1 2 3 4 JS-6 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 JOSCELYN RAMOS et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-07382-MCS-AFM 11 Plaintiffs, ORDER REMANDING CASE 12

13 v.

14 FCA US LLC et al., 15 Defendants. 16

17 18 Plaintiffs Joscelyn Ramos and Karla Henriquez question the Court’s subject- 19 matter jurisdiction over this matter. (Joint Rule 26(f) Report 3, ECF No. 12.) The Court 20 ordered the parties to brief whether exercise of diversity jurisdiction is appropriate given 21 the Court’s doubts about the amount in controversy. (Order Requiring Briefing, ECF 22 No. 14.) Defendant FCA US LLC submitted a brief; Plaintiffs did not. (Def.’s Br., ECF 23 No. 18.) 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 This is a case brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“SBA”). 26 Plaintiffs leased a 2020 Jeep Wrangler (the “Vehicle”) in November 2019. The Vehicle 27 exhibited defects. Defendant was unable to timely rectify the defects and refused to 28 replace the Vehicle or provide restitution. The Complaint seeks damages, replacement 1 or restitution, incidental and consequential damages, a civil penalty, costs of suit and 2 reasonable fees, and prejudgment interest. Plaintiffs submit that the amount in 3 controversy exceeds $25,000. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1-1.) 4 Plaintiffs initiated this proceeding in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, No. 5 21STCV24116. Asserting diversity jurisdiction, Defendant removed the case to this 6 Court. (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.) 7 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 8 A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 9 Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, having subject-matter jurisdiction only 10 over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life 11 Ins. Co. of Am.,

(1994). A defendant may remove a civil action in 12 state court to federal court if the federal court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 13 § 1441(a). Federal courts have original jurisdiction where an action arises under federal 14 law or where each plaintiff’s citizenship is diverse from each defendant’s citizenship 15 and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Id. §§ 1331, 1332(a). 16 There is a “strong presumption” against removal jurisdiction, and the removing 17 party bears the burden of proving that removal is proper. Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1992). “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as 19 to the right of removal in the first instance.”

20 B. Amount in Controversy 21 To invoke diversity jurisdiction, a party must demonstrate there is complete 22 diversity of citizenship between the parties and that the amount in controversy exceeds 23 the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.

(a). 24 “[W]here it is unclear or ambiguous from the face of a state-court complaint whether 25 the requisite amount in controversy is pled,” the removing defendant must establish by 26 a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy “more likely than not” 27 exceeds $75,000. Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp.,

(9th Cir. 28 2007); Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co.,

(9th Cir. 1996). 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 The amount in controversy is not clear from the face of the Complaint: Plaintiffs 3 expressly plead for damages in excess of $25,000, but the prayer for relief does not 4 indicate whether the total amount they seek exceeds $75,000. (Compl. ¶¶ 15, Prayer.) 5 Cf. Schneider v. Ford Motor Co.,

, 913 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“[T]he 6 Complaint alleges that Plaintiff suffered damages in a sum to be proven at trial in an 7 amount that is not less than $25,001.00. Hence, while Plaintiff seeks restitution for the 8 value of the car, civil penalties, and attorneys’ fees and costs, it is unclear whether all 9 these damages are subsumed within the request for $25,001.” (internal quotation marks 10 and citation omitted)). Thus, Defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence 11 that the amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds $75,000. 12 A. Damages 13 Actual damages under the SBA are “equal to the actual price paid or payable by 14 the buyer,” minus the reduction in value “directly attributable to use by the buyer.” Cal. 15 Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B)–(C). The reduction is based on miles driven before the 16 first attempted repair of the defect. Id. 17 Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs’ actual damages are $44,219.35. (Def.’s Br. 13.) 18 Defendant presents insufficient support for its calculation. The sole evidence Defendant 19 presents is a declaration of counsel attaching a payoff quote. (Proudfoot Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. 20 4, ECF No. 18-1.) Counsel does not support his estimation of the “total amount due to 21 Plaintiffs” of $9,839.40 with any substantiating evidence, (Proudfoot Decl. ¶ 6), and 22 Defendant fails to explain or present evidence supporting the other components of its 23 damages calculation. (See Def.’s Br. 13 (providing line items for down payment, 24 negative equity, unpaid late charges, scheduled payments, and “DMV”).) Nor does 25 Defendant provide an estimation of the reduction in value attributable to use by the 26 buyer, such as facts establishing “the number of miles traveled . . . prior to the time the 27 buyer first delivered the vehicle” for repair.

(d)(2)(C). The 28 Court rejects Defendant’s argument that the mileage offset should be disregarded in the 1 jurisdictional evaluation. (Def.’s Br. 17–19.) See D’Amico v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 2 20-2985-CJC (JCx),

, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2020) 3 (collecting remand decisions in which defendants failed to account for mileage offset). 4 Defendant fails to meet its burden to show its calculations are appropriate. 5 B. Civil Penalties 6 Plaintiffs may be entitled to a civil penalty no greater than twice the amount of 7 actual damages only if Defendant’s violations were willful.

