or privies relating to the same transaction or event. Id. at 693. 14 “District courts retain broad discretion to control their dockets and ‘[i]n the exercise 15 of that power they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate, . . . 16 dismissal.’” Id. at 688 (citation omitted). “After weighing the equities of the case, 17 the district court may exercise its discretion to dismiss a duplicative later-filed 18 action.” Id.; see also M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist.,

(9th Cir. 19 2012) (“a district court has broad discretion to control its own docket, and that 20 includes the power to dismiss duplicative claims”); Shappell v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 21 No. 10-cv-03020-MCE-EFB,

, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2011) 22 (dismissing second of two separate, but identical, actions, observing that “[t]he 23 inherent power to manage the Court’s own docket permits it to order dismissal of 24 duplicative claims in order to foster judicial economy and the ‘comprehensive 25 disposal of litigation’”) (citation omitted). 26 There is no justification for allowing two separate cases to proceed based on 27 what plainly is a single Section 2254 attack on Petitioner’s state court conviction. In 28 the interests of judicial economy, this action will be dismissed on the ground that it 1 || is duplicative of the parties and claims and matters at issue in the Pending 1393 2 || Petition Action.! 3 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: this action is dismissed, without 4 || prejudice, on the ground that it is duplicative of a pending action; and Judgment 5 || shall be entered dismissing this action without prejudice. 6 In addition, pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 7 || Cases in the United States District Courts, the Court has considered whether a 8 || certificate of appealability is warranted. See

(c)(2); Slack v. 9 || McDaniel,

(2000). The Court concludes that a certificate of 10 || appealability is unwarranted, and thus, a certificate of appealability is DENIED. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 YW 13 || DATED: September 23, 2021 “4 14 JOHN W.HOLCOMB 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

16 Presented by:

I8 GAIL J. STANDISH 19 || UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 || | The Court concludes that dismissal of this duplicative case is more appropriate than joinder 07 or consolidation of the two actions. This duplicative second action should never have been instituted by Petitioner in the first instance. By doing so, he has created unnecessary work for two 28 || separate federal courts, and dismissing this action is the most efficient way in which to resolve this unwarranted situation.