(c). 8 However, in the jurisdictional analysis, “[t]he civil penalty . . . cannot simply be 9 assumed”; instead, “the defendant must make some effort to justify the assumption.” 10 D’Amico,

, at *8 (internal quotation marks omitted) 11 (collecting cases). Courts do not include civil penalties in the jurisdictional analysis 12 “unless the removing defendant makes some showing regarding the possibility of civil 13 damages.” Savall v. FCA US LLC, No. 21cv195 JM (KSC),

81477, at *7–8 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2021) (collecting cases). 15 Defendant asserts that the Court should include the maximum civil penalty in 16 evaluating the amount in controversy given “Plaintiffs’ own detailed allegations 17 warranting a potential civil penalty.” (Def.’s Br. 12–15.) Defendant, not Plaintiffs, bears 18 the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. If Plaintiffs’ “boilerplate 19 allegations [concerning willfulness] were sufficient to defeat remand, then virtually any 20 [SBA] action . . . would remain in federal court.” See Savall,

81477, at *8. Defendant presents no evidence that a civil penalty is likely to be awarded 22 in this case, let alone evidence justifying the maximum penalty. See, e.g.,

(“Other 23 than referring to Plaintiff’s allegation that FCA acted willfully . . . , FCA provides no 24 support for the likelihood that a civil penalty based on its willfulness would actually be 25 awarded in this case, or that the full civil penalty would be awarded.”); Chajon v. Ford 26 Motor Co., No. 2:18-cv-10533-RGK (RAOx),

, at *3–4 27 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2019) (“As to civil penalties, while authorized under the Song-Beverly 28 Act, Defendants have not offered any evidence to support such an award.”). Defendant 1 has not established that the requested civil penalty is more likely than not in controversy. 2 Even if Defendant could support its argument for a civil penalty with evidence, 3 because Defendant fails to establish actual damages beyond speculation, the Court has 4 insufficient information to determine the proper measure of the civil penalty. See 5 Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 16-05852 BRO (PLAx),

153618, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2016) (“Defendant failed to establish the amount of 7 actual damages at issue, which is necessary to determine the total civil penalty.”); cf. 8 D’Amico,

, at *9 (“[T]here is no basis for concluding that 9 the amount payable under the lease even roughly approximates Plaintiff’s actual 10 damages. There is equally little basis for concluding that a civil penalty of double that 11 amount would be awarded.”). 12 C. Fees 13 “Section 1332(a)’s amount-in-controversy requirement excludes only ‘interest 14 and costs’ and therefore includes attorneys’ fees.” Guglielmino,

; Fritsch 15 v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC,

(9th Cir. 2018) (“[A] court must 16 include future attorneys’ fees recoverable by statute or contract when assessing whether 17 the amount-in-controversy requirement is met.”). 18 Defendant submits that “Plaintiffs’ attorneys in Song-Beverly cases tried or 19 prepared for trial regularly request more than $65,000 in fees.” (Notice of Removal 20 ¶ 31; accord Def.’s Br. 15–17.) Another court in this district rejected a strikingly similar 21 argument, and this Court finds its reasoning persuasive: 22 “Defendant argues . . . generally that plaintiff’s attorneys 23 regularly request more than $65,000 in [SBA] cases . . . . 24 [T]he Court is not persuaded that ‘more than $65,000’ is a 25 reasonable estimate of attorney fees in this case. Indeed, many 26 cases alleging violations of the Act settle early, and 27 Defendant provides no explanation for why this case is 28 similar to ones that went to trial. Nor does Defendant provide 1 an estimate of the hours that will be incurred or hourly rates 2 that would apply in this case. 3 D’Amico,

, at *10–11 (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 Irrespective of the fees commonly awarded or incurred in SBA cases, Defendant fails 5 to provide an explanation or evidence substantiating why this case will generate fees in 6 that amount. See, e.g., Schneider, 441 F. Supp. 3d at 914 (finding burden unmet where 7 “Defendants fail to provide the Court with specific evidence showing the attorneys’ fees 8 in this case are ‘more likely than not’” to bring the amount in controversy above the 9 jurisdictional threshold). Defendant fails to establish beyond speculation the measure 10 of attorney’s fees at issue in this case. 11 D. Summary 12 The amount in controversy is not clear from the face of the Complaint. Defendant 13 fails to present evidence establishing that the amount in controversy more likely than 14 not exceeds $75,000. Accordingly, Defendant has not shown the Court has subject- 15 matter jurisdiction over the case. Remand is appropriate.

(c). 16 IV. CONCLUSION 17 The case is remanded to the Los Angeles County Superior Court, No. 18 21STCV24116. The Court directs the Clerk to effect the remand and close the case. 19

20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21

22 Dated: December 1, 2021 ________________________________ 23 MARK C. SCARSI 24 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 27 28